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M AT H I J S  P E L K M A N S not, but also whether conditions are present for Islamist move-
ments to talk with (foreign) governments. In Uzbekistan for ex-
ample, the government practice of labelling every grass-root 
organization a terrorist organization has prevented any form 
of dialogue and has caused a general confusion of what ter-
rorism might actually be (Fumagalli, p.28); we may easily note 
parallels in other contexts. 
By stressing the different shades, tints, and nuances of an 
umbrella concept like Islamism we do not have the illusion 
that those who are dependent on black and white images 
will change their opinions. Labels are simply too important 
for fostering political agendas and the creation of a collective 
enemy. In his article, Devji shows how, in its self-declared War 
on Terror, the US government employs the label “terrorist” not 
only to boost its own legitimacy, but also to classify its adver-
saries as “criminal-like” and, on those grounds, deprive them 
of rights (p.30). In cases where the relation between labelling 
techniques and the reality unfolding on the ground becomes 
increasingly obscure, it is often insightful to shift from aca-
demic to artistic representations of reality. By portraying his 
dearest family members as “terrorists,” the artist Hassanzadeh 
effectively challenges the meaning of this label in an attempt 
to reclaim the right of self-representation (Shatanawi, p.54). 
Contributions to this ISIM Review ultimately demonstrate the 
importance of challenging dominant webs of signification as a 
means to maintaining our independence and as a reasonable 
prerequisite for critical analyses of the world we live in.
Turbaned princes, magic carpets, and other Oriental topoi 
thrive in computer and video games, apparently because stere-
otypes of the Orient translate easily into high sales (Reichmuth 
and Werner, p.46). While it may not be surprising that pashas 
and djinns appeal to Western tastes, it is harder to understand 
the utilization of equally archaic stereotypes by Pope Benedict 
XVI in his 12 September speech in Regensburg. In response to 
angry reactions to his speech, the Pope stressed that the hos-
tile views about Islam expressed by the Byzantine emperor he 
had cited did not coincide with his own, suggesting that he 
personally did not equate Islam with violence. Ironically, the 
written version of his speech, mentions violence only in rela-
tion to Islam, and Islam only in relation to violence. Further-
more, the topic of his lecture was not violence per se but the 
connection between Christian faith and reason. His reference 
to Islam was meant as an example of what can happen when 
reason is removed from faith. Violence and lack of reason are, 
of course, two key tropes in Orientalizing discourses. Employ-
ing those highly loaded tropes in a lecture that ostensibly aims 
to augment inter-religious dialogue is not only counterpro-
ductive but un-reasonable.
The incident underlines the need to be attentive to the la-
bels, categories, and concepts we employ in our speech and 
writing. We cannot communicate without terms, but their 
unreflective use may easily reinforce their stereotypic asso-
ciations preventing insight into their deeper significances. 
The main theme of this issue, “Shades of Islamism,” points at 
the need to reach beyond labels to see the various dimen-
sions of what we categorize “Islamism,” without discarding 
the term itself. In many media reports Islamists are per defini-
tion depicted as extremists and anti-modernists, and associ-
ated with violence and terrorism. By tracing the development 
of thought in the writings of important Islamist leaders, we 
cannot but recognize the modern qualities of their thinking, 
even while disagreeing with their conclusions (Ahmad, p.12; 
Reinbold, p.14). Likewise, when examining more closely the 
resentment expressed by most Muslims in the Middle East, 
it becomes apparent that radical Muslims do not necessarily 
reject democracy, liberty, or modernity, but rather the double 
standards of Western political projects and the debasement of 
moral values (Esposito, p.6). Often, it seems, it is not simply Is-
lamist ideology that is attracting growing support, but rather 
the way these ideologies are translated into social and political 
action (Meijer, p.16).
The societal relevance of such movements means that they 
cannot and should not be ignored in any attempt to promote 
democratization in the Middle East (Brusse and Schoonen-
boom, p.8). The political costs of entering the mainstream po-
litical arena have been conspicuous in the case of Hizbullah 
whose imprudent decision to kidnap Israeli soldiers seemed, 
at least partly, inspired by the wish to restore its authority as 
militant movement (Alagha, p.36). The retaliation that fol-
lowed demonstrated that we should not only think about 
whether states should engage in a dialogue with Islamists or 
The International Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World (ISIM) 
conducts and promotes interdisciplinary research on social, political, cultural, 
and intellectual trends and movements in contemporary Muslim societies and 
communities. ISIM was established in 1998 by the University of Amsterdam, 
Leiden University, Utrecht University, and Radboud University Nijmegen in 
response to a need for further research on contemporary developments of 
great social, political, and cultural importance in the Muslim world from social 
science and humanities perspectives. ISIM’s research approaches are expressly 
interdisciplinary and comparative, covering a large geographic range which 
includes North Africa, the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia, South 
and South East Asia, and Muslim communities in the West. Broad in scope, ISIM 
brings together all areas of disciplinary expertise in anthropology, sociology, 
religious studies, political science, and cultural studies.
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Conspiracies & Theories
ISIM
A S E F  B A Y AT  In the immediate aftermath of the Is-
raeli invasion of Lebanon on the four-
teenth of July many observers chal-
lenged the US-Israeli claim which justi-
fied the campaign as a response to Hiz-
bullah’s “kidnapping” of two Israeli sol-
diers two days earlier. First, Israel and 
Hizbullah had previously exchanged 
prisoners without going to war. On the 
other hand, a “normal” response to the 
kidnapping could not amount to such 
an immensely “disproportionate” scale 
(killing over 1800, wounding 4000, dis-
placing one million, and bombing civil-
ian infrastructures, homes, roads, bridges, power stations, and airports). 
And finally, countries do not simply augment wars in two days; waging 
war with clear aims requires careful planning and preparation. In other 
words (as Seymour Hersh documented in the New Yorker, 21 August 
2006) the Israeli government had planned with close involvement of 
the US the invasion far in advance in order to destroy Hizbullah and its 
military capabilities. This would remove a threat to Israel, and preempt 
retaliation by Iran through Hizbullah in the event that the US moves to 
attack Iran’s nuclear installations. Israel needed only a pretext, which 
Hizbullah provided by kidnapping the two soldiers.
The problem of conspiracism
The establishment circles often discredit and stifle such counter-narra-
tives by charging their authors with weaving “conspiracy theories.” How 
plausible are such charges? Not much. As a pejorative term, “conspiracy 
theory” or “conspiracism” originally referred to the work of historians who 
viewed most historical events and trends as the product of hidden de-
sign by those in power. To a large extent, grand happenings and sweep-
ing trends, rather than individual and less significant incidents, were tra-
ditionally the subject of conspiracy theory. In the current popular usage, 
however, the term is extended to include the narrative genre which as-
sumes behind many major or minor, social or political adverse events 
a concerted, secret, and unlawful plan by powerful people and institu-
tions. Whatever the connotation, the prevalence of conspiracism in any 
intellectual tradition and political culture represents a serious drawback, 
for not only is it built upon epistemological flaws, also because it follows 
grave social and political implications. As such it is the antipode of criti-
cal inquiry and agency; it denigrates probing, breeds cynicism, and justi-
fies passivity. Conspiratorial mindset fails to acknowledge that intended 
plots may be subverted, modified, or resisted by opposition, unforeseen 
factors, mistakes, or accidents. Moreover, it gives little credence to struc-
tural dynamics in forming a decision or shaping an event.
The Middle East is often said to harbour pervasive conspiratorial out-
look, where many attribute almost any unfavourable political act to for-
eign or domestic intrigues. An Islamist member of Egyptian Parliament, 
for instance, would go so far as to claim in 2002 that the sanitary towels 
the Ministry of Education provided for girls in schools were funded by a 
U.S.-Jewish company and could make Egyptian girls “infertile.” Or there 
are those Iranians who continue to believe that the Islamic revolution 
of 1979 was a British design to oust the Shah, to eradicate the US influ-
ence in Iran, and to install British-friendly clerics. Authoritarian regimes 
particularly find in their real or pretended paranoia a pretext to quell 
opposition groups and impose surveillance. The power elites invari-
ably charge genuine democracy advocates with collaboration with an 
overblown “western enemy” to undermine “national interests” and “tra-
ditional values.”
Some observers associate the source of conspiracist attitudes in the 
Middle East to such factors as the Islamic doctrine, historical decline of 
Muslims as a political and economic force, and authoritarian regimes 
dominating the region. Thus, predestination and fatalism in Islam are 
said to render Muslims to imagine hidden design behind every unex-
plainable occurrence. Additionally, the historic decline of Muslims and 
their humiliation at the hands of the colonial west and later Israel seems 
to have entrapped them into a conspir-
atorial obsession. Some even suggest 
that belief in martyrdom encourages 
Muslims to externalize their misfortune 
to which conspiracy theory becomes an 
outlet. Against this background, author-
itarian states and suppression of free ex-
pression would further bolster opinions 
which are informed by rumours and ex-
aggeration.
Real conspiracies
Whereas authoritarianism plays a sub-
stantial role in developing conspirato-
rial attitudes, fatalism as a cataclysm for conspiracism is problematic 
since free will and rationalism also figure prominently in Muslim intel-
lectual tradition. In addition, why should Middle Eastern Muslims in 
particular be susceptible to conspiratorial thinking, and not, say, those 
in Asia? The fact is that, and this is what many anti-conspiracist critics 
largely ignore, besides wild conspiratorial imaginations and paranoia 
occur also pervasive real conspiracies, which in turn may reinforce a 
mindset that is weary of the unknown, suspicious of strangers, and 
cynical of the powerful, and which promotes exaggerated fear among 
those who have little means, knowledge, and avenues to verify what 
they hear or to challenge what they doubt. Modern history of the Mid-
dle East is replete with colonial intrigues, divide-and-rule strategies, 
coups d’état, and recently, preparations for regime change. Indeed, it is 
the trade of secret services, such as CIA, KGB, or Israel’s Mossad, to en-
gage in plotting and implementing covert operations. In 1953, the CIA 
engineered a coup, which removed Iranian Prime Minister Muhammad 
Mosaddeq and reinstated the Shah, ending a unique democratic ex-
perience in twentieth century Iran. Mossad has engaged in numerous 
covert activities through its undercover agents in the Arab world. In-
credibly, in the 1960s, Mossad’s agent, Eli Cohen, infiltrated the highest 
ranks of the Baathist regime in Syria, reaching close to even the head 
of Syrian intelligence. Spielberg’s film Munich dramatizes some of these 
covert operations. The occupation of Iraq in search for its non-existent 
weapons of mass destruction and the July war against Lebanon consti-
tute a few of the latest episodes in this chain of intrigues.
While it is crucial to do away with any kind of conspiracist fantasies, 
one should also resist those who in the name of “conspiracy theory” 
discard or dampen critical inquiry into the possibility of real conspira-
cies. There exist fundamental differences between a “conspiracy the-
ory” and critical inquiry. Whereas conspiracism assumes habitually or 
in principle that all or most adverse happenings are plotted secretly, 
critical inquiry does not rule out the possibility of the conspiratorial 
origins of some events. Contrary to conspiracism which takes its narra-
tives for granted—narratives which often lack logical consistency and 
transcend common sense—critical inquiry begins by making critical 
observations, discovers inconsistencies, explores reasons, and devel-
ops a proposition to guide further examination. In a sense, critical in-
quiry aims at what the journalist Amira Hass believes to be the respon-
sibility of genuine journalism: “to monitor the centres of power”. Both 
the conspiracy theory and establishment narratives denigrate critical 
inquiry—the former defies serious investigation because it is sure of 
its presumptions while the latter silences critiques under the guise of 
anti-conspiracism. Conspiracy theory is as detrimental to truth as the 
cover-up of real conspiracies to justice. 
Currently, many people seem to be preoccupied 
with creating or discussing conspiracy 
theories. At the same time, others discredit 
unwelcome inquiries into hidden political 
agendas by labelling the resulting ideas 
“conspiracy theories.” In such an environment, 
the distinction between fantasy and critical 
thought tends to become blurred. Only by 
acknowledging that real conspiracies exist, and 
by refuting ideas that cannot be empirically 
staved, will we be able to analyse political 
situations in a manner that is neither politically 
naïve nor the product of a conspiracist mindset.
Asef Bayat is Academic Director of ISIM and holds the ISIM Chair at Leiden University.
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Shades of Islamism
Islamists and US 
Foreign Policy
J O H N  L .  E S P O S I T O As Islamist parties continue to rise in 
prominence across the globe, policy-
makers must learn to make distinc-
tions and adopt differentiated policy 
approaches. This requires a deeper 
understanding of what motivates and 
informs Islamist parties and the sup-
port they receive, including the ways in 
which some US policies feed the more 
radical and extreme Islamist move-
ments while weakening the appeal of 
the moderate organizations to Mus-
lim populations. It also requires the 
political will to adopt approaches of 
engagement and dialogue. This is es-
pecially important where the roots of 
political Islam go deeper than simple 
anti-Americanism and where political Islam is manifested in non-vio-
lent and democratic ways. The stunning electoral victories of Hamas in 
Palestine and the Shia in Iraq, the Muslim Brotherhood’s emergence as 
the leading parliamentary opposition in Egypt, and Israel’s war against 
Hamas and Hizbullah go to the heart of issues of democracy, terrorism, 
and peace in the Middle East.
Global terrorism has also become the excuse for many Muslim auto-
cratic rulers and Western policymakers to backslide or retreat from de-
mocratization. They warn that the promotion of a democratic process 
runs the risk of furthering Islamist inroads into centres of power and is 
counterproductive to Western interests, encouraging a more virulent 
anti-Westernism and increased instability. Thus, for example, despite 
Hamas’ victory in free and democratic elections, the United States and 
Europe failed to give the party full recognition and support. 
In relations between the West and the Muslim world, phrases, like a 
clash of civilizations or a clash of cultures, recur, as does the charge that 
Islam is incompatible with democracy, or that it is a particularly militant 
religion. But is the primary issue religion and culture, or is it politics? Is 
the primary cause of radicalism and anti-Westernism, especially anti-
Americanism, extremist theology, or simply the policies of many Mus-
lim and Western governments? 
A new Gallup World Study overwhelmingly suggests the latter. The 
poll enables us to get beyond conflicting analyses of experts and selec-
tive voices from the “Arab street.” It lets us listen to one billion Muslims 
from Morocco to Indonesia. And they tell us that US policies, not val-
ues, are behind the ire of the Arab/Muslim world.2
Political Islam: ballots or bullets?
History demonstrates that political Islam is both extremist and main-
stream. On the one hand, Ayatollah Khomeini’s Iran, the Taliban’s Af-
ghanistan, and Osama Bin Laden and al-Qaeda as well as terrorists from 
Morocco to Indonesia have espoused a revolutionary Islam that relies on 
violence and terror. On the other, many Islamist social and political move-
ments across the Muslim world have worked within the political system.
Since the late twentieth century Islamically oriented candidates and 
political parties in Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt, Lebanon, Turkey, 
Jordan, Kuwait, Bahrain, Pakistan, Malaysia, and Indonesia have opted 
for ballots, not bullets. They have successfully contested and won mu-
nicipal and parliamentary seats, held cabinet positions, and served in 
senior positions such as prime minister of Turkey and Iraq and presi-
dent of Indonesia.
Elections since late 2001 in Pakistan, Turkey, Bahrain, and Morocco 
as well as in Palestine, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt have rein-
forced the continued saliency of Islam in Muslim politics in the twenty 
first century. The more contentious aspect of political Islam has been 
the extent to which militant groups like 
Hizbullah and Hamas have turned to the 
ballot box. Hizbullah transformed itself 
into a Lebanese political party that has 
proven effective in parliamentary elec-
tions. At the same time, it remained a 
militia, fighting and eventually forcing 
Israeli withdrawal in 2000 from its 18-
year occupation of southern Lebanon. 
Hamas defeated the PLO in democratic 
elections.
In responding to mainstream and 
extremist political Islam, policymakers 
require a better understanding of how 
global Muslim majorities see the world 
and, in particular, how they regard the 
United States. The question “Why do 
they hate us?” raised in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 looms large 
following continued terrorist attacks and the dramatic growth of anti-
Americanism. A common answer provided by some politicians and ex-
perts has been, “They hate our way of life, our freedom, democracy, 
and success.” Considering the broad based anti-Americanism, not only 
among extremists but also among a significant mainstream majority in 
the Muslim world (and indeed in many other parts of the world), this 
answer is not satisfactory. Although the Muslim world expresses many 
common grievances, do extremists and moderates differ in attitudes 
about the West?
Focusing on the attitudes of those with radical views and compar-
ing them with the moderate majority results in surprising findings. 
When asked what they admired most about the West, both extremists 
and moderates had the identical top three spontaneous responses: (1) 
technology; (2) the West’s value system, hard work, self-responsibility, 
rule of law, and cooperation; and (3) its fair political systems, democra-
cy, respect for human rights, freedom of speech, and gender equality. A 
significantly higher percent of potential extremists than moderates (50 
percent versus 35 percent) believe that “moving towards greater gov-
ernmental democracy” will foster progress in the Arab/Muslim world. 
Potential extremists believe even more strongly than moderates (58 
percent versus 45 percent) that Arab/Muslim nations are eager to have 
better relations with the West. Finally, no significant difference exists 
between the percentage of potential extremists and moderates who 
said “better relations with the West concerns me a lot.”
While many believe anti-Americanism is tied to a basic hatred of the 
West and deep West-East religious and cultural differences, the data 
above contradicts these views. In addition, Muslim assessments of indi-
vidual Western countries demonstrate that Muslim views do not paint 
all Western countries with the same brush. Unfavourable opinions of 
the United States or the United Kingdom do not preclude favourable 
attitudes towards other Western countries like France or Germany. Data 
shows that while moderates have very unfavourable opinions of the 
United States (42 percent) and Great Britain (34 percent), unfavourable 
opinions of France (15 percent) and Germany (13 percent) were far less 
and in fact comparable to the percent of Muslims who viewed Pakistan 
or Turkey unfavourably (both at 12 percent).
Democratic exceptionalism? 
What creates unfavourable attitudes towards the United States? One 
crucial factor is what is perceived as the United States’ “double stand-
ard” in promoting democracy. Key factors of this perception include a 
long track record of supporting authoritarian regimes in the Arab and 
Muslim world while not promoting democracy there as it did elsewhere 
after the fall of the Soviet Union. Then, when weapons of mass destruc-
US foreign policy and political Islam today are 
deeply intertwined. Policymakers, particularly 
since 9/11, have demonstrated an inability and/
or unwillingness to distinguish between radical 
and moderate Islamists. They have largely 
treated political Islam as a global threat similar 
to the way that Communism was perceived. 
However, even in the case of Communism, 
foreign policymakers eventually moved from 
an ill-informed, broad-brush, and paranoid 
approach personified by Senator Joseph 
McCarthy in the 1950s to more nuanced and 
pragmatic policies that led to the establishment 
of relations with China in the 1970s, even as 
tensions remained between the United States 
and the Soviet Union.1
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tion were not to be found in Iraq, the Bush administration boldly de-
clared that the US-led invasion and the toppling of Saddam Hussein 
were intended to bring democracy to Iraq as part of a broader policy 
of promoting democracy in the Middle East. In a major policy address, 
Ambassador Richard Haass, a senior State Department official in the 
George W. Bush administration, acknowledged that both Democratic 
and Republican administrations had practised what he termed “Demo-
cratic Exceptionalism” in the Muslim world: subordinating democracy 
to other US interests such as accessing oil, containing the Soviet Union, 
and grappling with the Arab-Israeli conflict.
While the spread of democracy has been the stated goal of the United 
States, majorities in every nation surveyed by Gallup do not believe that 
the United States was serious about the establishment of democratic 
systems in the region. For example, only 24 percent in Egypt and Jordan 
and only 16 percent in Turkey agree that the United States was serious 
about establishing democratic systems. The largest groups in agreement 
are in Lebanon and Indonesia at 38 percent; but even there, 58 percent of 
Lebanese and 52 percent of Indonesians disagree with the statement.
Yet, while saying that the United States is not serious about self-de-
termination and democracy in the Muslim world, many respondents 
say the thing they admire most about the West is political liberty and 
freedom of speech. Large percentages also associate a fair judicial sys-
tem and “citizens enjoying many liberties” with Western societies while 
critiquing their own societies. Lack of political freedom was what they 
admired least about the Islamic/Arab world.
The United States after Gaza and Lebanon
Muslim perceptions of the US role and response to the Israeli wars 
in Gaza and Lebanon must also be seen within the broad context of 
the Arab and Muslim world. From North Africa to Southeast Asia, the 
Gallup World Poll indicates an overwhelming majority of people (91-95 
percent), do not believe that the United States is trustworthy, friendly, 
or treats other countries respectfully, nor that it cares about human 
rights in other countries (80 percent). Outside of Iraq, over 90 percent 
of Muslims agreed that the invasion of Iraq has done more harm than 
good. The Bush administration recognized that the war on global ter-
rorism has come to be equated in the minds of many Muslims (and oth-
ers) with a war against Islam and the Muslim world and reemphasized 
the importance of public diplomacy. The administration appointed a 
senior Bush confidante, Karen Hughes, as Under Secretary for Public 
Diplomacy, and spoke of a war of ideas. However, public diplomacy 
is more than public relations. It is about acting consistently with the 
words one speaks.
The US administration’s responses in Gaza and in Lebanon undercut 
both the president’s credibility and the war on terrorism. America’s un-
conditional support of Israel cast it in the eyes of many as a partner, 
not simply in military action against Hamas or Hizbullah militants, but 
in a war against the democratically elected Palestinian government in 
Gaza and the government of Lebanon, a long-time US ally. The primary 
victims in Gaza and Lebanon were hundreds of thousands of innocent 
civilians, not terrorists. In Lebanon, more than 500 were killed, 2,000 
wounded, and 800,000 displaced. Israeli’s military destroyed the civil-
ian infrastructures of both Gaza and Lebanon. International organiza-
tions like the United Nations, Amnesty International, and Human Rights 
Watch have criticized Israel for violating international law. Amnesty and 
Human Rights Watch has specifically cited the “use of collective punish-
ment and war crimes.” The regional blowback from the approach that 
the United States has taken will be enormous and enduring.
The Bush administration’s promotion of democracy and the Middle 
East Peace Process are in critical condition. The United States remains 
mired in Iraq and Afghanistan with no clear “success” stories in sight. 
The situation has been compounded by the US and European failure 
to respect the democratic choice of Palestinians, whatever its reserva-
tions, done little to ease the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, and then their 
passive and active compliance with Israel’s wars in Gaza and Lebanon. 
Hamas and Hizbullah have become symbols of resistance, enjoying a 
level of support that would have been unimagined in the past through-
out much of the Muslim world. European countries have enjoyed a great 
deal of credibility in the Middle East. However, if this trend continues, 
Europe's ability to positively affect developments in the Middle East 
will be eroded. Many US and European allies in the Arab/Muslim world 
increasingly use the threat of extreme Islamists and the war against 
terrorism as excuses for increased authoritarianism and repression, 
trading their support for United States backing down on its democratic 
agenda. The unintended consequences of uncritical US and European 
support for Israel’s extended war have played right into the hands of 
the Bin Ladens of the world. 
A critical challenge today is to distinguish between mainstream and 
extremists groups and to work with democratically elected Islamists. US 
administrations and many European governments have often said that 
they distinguish between mainstream and extremist groups. However, 
more often that not, they have looked the other way when autocratic 
rulers in Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, and elsewhere have intimidated and 
suppressed mainstream Islamist groups or attempted to reverse their 
successes in elections in the past several decades. The challenge has 
been particularly complex in connection to resistance movements like 
Hamas and Hizbullah. Both are elected political parties with a popular 
base. At the same time, they are resistance movements whose militias 
have fought Israeli occupation and whom Israel, the United States, and 
Europe have labelled as terrorist organizations. There are established 
precedents for dealing with such groups, such as the ANC in South Af-
rica and Sinn Fein, the political wing of the IRA in Ireland, groups with 
which we've had to come to terms. The United States and Europe need 
to deal with the democratically elected officials, while also strongly 
condemn any acts of terrorism by their militias. European countries like 
France, Germany, and Norway have both a long presence and credibil-
ity in the Middle East, are not associated as are the U.S. and Britain with 
the Iraq invasion and occupation, and seen as more independent in 
their relations with the Bush administration. This enables them to play 
an important and constructive role. Diplomacy, economic incentives, 
and sanctions should be emphasized, with military action taken only 
as a last resort. However, overuse of economic sanctions by the Clinton 
and Bush administrations has reduced US negoti-
ating leverage with countries like Iran and Sudan. 
Equally difficult, the United States and Europe, 
while affirming their support for Israel’s existence 
and security, must clearly demonstrate that this 
support has clear limits. They must be prepared 
to condemn Israel’s disproportionate use of force, 
collective punishment, and other violations of 
international law. Finally, most fundamental and 
important is the recognition that widespread 
anti-Americanism among mainstream Muslims 
and Islamists results from what the United States 
in particular does—its policies and actions—not 
its way of life, culture, or religion.
Notes
1. This article is based on “It’s the Policy, 
Stupid: Political Islam and US Foreign  
Policy,” Harvard International Review,  
http://hir.harvard.edu/articles/1453/.
2. The Gallup Organization, in association with 
Gallup Senior Scientist John L. Esposito, is 
producing a large, in-depth study of Muslim 
opinion. The preliminary findings of the 
Gallup study reflect the voices and opinions 
of 800 million Muslims from Morocco to 
Indonesia. Samples include at least 1,000 
adults surveyed in each of the poll’s  
10-targeted preliminary countries. 
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Islamic Activism and 
Democratization
Ever since the rise of Islamic activism 
in the 1970s and ‘80s, regimes in the 
Middle East and their political support-
ers in the West have been reluctant to 
allow Islamic political movements full 
and equal participation in national 
elections and parliaments. Their argu-
ment has been that once such move-
ments receive access to the political 
arena and assume power, they would 
quickly end democratic competition al-
together. In view of the absolute claims 
of many early Islamic activists, this fear 
of “one man, one vote, one time” was quite understandable. After all, 
these activists rejected principles of democracy and human rights as 
contradictory to the absolute sovereignty of God and to Sharia. They 
wanted the Islamization of society and the crea-
tion of an Islamic state based on their own, lit-
eral interpretations of the rules laid down in the 
Quran and Sunna, including the cruel hadd penal-
ties. It is mainly their ideology that has inspired 
the widespread notion of a “clash of civilizations” 
between the West and Islam. 
Islamic activism has proved to be neither static 
nor monolithic, however. Today’s movements are 
usually very different from those of the 1970s 
and 1980s. Many former, revolutionary leaders 
have taken on more constructive roles within so-
ciety and politics. Instead of striving to replace 
the (secular) national state, violently if necessary, 
with an (Ummah-wide) Islamic state, they now 
fight authoritarian rule through participation in 
the existing political system. Some have taken on 
board the ideas of Islamic reform thinkers who try 
to connect Islam with democracy by using Islamic 
concepts such as shura (consultation). Others 
see democracy as a valuable product of human 
reason that favourably relates to the intentions 
of the Quran. Others do not even look for a solid 
theological or ideological foundation for reconcil-
ing Islam and democracy. What all three groups 
share is the willingness to adapt themselves to ex-
isting political rules. They formulate political pro-
grammes, join coalitions, and distance themselves 
from the absolute truths and undefined forms of 
“opposition Islam” that appeal to dogmatic radi-
cals and extremists. The younger generation, in 
particular, often draws on Islamic grassroots networks to gain support 
among ordinary citizens. They have become familiar with the role of 
democratic principles and human rights in the fight against state op-
pression, arbitrariness, lawlessness, and social marginalization. 
Islamic activism in Egypt
The Jamaa al-Islamiyya in Egypt offers an example of such a transfor-
mation of Islamic activism. After violent confrontations with the gov-
ernment during the 1990s, which peaked with the Luxor bombing in 
1997, the Jamaa leadership decided to renounce violence. This led to 
a secret agreement with the government in 2002 and a historic public 
explanation from the imprisoned Jamaa leaders about their change of 
course. The Egyptian authorities even allowed them to travel around 
various prisons to persuade their followers. The leaders also pub-
lished four books in which they gave an underpinning, on the basis 
of the Quran and Sunna, for the thesis 
that armed Islamic struggle is not le-
gitimate. Furthermore, they distanced 
themselves from the Jamaa doctrine 
and practices of the 1970s and 1980s, 
including the strict interpretation of 
the sovereignty of God provided by 
Islamic thinkers such as Mawdudi and 
Qutb. To avoid any misunderstanding 
that this indeed represented a new, of-
ficial position of the Jamaa, the books 
included the names of their authors, 
sympathizers, as well as all the Jamaa 
founders and historic leaders. Some of them revealed in interviews 
that their process of reconsideration had begun in 1982 but had been 
eclipsed by the escalation of violence and radical splintering during 
confrontations with the Egyptian regime. 
Despite this moderation, the regime continued its predominantly 
repressive approach towards Islamic movements. This treatment in-
cluded the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, which has always been more 
conciliatory towards the regime than the Jamaa. In the full glare of the 
state-controlled media, prominent Brotherhood leaders have been 
charged with membership of a religious—and therefore illegal—or-
ganization and with undermining state security. Through the imposi-
tion of prison sentences they were removed from the political arena 
and many other activists were frightened off. Initially, the Brotherhood 
ended up further on the political sideline and experienced a crisis. 
Younger generations accused their leadership of being ideologically 
rigid, autocratic, and insufficiently open to constructive debate and 
coalitions with other parties. In 1996 several prominent critics decided 
to form a new party called al-Wasat (Centre). This party, whose found-
ers included women and Copts, was initially considered by the regime 
as a clone of, and front for the Brotherhood. A principal founder, Abu-
l-Ila Madi, two party sponsors, and thirteen leaders of the Brotherhood 
were arrested and accused of membership of an illegal organization 
and conducting political activities without authorization. Ultimately, 
eight Muslim Brothers were sentenced to prison terms.
Unlike the Brotherhood, al-Wasat labels itself a political party that is 
not linked to Islamic faith but to “Islamic culture” on the basis of citi-
zenship. With this concept the party stresses to seek a society in which 
Muslims and Christians have an equal place as citizens. They distance 
themselves from the Islamization policy of the Brotherhood and, fol-
lowing the example of modern, formally recognized, religiously orient-
ed parties in Turkey, Jordan, Yemen, and Malaysia, are trying to become 
a broad party with a democratic, and reform-minded direction that is 
willing to form alliances. Because of this stance, the Party (now officially 
called Hizb al-Wasat al-Gedid, the New Centre Party) has received sup-
port from several prominent secular opposition leaders.1 Meanwhile, 
the Brotherhood has learned from its competitor and has made a politi-
cal comeback. During the November 2005 parliamentary elections, its 
politicians presented themselves as “independent” candidates in 150 
of the 444 districts, and eventually won in 88 districts. Although still 
formally banned, they are now the largest opposition group in parlia-
ment. 
The need for constructive European engagement
Unlike what many “clash thinkers” and authoritarian regimes impute, 
Islamic politics do not constitute a homogeneous, immutably funda-
mentalist, and/or violent threat. It is true that threats do arise from ji-
hadist groups. However, while their ideology and actions have caused 
widespread damage and fear, they are not representative of the po-
litical developments in the Middle East. Nor is the evolutionary path 
Islamic activist movements and parties have 
become crucial political players throughout the 
Muslim world. In a recent policy advice to the 
Dutch government, the Netherlands’ Scientific 
Council for Government Policy argues that 
the EU should recognize Islamic activism as a 
potentially constructive force for promoting 
democracy. The EU should use its renewed 
Euro-Mediterranean policy for the Middle East 
to support the participation within the political 
system of all constructive political parties, 
including Islamic parties.1
The European 
Commission now 
stresses that Europe 
should be open to 
ties with all the 
relevant democratic 
actors, including 
Islamic political 
movements and 
parties.
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of Islamic activism in Egypt so unique. Many other Islamic 
movements and parties have undergone similar endog-
enous reform processes. This can be observed in Jordan, 
Morocco, Kuwait, and Yemen, where Islamic parties can now 
take part in politics under certain conditions. Consequently, 
non-religious parties have taken more heed of the voters’ 
wishes to see political programmes reflect religious values. 
The result is increasing competition for the large group of 
voters in the middle of the political spectrum, which leads 
to further moderation and readiness to compromise. The 
political agenda and behaviour of these Islamic parties also 
serve as examples for movements in neighbouring countries 
and other regions. Even in Egypt and Tunisia, where religious 
political parties and movements still have no access to the 
political arena, the success of Turkey’s religiously inspired 
AKP serves as a source of inspiration for pragmatism and 
the gradual appropriation of democratic and human rights 
concepts. 
The current turmoil in the Middle East should not block 
our view of such promising developments. The member 
states of the EU, who have Muslim states as their immedi-
ate neighbours and many Muslims among their own popu-
lations, cannot remain aloof. Relations with and within the 
Middle East have become a crucial influence on their international as 
well as their domestic internal stability. An inward-looking EU, which 
renounces external ambitions, only creates an illusion of security that 
does not remove existing vulnerabilities. Moreover, aloofness would 
mean ignoring opportunities to support promising developments 
within the region. At the same time, recent history shows that democ-
racy cannot permanently be imposed from outside. It needs to emerge 
primarily from within. 
Euro-Mediterranean policy and European 
neighbourhood policy
The EU can and should use its “soft power” to stimulate endogenous 
steps towards democratization. In the past, the EU’s advocacy of de-
mocratization in the Middle East was directed towards secular move-
ments and parties, even though these had little political legitimacy 
among the local population. Its so-called Euro-Mediterranean Policy 
(EMP) was even designed to curtail the popularity and influence of Is-
lamic activist movements. Created in the wake of the Oslo Peace agree-
ments (1993), its charter originally intended to settle the peace rela-
tions between the Arab world, Israel, and the EU. With the rise of the 
FIS and the civil war in Algeria fresh in memory, however, the framers 
of the so-called Barcelona declaration on the EMP (1995) associated 
Islamic activism chiefly with fundamentalist, violent movements that 
would seriously undermine stability in the region. Scenario’s of “one-off 
elections” dominated their risk analyses. 
In its original form, the EMP rested on the assumption that mutu-
ally improved market access in combination with foreign direct in-
vestments, and multilateral trade liberalization could set in motion a 
process of economic growth that would lead to a strengthening of the 
rule of law and democratization. Political reforms would be stimulated 
best by supporting secular opposition groups, Western-oriented NGOs, 
and so-called civil society organizations. Ideally these would gradually 
develop into countervailing powers that could extract democratic con-
cessions from the incumbent regimes. So far, however, these groups 
have played only a marginal role in politics and society. By clever com-
binations of repression, patronage, and co-optation, they have been 
sidelined or “bought off.” Many “official” NGOs, such as community 
service organizations, unions, and chambers of commerce now have 
close economic and personal ties with policy-makers whom they do 
not wish to jeopardize. Yet, the Islamic-inspired political movements, 
parties and organizations that do manage to mobilize the masses of 
ordinary citizens (including also women), have thus far not been in-
volved in the EMP. 
Despite its low public profile and very modest record over the first 
ten years, the EMP can potentially support democratization. Now, there 
exists within the European Commission and among the member states 
support for a renewed EMP that introduces a firm link to the bilateral 
policy of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). This latter policy 
instrument can introduce a more forceful linkage between political 
reform efforts by individual countries and positive incentives such as 
improved access to the internal EU market, financial aid, and loans. In 
this manner, a better balance can be achieved between the multilateral 
co-operation of the EMP and the individual reform trajectories of the 
ENP. The range, emphases, and tempo of the reforms no longer need to 
depend on the least enthusiastic reformers among the Middle Eastern 
partner countries. 
In a remarkable change of course, the new EMP has abandoned the 
premise that secular forces in the region are natural allies in the bat-
tle against Islamic activism and that NGOs outside the political arena 
always provide the most important impulses for democratization. The 
European Commission now stresses that Europe should be open to 
ties with all the relevant democratic actors, including Islamic political 
movements and parties. This change forms an important opening for 
constructive engagement with Islamic activism. What remains unclear, 
however, is the extent of support for its position among EU member 
states. Recent calls by the Commission for defining a standpoint on 
democratic Islamic parties has found little resonance on the ministerial 
level. “Islam” has become a very sensitive issue in most member states 
and politicians are clearly reluctant to be seen to endorse the Commis-
sion’s views. 
Muddling through?
While violent confrontations are now increasingly being framed as 
clashes between the West and Islam, it is no longer possible to main-
tain the status quo by muddling through. Also in its own interest the EU 
should step up efforts to stimulate endogenous democratization in the 
region. It should explicitly recognize Islamic political and social groups 
as potentially legitimate and credible partners for constructive engage-
ment. This recognition must not only penetrate the bureaucratic cir-
cuits of “Brussels.” EU governments should explicitly endorse this new 
policy and explain this to their own populations. In the current polar-
ized climate they will thus send the signal to people in the Middle East 
and to their own (Muslim) populations at home that all constructive 
political activists, including religiously inspired groups, will be taken 
seriously as potential allies in the pursuit of political participation, de-
mocratization, and improvement of human rights. Accordingly, the EU 
may regain some credibility regarding its own commitments to these 
values.
Wendy Asbeek Brusse is Researcher at the Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy. 
Email: asbeek@wrr.nl
Jan Schoonenboom is Member of the Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy.
Email: jan.schoonenboom@hetnet.nl
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1. Scientific Council for Government Policy, 
Dynamism in Islamic Activism: Reference 
Points for Democratization and Human Rights 
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Throughout the Middle East, actors 
across the political spectrum cooper-
ate in ways that were unprecedented 
before the democratic openings of the 
early 1990s. Even though few of these 
openings have advanced toward de-
mocracy, groups that had never previ-
ously worked together—indeed, some 
with long histories as rivals—now 
routinely cooperate in a wide range of 
political activities. In addition to parlia-
mentary opposition blocs, cooperation 
has emerged within professional asso-
ciations, in the organization of protest activities, and within special bod-
ies convened to debate constitutional amendments or draft national 
charters. Perhaps most strikingly, many Islamist groups now routinely 
cooperate with a range of leftists, including liberals, communists, and 
socialists. Repressive regimes remain the primary obstacle to demo-
cratic reform in the Arab world, but even strategic and limited openings 
have led to new forms of political contestation. Do these new practices 
hold long-term consequences for democratization in the region? 
In order to address this question, we organized two conferences to ex-
plore Islamist-leftist cooperation in the Middle East.1 Applying a typolo-
gy of three forms of cooperation—tactical, strategic, and ideational—to 
three prominent cases of cross-ideological cooperation in the Middle 
East, we find a high degree of low-level cooperation 
and increased mid-level cooperation, but less evi-
dence that high-level cooperation will emerge soon.
Levels of cooperation
The lowest level of cooperation is purely tactical: 
when groups engage in joint activities on an issue-
by-issue and short-term basis. Cooperation might 
be repeated in the future, but only when actors 
embrace a common narrative—such as support for 
Palestinians—that entails few political costs. Tactical 
cooperation does not require (even if it sometimes 
facilitates) that groups seek to justify their coopera-
tion in terms of their core ideological commitments. 
Mid-level cooperation is more strategic and en-
gagement is sustained and encompassing of multiple issues. Coopera-
tion may be initiated around a particular set of aims but expanded as 
new issues arise. At the same time, strategic cooperation may be pos-
sible only with the understanding that certain issues are off the table: 
groups share a commitment to working together in a sustained man-
ner, but not to forging a shared political vision or ideology. 
High-level cooperation is when groups remain distinct entities but 
strive to develop a collective vision for political, social, and economic 
reform. Participants are open to exploring any issue that might arise, 
and ideological positions are decided through substantive debate 
about core ideological commitments. High-level cooperation also en-
compasses broader issues of identity, as participants claim a commit-
ment to a shared worldview as well as specific policies about how to 
realize that vision.
The cases of Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen illustrate increasing levels of 
Islamist cooperation within different political contexts, as well as the 
continuing obstacles to high-level cooperation.
Egypt
Egypt has a history of cooperation 
across ideological divides, but the par-
liamentary and presidential elections 
in 2005 brought massive cooperation 
across partisan, regional, and class 
lines calling for Mubarak’s removal 
and the adoption of a new constitu-
tion. Political demonstrations reflected 
themes so common that the ideologi-
cal commitments of specific organizers 
were often hard to discern in the midst 
of the events. However, though some 
instances of high-level cooperation may be emerging, cooperation 
between Egypt’s Islamists and leftists remains primarily tactical and 
strategic. 
Within the Muslim Brotherhood, the new generation pressed for a 
means through which their banned organization could access a greater 
political voice in parliament. In 1984, it forged a tactical electoral alliance 
between the Brotherhood and the right-of-centre Wafd Party, followed in 
1987 by one with the Labour Party that continues to today. These allianc-
es had a veneer of sustained cooperation, but they proved to be largely 
tactical. Indeed, the Brotherhood is accused of infiltrating—more than 
cooperating with—the Labour Party in order to Islamicize that group. 
When Mubarak closed the political system in the early 1990s in re-
sponse to the resurgence of violence by Islamic mili-
tants, leaders across the political spectrum jointly op-
posed the strict new electoral laws, the termination 
of local mayoral and university elections, and greater 
press censorship. As in other states, political opposi-
tion found new spaces in which to operate. The Broth-
erhood soon commanded the majority of seats in the 
boards of directors of numerous professional associa-
tions but also organized demonstrations around issues 
of broader political concern attracting activists of all 
political stripes.2
The latter half of the 1990s witnessed leftist civil so-
ciety organizations collaborating on a sporadic basis at 
the grassroots level. With the outbreak of the second 
Palestinian intifada in September 2000, this coopera-
tion drew in Islamic activists, as well as large segments of the general 
public. Demonstrations and rallies increased with the Iraq war, culmi-
nating in a massive demonstration in Cairo on 20 March 2003. This new 
mood of activism in Egypt has led to the creation of a network of joint 
initiatives, raising the question whether the Brotherhood is moving to-
ward more consistently strategic cooperation. This upsurge in joint activ-
ism includes the Anti-Globalization Egyptian Group, formed in 2002 and 
joined by Islamists in 2003, and the dissent movement known as Kifaya 
(Enough), the brainchild of seven friends with Islamist, Marxist, Nasserist, 
and liberal backgrounds. But participants avoid controversial topics for 
the sake of unity, and cooperation has not reached a high level.
The number and diversity of cross-ideological organizations, forums, 
and blocs represents a deep and growing frustration with Egypt’s status 
quo across the entire political spectrum.3 In 2005, the Wasat Party, Kifaya 
Party, the Karama Party (a break-away group from the Nasserists), and 
several nationalist opposition parties announced the formation of the 
National Front for Change, pledging to coordinate which parliamentary 
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candidates would run against NDP candidates in the fall contest. For its 
part, the Brotherhood’s participation in joint activities remains primarily 
at the low and middle levels, though the group does regularly reach out 
to other parties. It joined the National Front for Change in 2005 in spirit 
only, stating that it would not coordinate candidates or political slogans. 
Indeed, like many political actors, the Brotherhood attempts to play all 
sides by maintaining cooperative relations with the regime while also 
reaching out to opposition groups and candidates at other moments. 
Jordan
Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood has increasingly cooperated with left-
ists since the 1989 political opening that brought the resumption of 
national elections and the lifting of martial law the following year. 
Tactical cooperation first emerged in the course of political protests, 
notably the massive popular events against the Gulf War of 1990-91. 
By 1992, leaders from the new Islamic Action Front (IAF)—a political 
party dominated by Brotherhood members—were holding press con-
ferences alongside leftist leaders to protest changes to the elections 
law. When a new electoral law produced losses in the 1993 parliamen-
tary elections for Islamist and leftist parties alike, they began to hold 
irregular meetings of an informal opposition bloc. 
By the signing of the Jordan peace treaty with Israel in late 1994, 
Jordan saw a precipitous decline in political freedoms as the regime 
sought to silence widespread opposition to the treaty. Ironically, the 
closing of the political system led diverse political actors to cooperate 
more frequently on a wider range of activities. These engagements re-
mained largely tactical in character and were organized around broad 
issues such as opposition to U.S. intervention in the Middle East. 
A more sustained form of cooperation among 13 parties emerged 
with the creation of the Higher Committee for the Coordination of Na-
tional Opposition Parties (HCCNOP) under the leadership of the IAF in 
1994 as an extra-parliamentary coalition.4 Over its twelve-year history, 
the group’s agenda has expanded beyond foreign policy to critique the 
regime’s authoritarian practices. Former IAF leader Abd al-Latif Arabiy-
yat has called the HCCNOP a democratic model for the Arab world.
Like Egypt, Jordan has also seen new alliances evolve into the forma-
tion of entirely new groups. The 2003 elections included candidates 
from Jordan’s own al-Wasat. Like its Egyptian namesake—the two have 
no formal relations—the new Party unites moderate Islamists with left-
ists intent on presenting a new vision of pluralist reform. The Party (while 
licensed) remains very small and holds only two seats in parliament.
Jordan’s Brotherhood and the IAF have been at the forefront of the 
trend toward cooperation in the kingdom. In addition to parliamentary 
blocs and various anti-normalization committees, Islamists have en-
gaged in less visible local cooperative activities. The overall trend has 
been an evolution from purely tactical cooperation to the normalization 
of sustained, strategic cooperation. Nevertheless, Islamists draw red 
lines around issues on which they refuse to cooperate or compromise, 
particularly issues concerning gender and the application of Islamic law. 
Relations between the parties are periodically strained as the IAF con-
tinues to seek its previously privileged relationship with the regime.
Yemen
In Yemen, the mainstream Islamist political party—the Yemeni Con-
gregation for Reform, or Islah (reform) party—is a coalition of moder-
ate and radical Islamists, conservative tribal leaders, and businessmen. 
Because it is characterized by deep divisions—for example, the Party 
formally accepts democracy as a legitimate form of government while 
one Party leader, the extremist Abd al-Majid al-Zindani, routinely re-
jects it—the sustainability of the Party’s cooperative endeavors has 
been uneven. Its factions share only a vision of conservative Islam as a 
necessary centerpiece to all spheres of life, with significant differences 
on what that would look like and how to achieve it. Indeed, Yemen il-
lustrates that individual personalities play a crucial role in forging co-
operation and the very real challenges of bringing together parties of 
different ideologies, strategies, and relations with the regime. 
Following Yemen’s 1990 unification, the new Islah Party was closely 
allied with the General Popular Conference (GPC). This alliance was 
easily forged around long and close relations between the regime and 
various factions within the Islah Party, with the latter playing a crucial 
role in helping to offset the potential gains of the Yemen Socialist Party 
(YSP) in the unified state’s first parliamentary elections in 1993. In the 
years between unification and that first electoral contest, some two 
hundred YSP members were targets of assassinations, many of which 
were carried out by Islamists connected to the more radical factions 
within the Islah Party. 
Yet a decade later, a prominent YSP leader was invited as an hon-
oured guest to address the biennial gathering of the Islah Party general 
membership. This dramatic turnaround—from a party bent on defeat-
ing the YSP to the exploration of limited cooperation—reflects less the 
shifting commitments of the Islah Party than the deterioration of its 
alliance with the GPC. With the defeat of the YSP in Yemen’s civil war 
in 1994, the logic of GPC-Islah cooperation was diminished: the GPC, 
which dominated the government, no longer needed the Islah Party to 
help offset the potential influence of the YSP.5 Within three years, the 
ministries held by Islah declined from nine to zero. 
In this context of near total domination of Yemeni politics by the GPC, 
the logic of sustained strategic cooperation between Islah and the 
other opposition parties became increasingly hard to ignore. In 2002, 
several moderate Islah leaders from the Brotherhood trend sought to 
forge an alliance with the YSP largely concerning the upcoming elec-
tions but with clear intentions that the alliance could continue. The 
deputy secretary-general of the YSP, Jar Allah Umar, addressed the Islah 
general conference in December 2002. As he exited the stage, he was 
fatally shot by a radical salafi seated in the second row, an area usually 
reserved for dignitaries.6 The Islah Party issued a statement condemn-
ing the act, although it remains unclear whether the assassin, Ali Jar 
Allah, was a member of Islah.
Nevertheless, the Islah party, the YSP, and four smaller parties formed 
the tactical Joint Meeting Group in preparation for the 2003 elections. 
Islah promised to withhold from running candidates in 30 districts 
where the YSP’s prospects were better, and the YSP agreed not to cam-
paign in 130 constituencies where Islah stood a good chance.7
Yemen illustrates that even when the logic of cooperation is com-
pelling, the divergent ideological commitments of the actors involved 
might render cooperation unimaginable for some actors. The factional-
ized Islah party moved from strategic cooperation with the GPC toward 
tactical and strategic cooperation with the YSP and other leftist parties. 
Not all Islah members or even leaders embraced 
this move, illustrating the key role individuals play 
in forging cross-ideological cooperation and gain-
ing the support of the broader party membership.
Democratic practice in action?
Do these new practices of cross-ideological 
cooperation hold long-term consequences for 
democratization in the region? Egypt, Jordan and 
Yemen illustrate that Islamist-leftist cooperation 
in the Arab world continues to expand, even as 
democratic openings are steadily reversed. While 
most cooperation remains short-term and tacti-
cal, instances of sustained and strategic coopera-
tion are increasing. Cooperation emerges prima-
rily when political opportunities render it useful, 
as when opposition parties develop a sense of 
common purpose in the face of a repressive re-
gime. Even sustained cooperation, however, does 
not foreclose the possibilities that individual par-
ties will still seek to cooperate with the regime to 
advance their own agendas. Mid-level coopera-
tion does not necessarily reflect a growing com-
mitment to democratic norms, but the ease with 
which many Islamists now cooperate with leftists 
suggests that high-level cooperation may emerge 
in the near future. In the meantime, however, the 
very limited cases of high-level, ideational coop-
eration appear to emerge primarily when new 
groups are formed out of splintering of parties, 
rather as a result of a broader evolution of estab-
lished parties. 
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The vast literature on political Islam 
pre-dominantly offers the following 
explanation for centrality of “state” in 
the discourse of Islamists: the state 
is pivotal to Islamism because, un-
like other religions, Islam (as a faith) 
does not make a distinction between 
religion and state. Put differently, the 
argument asserts that since it fuses re-
ligion and politics, the idea of a state 
naturally flows from the very character 
of Islam. In Ernest Gellner’s view, Islam 
has a lack in so far as, in contradistinc-
tion to Christianity, it failed to enact a 
separation between religion and politics. So pervasive is this argument 
that it invariably informs the writings of scholars such as Louis Dumont, 
Bernard Lewis, Bassam Tibi, Montgomery Watt, and Myron Weiner. Per-
haps as a reaction to this, some scholars have taken the pain to dem-
onstrate the opposite. Egyptian Ali Abd al-Raziq and Said al-Ashmawy, 
as well as the Indian theologian Wahiddudin Khan, for instance, con-
tend that Islam does distinguish religion from state and that the latter 
is not important to it as a faith. On the face of it, both these positions 
look radically antagonistic. However, a closer scrutiny shows their basic 
similarity: both arguments parade a theological logic. In different ways, 
the proponents of both positions quote, inter alia, Quran and hadith to 
prove their respective arguments. 
In this article, I call into question the validity of the theological ap-
proach to the issue of state and Islamism. I argue instead that the rea-
son why the state became central to Islamism was not because Islam 
theologically entailed it. Rather it did so because of the configuration of 
the early twentieth century socio-political forma-
tions under which the state as an institution had 
acquired an unprecedented role in expanding its 
realm of action and scope of its effect. Since Is-
lamism was a response to the modern state for-
mation with its far-reaching consequences it was 
only logical that the state became the centre of its 
discourse. Thus it was not due to Islamic theology 
that the state became central to Islamism; on the 
contrary, it was the unusual expansion of the early 
twentieth century state and its imprint on almost 
every domain of life that drove Islamists to make 
the state central to theology. To substantiate my 
argument, I will discuss the writings of Abul Ala 
Maududi (1903-79). Arguably, he is the foremost 
ideologue of Islamism. Founder of the Jamaa-e-
Islami in India, Maududi’s appeal has crossed the 
frontiers of India to influence Islamist movements 
in the Arab world, prominent amongst whom is 
Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood and its ideologue, 
Sayyid Qutb. Here I will show how Maududi’s theoretical elaboration 
about Islam being synonymous with the state was enmeshed in and a 
direct product of the political-electoral matrix of colonial India. 
The modern state
As is well documented, the medieval European state governed 
mostly by not governing. That is to say, seldom did it interfere in most 
affairs of its subjects. Its main interest, then, was to extract levies. Its 
administrative scope was also far less limited. The modern state, by 
contrast, developed a more penetrative scope. Because of print media, 
transportation links and other innovations, it assumed what Giddens 
calls “heightened administrative power”1 and thus went beyond mere 
extracting taxes to impact mundane 
life. Around the sixteenth century or so, 
observes Foucault, there was a “verita-
ble explosion of the art of governing”2 
in Europe as a result of which state ac-
quired the pastoral power manifest in 
its regulation of every facet of life, in-
cluding the intimate zones of sexuality 
and care. It would be wrong to say that 
the Indian colonial state had a similar 
pastoral power. But its administrative 
scope was surely more vast and far-
reaching than that of its predecessor, 
the Mughal state. According to the 
political theorist, Sudipta Kaviraj, the pre-modern Indian state was of 
marginal significance to everyday life. It was barely interested in alter-
ing socio-religious order. “The state, far from being the force which cre-
ated … or changed this order,” he argues, “was itself subject to its con-
trol.”3 In contrast, the role of colonial state was unusually far reaching. 
It played such an interventionist role in religion, law, education, census, 
language, and so on that it directly affected everyday life.4
Given its centrality, all social movements in the nineteenth century 
and later pertained to the role of the state even if their target were non-
state actors. The anti-colonial movement, spearheaded by the Indian 
National Congress (hereafter Congress) under M. K. Gandhi’s able lead-
ership, was the largest. From the early twentieth century, its main goal 
became swaraj, self-rule. Clearly, self-rule was essentially about the 
state. It was in such a context that Maududi, still a teenager, appeared 
as a journalist on the scene. Initially, he was a devoted Congressman. 
He wrote laudatory biographies of Gandhi and Pundit Madanmohan 
Malaviya, a Congress revivalist leader who he called “sailor of India’s 
boat.” In 1920, Maududi, believing in its mission for a secular, religiously 
composite, and free India, became an editor of Muslim, a newspaper 
published by the Jamiatul Ulema-e-Hind, an organization of ulama, 
and ally of the Congress. However, Maududi soon grew disenchanted 
with the Congress, which he believed favoured Hindus at the cost of 
Muslims. 
From communalism to Islamism 
In 1928, Maududi left Delhi for Hyderabad, capital of the Muslim 
princely state of the Nizams. There he devoted himself to studying 
Islam. Worried as he was about the decline of Muslim power, he offered 
a blueprint to the Nizams to revitalize it. It called for overhauling the 
education system and propagating a “pure” Islam. To his dismay, the 
Nizams showed no interest in it. In 1932, he launched an Urdu journal, 
Tarjumanul Koran as a part of his own plan. 
While busy with his studies, the elections of 1937 took Maududi by 
storm. Consequently, he moved first to communalism and finally to 
Islamism. Under the Government of India Act of 1935 introduced by 
the colonial state, elections to form provincial governments were held. 
The contest was mainly between the Congress and the Muslim League, 
a party of landed magnates who demanded a separate Muslim state, 
Pakistan. As such the League rejected the Congress’ claim to repre-
sent Muslims. Yet, it lost the elections. The Congress clinched victory 
to form provincial Ministries. It was then that Maududi turned Tarju-
man into a weapon against the Congress. He equated the policy of the 
Ministries (1937-39) with heralding a “Hindu Raj.” He accused them of 
imposing Hindu culture on Muslim students in schools: schools were 
named Vidya Mandir (literally temple), which “smelled of Hindu reli-
gion.” Muslim students were forced to wear the dhoti (a lower garment 
worn mostly by Hindu men) and sing the anti-Islamic Sanskrit anthem 
vande matram; while the curriculum elided or misrepresented Islam 
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The State in 
Islamist Thought
The state became central to Islamism not 
because Islam theologically entailed it, but 
because of socio-political formations that 
developed in the early twentieth century. 
The article analyses how these historical 
developments are reflected in the writings of 
Abul Ala Maududi, whose influence has crossed 
the frontiers of India to influence Islamist 
movements across the Arab world. In doing so, 
the author offers a critique of the pervasive 
view that the importance of the state stems 
from a presumed lack of separation between 
religion and politics in Islam. 
[I]f someone 
claimed to be the 
ruler of a country 
his claim would 
be equivalent to a 
claim to be God …
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questionably obey His laws, sharia, in the political realm. Thus taghoot, 
another Quranic word, does not just mean Satan or idol. It means a 
political order not based on Allah’s sovereignty. He chided the ulama 
for reducing the meaning of taghoot to a literal idol. For Maududi, the 
Quranic injunction to worship Allah and shun taghoot meant fighting 
for a sharia state and rejecting all forms of non-Islamic polity. 
In Maududi’s formulation, like Allah, worship, also meant obeying 
the ultimate political authority. He lamented that Muslims had limited 
its meaning to worshiping Allah in metaphysical life alone and ban-
ished Him from their political life.10 He furthermore equated rituals like 
prayer to military training and considered them as tools to achieve the 
goal of Islamic state, “prayer, fasting … provide preparation and train-
ing for the assumption of just power.”11 Likewise, Maududi interpreted 
deen, religion, politically, “The word of the contemporary age, the state, 
has … approximated [the meaning of deen].”12 Elsewhere, he wrote, “in 
reality, the word deen approximately has the same meaning which the 
word state has in the contemporary age.”13 Many other theorizations of 
Maududi also echo the spirit of modern politics; 
for instance, the conceptualization of Islam as a 
movement and Muslims as a party. Interestingly, 
he introduced such innovative theorizations in 
the name of reclaiming “pure” Islam. 
Conclusion 
The aim of this article has been to rethink the 
dynamics of state and Islamism. To this end, I 
have demonstrated that the reason why the state 
became foundational to Islamism was not due 
to Islamic theology that presumably fused reli-
gion and politics. Drawing on the writings and 
politics of Maududi, I have instead argued that it 
became basic to the Jamaat-e-Islami because of 
the expansion and unusual reach of the colonial 
Indian state and the ways in which it crucially im-
pacted everyday life. Not surprisingly, Maududi 
interpreted the Quranic words—Allah, worship 
and religion—to mean state. The study of theol-
ogy is important, far more important however are 
the political dynamics in which theology unfolds, 
wins, or loses salience. 
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and unduly highlighted Hinduism. Maududi saw evidence 
of “Hindu Raj” in the marginalization of Urdu as well. Clearly, 
Maududi’s allegations pertained to the role of state—a role 
the pre-colonial state barely had. 
After the elections of 1937, both Maududi and the League 
thus opposed the Congress. This did not make them friends, 
however. Actually, as the possibility of Pakistan’s creation 
intensified so did Maududi’s critique of the League. He criti-
cized it for the absence of a sharia state from its agenda. In 
the late 1930s, the whole national politics revolved around 
the issue of state: the League demanded a separate Mus-
lim state; the Congress attempted to avert it by having a 
secular state of united India; and the Indian Communist 
movement’s agenda was to secure a socialist state. In a con-
text where “state” was the reigning vocabulary of politics, 
Maududi advanced his own, a sharia state. From this stand-
point, he found the League un-Islamic. For him, there was 
no difference between the Congress and the League as both 
desired a secular state. He described the League as a “party 
of pagans,” because its leaders did not know even elemen-
tary Islam. Nor did they quote, even mistakenly, the Quran in 
their meetings. Since the League had no agenda for a sharia 
state, Maududi declared that future Pakistan would be “na-Pakistan,” 
a profane land. He even called it an “infidelic state of Muslims.” It was 
for this reason that in 1941, he founded Jamaat-e-Islami as an alterna-
tive to both the Congress and the League. The Jamaat’s Constitution 
described its goal as the establishment of hukumat-e-ilahiya, “Islamic 
State.” 
Theology of state, state of theology
To Maududi’s amazement, there were only a few enthusiasts for hu-
kumat-e-ilahiya. As a party of reputed ulema, the Jamiatul Ulma-e-Hind 
believed in a secular, composite India and did not regard “state” as es-
sential to Islam. Given the wholesale rejection of his ideology, Maududi 
realized that Muslims, in general, and ulama, in particular, would rally 
around him only if he proved, through the Quran and hadith, why the 
state was basic to Islam. A radically new theology of the state was on 
the anvil. 
It is not as if Maududi was oblivious to the all-encompassing nature 
of the modern state. In March 1938, he wrote in Tarjuman, “Now [the 
state] also decides what to wear or what not to wear … what to teach 
your kids … what language and script you adopt. … So, the state hasn’t 
left untouched from its ultimate intervention even most peripheral is-
sues of life.” Not only did Maududi fully comprehend the nature of the 
modern state, his views also reflect a critique of the policies of provin-
cial Ministries on issues of dress, language, curriculum, and religion. 
Considering nineteenth century approaches to understanding the 
state outdated, he remarked in the same issue: “The state is beginning 
to acquire the same status that God has in religion”. Given the extreme-
ly interventionist role of the modern state and the manner in which it 
impinged on the daily lives of Muslims, he equated Islam with state and 
accordingly interpreted the Quran. 
The bible of Maududi’s political theology is the tract Four Fundamen-
tal Concepts of the Koran (1979),5 where he argued that to know the 
“authentic objective” of the Quran it is crucial to grasp the “real and 
total” meaning of the four Quranic words: ilah (Allah), rabb (Lord), iba-
dat (worship) and deen (religion). He claimed that soon after the revela-
tion, their real meaning was lost. 
Maududi considered “Allah” the most important word. His exposition 
on its meaning is premised on a distinction between the “metaphysi-
cal” and “worldly political” life which together constitute an organic 
whole. To be a Muslim is to worship Allah alone not just on the meta-
physical plane but also in political life because He is the master of both. 
Accordingly, Maududi contended that Allah must also be the “Ruler, 
Dictator (aamir), and Legislator” of the political domain.6 Consequent-
ly, if someone claimed to be the ruler of a country his claim would be 
equivalent to a claim to be God on the metaphysical plane. Thus, to 
share political power with someone who disregards the laws of Allah, 
he declared, would be polytheism in the same sense as someone who 
worships an idol rather than God.7 Elaborating on the meaning of rabb, 
a cognate term for Allah, he wrote that it was “synonymous with sover-
eignty, sultani.”8 Since he regarded sovereignty as basically political, he 
argued that Allah is also a “political rabb.”9 To believe in Allah is to un-
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The term “Islamism” encompasses a 
variety of socio-political movements 
oriented toward the establishment 
of Islam, however interpreted, as the 
fundamental framework for the po-
litical and social ordering of the state.1 
Though Islamist movements often 
differ dramatically from each other—
ranging from formulations of ideologi-
cal critique to political reform to revo-
lutionary violence—the “understand-
ing Islam” literature of the post-Sep-
tember-11 era has tended for obvious 
reasons to foreground today’s most 
radical manifestations of Islamism.2 
Few phenomena, however, present a 
greater challenge to concerted, dispassionate analysis than lawless acts 
of violence of the sort executed by the 9/11 hijackers, and it is therefore 
hardly surprising that post-9/11 theorizations of Islamism have gener-
ally foundered upon the doctrine of radical jihad—a doctrine which 
rests at the heart of Islamism’s most extreme movements. The difficulty 
of theorizing such violence has left analysts mired either in defensive 
apologetics or in lofty abstractions of the sort invoked in Roel Meijer’s 
synopsis of this issue (p. 16, this issue). In both cases the rhetoric of 
practical political activism, frequently 
a central feature of both radical and 
more dialogical Islamist discourses, be-
comes overlooked or occluded. 
What do we miss when we neglect 
the rhetoric of political practice not 
merely within contemporary Islamism 
but, more specifically, within its radical 
jihadi movements? Roxanne Euben as-
serts that such neglect is tantamount 
to ignoring the manner in which such 
radical discourses sync with broader 
anxieties and critiques pertaining to 
modern socio-political patterns of 
life—in other words, to the manner in 
which radical Islamism might be un-
derstood to participate within a broad process of modern self-criticism 
which has, in diverse contexts, swept the globe in the latter half of the 
twentieth century.3 A key figure within this Islamist critical tradition 
is Sayyid Qutb, an Egyptian thinker of the 1940-60s who shifted ear-
lier fundamentalist discourses in the direction of revolutionary jihad-
ism and who has been labelled by Paul Berman as “the Arab world’s 
first important theoretician of the Islamist cause.”4 Though the direct 
influence of his writings upon contemporary jihadi groups such as al-
Qaeda remains under debate, Qutb’s most popular work, Ma'alim fi-l-
Tariq—known in English as Milestones—is widely credited as the first 
systematic theorization of a violent jihad directed primarily against 
Islamic leaders and intelligentsia, whom Qutb determined to be guilty 
of propagating and legitimating immoral “Western” values within the 
North African and Middle Eastern societies of his day. Qutb’s particular 
doctrine of jihad endures within contemporary radical Islamist move-
ments, even within those movements such as bin Laden’s al-Qaeda that 
have shifted their rhetorical attention to the West itself as the primary 
and direct threat to the Islamic societies of today. 
Jihad and the choice to believe
The force of Qutb’s impact upon today’s radical Islamists notwithstand-
ing, Milestones presents an important articulation of the logic of socio-
political activism embedded within the doctrine of radical jihad, and 
this work has thus undergone something of an analytic renaissance as 
scholars and policymakers in the post-9/11 era have attempted to come 
to an understanding of terrorism. Most crucial to an understanding of 
the link between jihad and socio-political activism is Qutb’s framing of 
the jihadist as the unique bearer of a vision—indeed, of a strategy—of 
socio-political liberation capable of galvanizing victims of Western cul-
tural and material domination and of countering the “universal” values of 
post-Enlightenment secularism (be such secularism in the form of liberal, 
socialist, or communist society). Qutb’s peculiar take upon these matters 
stems from his insistence upon the centrality of “free moral choice” to the 
establishment and the ongoing promotion of Islam in its original, most 
authentic, form.5 Not only does Qutb designate such choice-making as 
the quintessential activity whereby man distinguishes himself from all 
other animals—hence effectively equating conversion to Islam to the 
“fullest expression” of “man’s noblest characteristics”—but he also states 
that the optimal context for this choice-making in which man realizes 
his noblest qualities is a context in which all socio-political “obstacles” 
have been removed in such a way that “no barrier remains” between the 
individual and the only religion which “places the highest value on the 
‘humanity’ of man.”6 In other words, while “Islam does not force people to 
accept its belief,” it does “wan[t] to provide a free environment in which 
they will have the choice to believe” and thus the choice to elevate them-
selves “far above the purely animal level.”7
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The “Humanity” of 
Radical Jihad
Sayyid Qutb, one of the fathers of modern 
Islamic fundamentalist thought, located 
physical jihad at the centre of his vision of 
twentieth century political Islam. Although 
analysts—particularly in the post-9/11 era—
have tended to conceptualize physical jihad 
as a thoroughly warlike enterprise, Qutb’s 
rhetoric reveals a very different logic at work 
in the propagation of jihad as a primary means 
of political transformation in the name of 
Islam. In fact, Qutb’s most influential work 
frames jihad as a particular strategy of socio-
political activism—an activism geared toward 
the reinvigoration of particular conceptions of 
human nature and human agency.
Sayyid Qutb 
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©
 A
F
P
, 
1
9
6
6
1 4  I S I M  R E V I E W  1 8  /  A U T U M N  2 0 0 6
In a manoeuvre which flies in the face of the “Western” vaunting of uni-
versal values such as dignity, liberty, and equality, Qutb accuses secu-
lar societies of actually overlooking the true source of human dignity 
and—in conceiving of humanity primarily in terms of science or “mate-
rialism”—of placing “biological chains” upon beings designed by Allah 
to be free and equal.8 After all, asserts Qutb, 
“[M]an is able to change his beliefs, thinking, and attitude toward 
life, but he is incapable of changing his colour and race, nor can he 
decide in what place or nation he is to be born. Thus it is clear that 
a society is civilized only to the extent that human associations are 
based on a community of free moral choice, and a society is back-
ward in so far as the basis of association is something other than free 
choice … Only Islam has the distinction of basing the fundamental, 
binding relationship of the community in belief. 
On the basis of this belief, black and white and 
red and yellow, Arabs and Greeks, Persians and 
Blacks; all the nations of the earth become one 
community.”9
Ultimately, such accusations create the dual ef-
fect, in the first place, of undermining the univer-
salistic claims of Western secularism and, in the 
second place, of initiating a call “for the Muslim 
community to come vigorously into presence” 
and to exercise its “right to take the initiative for 
human freedom.”10 Qutb locates the jihadist at 
the forefront of this Islamic vanguard, framing 
him as a moral revolutionary who, in the name 
of Islam, “does not attack individuals” but “attacks 
[Westernized] institutions and traditions in order 
to release human beings from their pernicious influence, which dis-
torts human nature and curtails human freedom.”11 Not only does such 
a framing of jihad call into question the widespread understanding of 
such violence as simple “warfare” against non-Muslims or inauthentic 
Muslims, it emphatically refutes the related notion of jihad as a purely 
“defensive” enterprise. Hearkening repeatedly to what can only be de-
scribed as a proactive and fraternal conceptualization of jihad, Qutb 
asserts that “[i]f we insist on calling Islamic jihad a defensive move-
ment, then we must change the meaning of the word “defence” and 
mean by it “the defence of man” against all those forces that limit his 
freedom.”12 
Of course, we might very well question the logistics and even the sin-
cerity of Qutb’s formulation of jihad as a means of bestowing upon one’s 
fellow man the opportunity to achieve “real and complete” dignity, free-
dom, and equality.13 How, for example, is the jihadist to distinguish be-
tween “individuals” versus “institutions and traditions” as objects of his 
physical attacks? Is such a distinction ultimately important to Qutb, or 
is this distinction (as well as the rest of his discourse) merely a rhetorical 
flourish designed to rationalize a revolutionary and perhaps a wanton 
violence? How, precisely, would the facilitation of a “free environment” 
lead to a conversion to Islam that is nevertheless “noncompulsory,” and 
what would happen should the free, choice-making individual opt not 
to embrace Islam? Milestones sidesteps all of these issues, largely by way 
of its particular approach to what Qutb calls the “man-made systems [of 
theories and laws]” at the foundation of Western—and, increasingly, so-
called Islamic—societies.14 The elevation of such “man-made” systems 
of knowledge to the highest source of socio-political authority not only 
amounts to a form of human self-worship in the guise of scientific ob-
jectivity but, most important to the issue of jihad, it engenders compla-
cency and lack of initiative within the individuals looking to such sys-
tems for moral guidance. As Qutb puts it, man-made theories and laws 
tend to mire people in “discussion, learning, and information” for its own 
sake rather than for the sake of “knowing with the intention of acting 
upon it,” which Qutb believes to be intrinsic to the authentic message 
of Islam.15 In the interest of combating such complacency, of “rend[ing] 
the curtains that ha[ve] fallen on the hearts and minds of people” and 
smashing “all the walls that [stand] between man and the truth,” Qutb 
seizes upon jihad as the quintessential gesture of unequivocal and un-
mediated socio-political activism; a gesture which affords each indi-
vidual the means of breaking radically with the “scholastic sophistry” of 
Western rationalism while simultaneously presenting a similar opportu-
nity to the oppressed individuals around him.16 
Jihad as political activism
Though Qutb declares the “foremost objective” of Milestones to be 
the transformation of individuals in such as way that they become em-
powered to “change the practices of [their] society,” his formulation of 
jihad functions at a broader level as a powerful and surprisingly “post-
modern” ideological confrontation of the Western/secularist worldview 
believed by many to be the source of the socio-political ills of the twen-
tieth century—a worldview marred in Qutb’s mind by excessive theo-
rization, neglect of personal initiative and responsibility, and disregard 
of free moral choice as representative of the highest human value.17 
Anticipating what has today become a primary explanation for the rise 
of Islamism (of all sorts) within the Middle East, Qutb exhorts his read-
ers that the “enemies of the believers may wish to change this struggle 
into an economic or political or racial struggle, so that the believers 
become confused concerning its true nature and 
the flame of belief in their hearts goes out.”18 He 
encourages his readers to recognize this manoeu-
vre as “a trick” designed to deprive authentic Mus-
lims of “their weapons for true victory”—namely, 
their intractable commitment to translating Islam 
“into a living reality” rather than into a privatized 
system of belief along the lines of the secular 
model of religion.19 For Qutb, jihad represents 
the quintessential practical means by which Islam 
becomes translated into such a living reality, for 
it places in the hands of each Muslim the power 
to create the initial “free environment” necessary 
for conversion to Islam and it thereafter propels 
Islam’s “growth through the struggle against sur-
rounding forces”—a struggle which, due to the 
“residual influences” of the Western worldview, is 
predicted by Qutb to endure “until the Last Day.”20
Of equal importance to the issue of jihad and the spread of Islam is 
the manner in which this forceful method of socio-political engage-
ment might be understood to hold the promise, if properly channelled, 
to engender a society in which “man’s dignity is 
held inviolable to the highest degree.”21 Such uto-
pianism serves to elevate (for the jihadist, anyway) 
what might otherwise be comprehensible only as 
an act of war or self-defence to the level of a hu-
manitarian intervention of sorts—to a project, as 
Euben quotes, of securing “the well-being of all 
humanity.”22 Thus, in addition to placing in the 
hands of the Muslim the power to initiate and to 
propagate the spread of Islam, jihad as framed by 
Qutb affords the Muslim the power to bestow a 
particular conceptualization of “humanity” upon 
his fellow humans—a conceptualization that re-
mains more faithful, according to Qutb, to man’s 
unique stature than does the scientistic vision of 
“humanity” propounded within the modern West. 
As the primary translator of Islam’s promise into 
immediate and unequivocal action—an action, as 
Baudrillard attests, without equal in the Western 
“zero-death system”—the jihadist is endowed by 
Qutb with the extraordinary capacity to deploy 
physical violence as the means of freeing himself 
and those around him from the fetters of materi-
alism “so that they might rise above the angels.”23 
Shades of Islamism
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Philippines, and Afghanistan under the 
Taliban. After the bomb attack in 1996 
on the American base at Khobar in Saudi 
Arabia, he was arrested and tortured in 
prison. But when he was released two 
years later he continued his transna-
tional jihadi activities, and was asked 
by Osama bin Laden to organize the 
al-Qaeda branch in Saudi Arabia. Dur-
ing the next years he was both a prolific 
writer, establishing an Islamic research 
centre, running al-Qaeda’s website al-
Nida, as well as recruiting the leaders of the different cells who would 
later become famous from the mug shots of wanted persons that the 
Saudi government published after the bomb attacks in Riyadh in 2003. 
Although Yusuf al-Ayiri was killed in a shoot out in Turba/Hail at the end 
of May, just after the first bomb attack in Riyad on 12 May 2003, by what 
later became known as al-Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula, his immedi-
ate influence reached out to the famous online magazine Sawt al-Jihad 
and beyond. Since his death, he has become a role model for many of 
the young Jihadi Salafis, embodying the ideal of an independent ‘alim-
thinker-Jihadi cum political activist, whose death, because of his rooted 
as well as his transnational background, was a political statement. He was 
especially honoured by the Jihadi’s in Iraq, who in the beginning of the 
Sunni insurgency often referred to his works and martyrship. But also in 
the Netherlands, those who probably will stand trial in the Piranha case 
regard him as a hero, together with one of the subsequent leaders of al-
Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula, Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin. 
Rationalism
What immediately strikes the reader of the works of Ayiri is their 
scope, depth, and length.5 Between 1998, when he was released from 
prison until his death, he managed to publish hundreds of pages on 
topics ranging from open letters to the two leaders of the Sahwa move-
ment in Saudi Arabia, Salman al-Awda and Safar al-Hawali, to a work 
on Islamic “modernist” opponents, to several political analyses of the 
American presence in the Middle East, the jihad in Chechnya, the Abu 
Sayyaf group in Philippines, and the Taliban in Afghanistan. Some of 
these works were written only months before he was killed, even after 
publication of the wanted List of 19, with his mug shot as number ten. 
In contrast to the usual image of the Jihadi as a myopic ideologue, and 
a mystical pedant who is alienated from his surroundings, from his 
work Ayiri comes across as a well-informed, clear-headed, and down 
to earth analyst. For instance, in his work on the United States in Saudi 
Arabia he refers to Nixon’s memoirs, delves into the Carter and Bush 
doctrines, and gives a coherent analysis of the American policy in the 
region. The same applies to his analysis of Iraq, predicting—correctly—
a long war just before he himself was killed, or Chechnya, combining 
his first hand knowledge with historical facts and a clear analysis of 
the political situation. Although it is doubtful whether he has read all 
the books he mentions in his work against the “modernists,” the array 
of especially Egyptian writers he castigates is impressive, ranging from 
Muhammad ‘Abduh to Fahmi Huwaydi. 
Despite his typical Salafi rejection of rationalism, Ayiri work stands 
out for the rational and argued quality of his arguments and analy-
sis. In fact, one of Ayiri’s overriding concerns is with reality (al-waq‘i). 
For instance, in the case of the “martyrship operations,” carried out by 
Chechen women against Russian troops, or the case of Moscow Theatre 
hostage affair, Ayiri only briefly goes into notion of martyrship and its 
rewards in heaven. By far the largest part of these writings is taken up 
with the (chilling) rational analysis of the costs and benefits of such 
actions, legitimating them because their benefits—vast damage to the 
Most works deal with al-Qaeda as a ter-
rorist organization. When these works 
deal occasionally with al-Qaeda’s intel-
lectual background they mostly draw 
an eschatological ideology that repre-
sents history as a cosmic war between 
good and evil; a metaphysical struggle 
between the forces of darkness and 
light.1 This type of analyses is especially 
prominent in post-Structuralist writings 
on al-Qaeda. 
According to Jean Baudrillard, 9/11 
had shelved concrete politics: “we are far beyond ideology and politics 
now … the aim is … to radicalize the world by sacrifice.”2 Faisal Devji 
pursues this line further. His main argument is that a transnational jihad 
has replaced politics and intentionality. “These are [global] movements 
whose practices are ethical rather than political in nature because they 
have been transformed into gestures of risk and duty rather than acts of 
instrumentality3 […] One implication of treating holy war as an individual 
duty (farz kifaya), like prayer, is that it becomes spiritualized and finally 
puts the jihad beyond the pragmatism of political life.”4
However brilliant these post-Structural insights are, the problem is 
that in as far as they analyse ideology, they focus only on the top figures, 
Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, and their extreme expressions 
of globalization, as represented in their speeches, video’s, and ad hoc 
writings and actions. The above authors refrain from studying the more 
concrete relations between the separate branches of al-Qaeda, the back-
ground of their members, their often much more elaborate writings, and 
their (sometimes) intensive relations with local Muslim political move-
ments. In a way they play into the hands of these leaders by helping them 
to become mythical heroes who float in empty transnational space. 
Only a cursory look at the life and times of the first leader of al-Qaeda on 
the Arabian Peninsula, Yusuf al-Ayiri, shows that at least this group defies 
this type of analysis. To be sure, the rhetoric of Bin Laden's civilizational 
war is not absent, and in true al-Qaeda style, jihad 
is regarded as the alpha and omega of Muslim doc-
trine. But on the whole his programme is imminent-
ly political. In fact, purposeful politics—including, 
its analysis, strategic planning, and mobilization of 
followers for concrete goals—form the very core of 
Yusuf al-Ayiri’s writings. Intention rather than ethics 
is the stuff of his writings. Politics are instruments 
for a specific goal, not explicitly stated as the es-
tablishment of an Islamic state, but at least as the 
destruction of the power of the United States and 
Israel and the spread of Islam and the Salafi pro-
gramme (manhaj) over the world. Although these 
goals may not be realistic, they should still be seen 
as an explicit political agenda. Moreover, it is clear 
that while Yusuf al-Ayiri was active in al-Qaeda, he 
was also involved in the Sahwa (awakening) move-
ment, the Saudi Salafi reform movement of the 90s, and always regarded 
himself as part of that movement. 
Yusuf bin Salih bin Fahd al-Ayiri (or Uyayri), born in 1973 in Damam, is 
a typical member of the Saudi youth who were influenced by the Jihadi 
youth culture that sprang up in the 1990s under influence of the Sahwa 
movement. He did not finish his secondary school and left for Afghani-
stan when he was 18 years old. There he was trained in one of the training 
camps, al-Faruq, where he himself later became a trainer. He was also for 
a short while a bodyguard of Osama bin Laden, with whom he travelled 
to the Sudan in 1994, and was involved in most of the jihadi fronts of the 
time, many of which he visited: Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Chechnya, the 
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Re-Reading al-Qaeda
Writings of Yusuf al-Ayiri
Second generation activists such as Yusuf al-
Ayiri are now far more important than Osama 
bin Laden. They are regarded as true role 
models, the few who defend ideals and want 
to change “reality.” The author argues that to 
understand the appeal of al-Qaeda related 
groups, we should look not only at their 
globally communicated doctrines and ideals, 
but also analyse how these messages are, often 
locally, connected to political programmes 
and activism.
… Ayiri comes 
across as a well-
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enemy, psychological disarray, greater 
awareness for the cause abroad—far 
outweigh the costs to the mujahidin, 
who will go to heaven anyway. The 
same applies to the 9/11 Operation. 
In accordance with al-Qaeda ideol-
ogy, the massive killing of innocent 
Muslims in, for instance, Palestine, Iraq 
(sanctions) is compared to the limited 
numbers of deaths in the WTC and 
Pentagon attacks. The difference with 
other works, is that Ayiri tries to make 
a much more political and lengthy and 
reasoned argument for the attacks, 
while vehemently attacking Ameri-
can double standards and hypocrisy, 
which have led to the decline of the 
Islamic ummah. Despite the presence 
of the “cosmic” dimension, the analysis 
focuses on economic, political, as well 
as cultural factors leading to this war 
of life and death between the forces of 
evil, the unbelievers (kuffar), and good, 
the vanguard of Muslims, consisting of 
the mujahidin. 
Activism
However, like all activists, Ayiri is not 
driven by the search for pure knowl-
edge, whether religious or secular, despite his stress on the necessity 
of analysing “reality.” His goal is to translate political knowledge and 
analysis into action, and action into knowledge, almost in the Marxist 
notion of Praxis. Both are dependent on each other: In the present cri-
sis, knowledge without action is worthless, while action without knowl-
edge is irresponsible and can lead to even greater decline. In that sense 
concrete political action and not globalized ethics acquires an episte-
mological dimension, for truth (haqq) can only be discerned in action, 
which is jihad, and this in turn is dependent on individual experiences 
in very different specific geographic and political circumstances. Only 
the mujahidin as the vanguard can have true knowledge for they have 
acquired this unique experience. In this activist sense Jihadi Salafism is 
truly transformative. The true believer is not just working for God but 
working in concrete history “for” God, and transforming “reality.” Need-
less to say, the correct belief (‘aqida) is of course a crucial lynchpin in 
this process: for believing without action is irja‘, while acting without 
a proper belief makes one a hypocrite (munafiq). It is in this action and 
knowledge embodied in jihad that the vanguard, the “victorious group” 
manifests itself, and sets itself apart from those who are not only weak, 
but are also theologically misguided and factually misinformed. Sacri-
fice is therefore neither a goal in itself nor the ultimate legitimation, as 
post-Structuralists maintain, but sacrifice as a contribution to a concrete 
victory of Islam over its adversaries. Purity of intention (ikhlas al-niyya), 
such a crucial element in Salafi thinking, is an essential ethical principle, 
but the action itself is conditional on its practical results. In the end, 
action must be to the benefit of the “interest (maslaha) of the religion,” 
which can be measured in rational terms. 
Local context
Besides throwing new light on the political theory of al-Qaeda, Yusuf 
al-Ayiri’s writings also provide some new insights into al-Qaeda as organi-
zation. Although most researchers stress its de-centralized, globalized, 
networked character, only a few see it as part of a larger Saudi social 
movement.
Yusuf al-Ayiri writings give a more detailed view of the relations be-
tween his group of Jihadi youth and the elder Sahwa shaykhs and their 
movement. In several writings of Ayiri on the Sahwa movement, among 
which are two open letters to Safar al-Hawali and Salman al-Awda, it is 
clear that he feels his group as still part of the movement, while on the 
other hand he also tries to acquire an independent position and attempts 
to establish his own religious authority. For instance, in his open letter 
to Safar al-Hawali he thanks him for educating the youth of the Sahwa, 
but accuses him of having abandoned his previous ideas after his release 
from prison in 1999 when he started to attack the jihad and the mujahi-
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din.6 Ayiri is especially angered by al-Hawali’s accusation that the mujahi-
din do not have a manhaj. In response, he states that the mujahidin are 
in fact the only Muslims with a programme. But as important: “they are 
the only ones who say and do what they believe in.” Only they are “only 
afraid of God.” In his “advice” to Salman al-Awda he is even more vehe-
ment.7 He accuses him of “submitting to reality” and therefore “mitigat-
ing” and “destabilizing” his manhaj, which will finally lead to “compromise” 
and “dilution” of the aqida, tenet of faith. Even after the Sahwa shaykhs 
condemned 9/11 and half-heartedly supported opposition against the 
Americans in Iraq in 2003, Yusuf al-Ayiri did not cut off all his relations 
with them.8 Nor does he rule out other forms of resistance against the 
Saudi government, such as demonstrations. Instead, to demonstrate his 
own moral and political superiority, he calls them mere “intellectuals”; 
they are only interested in “raising consciousness” of the impending US 
invasion of Iraq and do not call for “practical plans.” 
That Yusuf al-Ayiri never intended to wage an armed struggle against 
the Saudi Arabian state is clear from his last writing after he was added 
to the List of 19.9 In it he warns the general public that the state is round-
ing up the Jihadis for the benefit of the United States. He concludes that 
the mujahidin “have not reached this phase voluntarily, but have been 
forced on this path by measures of the intelligence 
services.”
Second generation activists as Yusuf al-Ayiri are 
now far more important than Osama bin Laden or 
Ayman al-Zawahiri. It is their message that comes 
across in the countless websites that publish his 
as well as the works of other young Jihadi Salafis. 
They are regarded as true role models, the few who 
defend ideals and want to change “reality,” and pay 
for the cause with their lives. Their writings embody 
a new political activism of young thinkers whose 
religious authority is based on both their religious 
and their factual political knowledge, reinforced by 
their claim that only they are independent and pure 
in their intentions and only they are incorruptible, 
unswayable, and principled. This transforms them 
into a much more powerful force than the old al-
Qaeda gang. 
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A B D U L K A D E R  T A Y O B
Liberal Islam 
Between Texts and its 
Modern Condition
At a conference in Khartoum in April 
2006, Islamist leader Hassan al-Turabi 
caught the attention of more than one 
observer when he expressed unusually 
liberal views on Islam. He also came to 
repeat similar views in an interview on 
Arabiyyah satellite channel:
“I want women to work and become 
part of public life, Allah willing. Allah 
gave them certain advantages over 
us, and gave us certain advantages 
over them. He gave men and women 
advantages over one another. I would 
like there to be equality between people, because we were all cre-
ated from the same soul: ‘Allah created from a single soul its mate.’ … 
I have not found a hadith that prohibits women from being Imams.”
In Sudan some ulama were swift in condemning these public state-
ments, and called for meeting out the appropriate capital punishment 
(hadd). Internationally, Turabi’s statements have attracted much atten-
tion given his position in the Islamist camp. 
Turabi has been the unquestioned leader of the Sudanese Islamists 
who first originated in the 1960s as a branch of the Egyptian Muslim 
Brothers. He eventually became the real power behind the throne fol-
lowing a coup that unseated a democratically elected government in 
1989, and has led the Islamization of the country for most of the last 
decade of the twentieth century. Since 2001, however, Turabi and Gen-
eral Omar al-Bashir broke up their thirteen-year alliance, and Turabi has 
been arrested twice in a brush with his former ally. Meanwhile, he has 
been campaigning for more liberal reforms but, still, under a clearly 
Islamist ideology. 
Texts beyond contexts
In the last year or so, a group at ISIM has come together to put such 
remarks in a larger time span framework. Rather than simply regarding 
such statements as the harbingers of a liberal Islam, or as unorthodox 
views challenging the essence of Islam, we urged scholars and research-
ers to look for broader patterns in modern Islamic thought. Such analy-
ses would give a better perspective on the statements and utterances 
of individual thinkers such as Turabi. Several articles have since then 
appeared in the ISIM Review on this theme. This, my final reflection as 
ISIM professor at the Radboud University, is dedicated to sharing some 
thoughts on the recent spate of liberal Muslim pronouncements. 
Turabi himself has been rather more liberal in comparison to other 
Islamist leaders with whom he shares a political ideology. In the early 
1990s, Turabi told an American audience that women need not wear 
a headscarf. Soon thereafter, though, the government of Sudan intro-
duced a bill that made hijab mandatory. Turabi’s liberal views complete-
ly contradicted the project of Islamization that he had campaigned for 
and led during the greater part of Sudan’s post-independence era. Dur-
ing the height of Sudan’s Islamization project, women systematically 
lost rights on a grand scale, following similar Islamization projects in 
Pakistan and Iran. If there is anything unequivocal about Islamization 
projects of the twentieth century, then it is the systematic erosion and 
denial of the rights of women in public life. Thus, for Turabi to utter such 
statements today raises even more questions than provides answers.
In a book on Islamic fundamentalism 
and gender, Shehadah has argued that 
moderate Islamists like Turabi tailor 
messages for respective audiences.1 
They present one message for domes-
tic purposes, and another for interna-
tional arenas where they defend the 
reasonable credentials of Islam. In this 
particular case, it seems that Turabi is 
employing the liberal vision of Islam 
against his earlier allies and in contra-
diction with his earlier practices. On 
an international level as well, there is a 
ready audience for liberal and moder-
ate Islamic voices. Turabi’s words seemed in step with a whole range 
of international policy think-tanks that have urged governments in the 
last few years to identify moderate and liberal Muslims, and build alli-
ances with them. The much-publicized Rand Report of 2003 and more 
recently, the report of the policy research unit for the Dutch govern-
ment (WRR), are two well-known cases in point.2 Academics like Etzioni 
have joined the call for building a public culture with the participation 
of moderate Muslims.3
Notwithstanding, one ought to look beyond the expedient procla-
mations, and identify Turabi’s statement as an expression of a highly 
problematic but powerful pattern in modern Islamic thought. I suggest 
that we go beyond a contextual reading that maps Turabi’s statements 
in national, regional, and global settings. Turabi’s mode of argument is 
too familiar to be restricted to the contexts and settings of the hour. It 
is a mode of argument that has been employed in a diverse number of 
contexts. Its proliferation and ubiquity therefore demand more careful 
reflection on a more comprehensive and fundamental level.
Back to texts 
Turabi’s approach is a familiar one of relying and appealing to a purely 
textual foundation for his views. A careful reading of his interviews indi-
cates how his views filter one or the other texts from the Islamic legacy. 
And it is this particular textualist approach that merits scrutiny. It ap-
peals to those both inside and outside Islam who yearn for an authentic 
voice to defend liberal values. As an Islamist leader, Turabi’s liberal views 
might be regarded more authentically Islamic than those of a feminist 
writer, such as Fatima Mernissi, or a liberal thinker, as Abdul Karim So-
roush, relating the same thing. In Muslim matters, clearly, nothing can 
replace an argument founded on a set of texts. And nothing beats an 
Islamist defending a liberal approach through an appeal to texts.
Text-centred-ness is widely shared by Muslims across the broad spec-
trum of modern trends, and deserves close scrutiny as an ethic, and a 
way of doing things in the world. Recent progressive and liberal ap-
proaches have offered alternative ways of approaching the texts. Few, 
however, have explored the quandaries of the textualist–literalist ap-
proach as a fundamental modern feature that deserves critical review. 
In fact, I believe that paying more careful attention to the textualist ap-
proach of modern Islam should be the starting point of a fundamental 
analysis of its discourse. I would even venture to say that the play and 
obsession of texts in Islamic discourses mirrors the dilemmas of mod-
ern philosophy and its grappling with Existence, Being, and the threat 
of illusion. Texts pose a similar attraction and suggestion for Muslims in 
that they can unlock all secrets of a moral life.
The Sudanese Islamist leader Hassan al-
Turabi has become known for what appear 
to be contradictory statements, for example, 
defending women’s rights one day and 
denying them another. Significantly though, 
such conflicting statements are based on a 
singular fidelity to Islamic texts. Rather than 
just explaining the apparent contradictions 
by referring to the contexts in which such 
statements are made, the author argues that 
only by moving beyond contextuality is it 
possible to capture and understand the power 
of texts in modern Islamic thought.
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How texts work
I would suggest several important facets that show 
how texts work in Islamic discourses. The first point 
to note is how a textual approach could justify com-
pletely different standpoints on the same issue. As 
such, selecting texts that suited his particular view at 
the time, Turabi conveniently ignored others that con-
tradict his position. Some might triumph at detecting 
the obvious contradictions in Turabi’s position. But 
Turabi’s contradiction is only valid if we judge him on 
the basis of a value or set of values outside the texts. 
If the principle position is not a value, but the selec-
tion of texts, one can find no fault with defending the 
rights of women one day and denying them another 
day. Turabi has, in effect, remained faithful to texts. 
The value itself is of secondary concern. 
Turabi’s method is widely employed, and reflected 
in a pattern that has justified Islam to trends and de-
velopments in the modern world. In the nineteenth 
century, it was modernization, then came nation 
building, left-wing mobilization, followed by Islami-
zation. Always, a set of verses has been employed to 
support the sentiment that Islam is compatible with 
modern, anti-modern, socialist, nationalist, popular, 
third world, and European values. The only consist-
ent feature of these processes of justification has been the selection 
of texts as a tool of legitimization. And so, I will venture to say that 
one of the cornerstones of contemporary Islamic thought is a fidelity to 
texts—any texts that can be presented as Islamic. When the principle 
is fundamentally grounded on texts, and the choice of texts is inher-
ently subjective and arbitrary, then contradiction of values and effects 
necessarily follows, including self-contradiction. I would argue that a 
discourse dominated by texts builds a feeble foundation. One scien-
tific theory to another, one political project to another, have all been 
anointed by texts. The texts are the only secure markers for discourses 
that have no moorings.
Certainly, this is not a classical relativist position of modern philoso-
phy. Muslims are not engaged in a search for truth or reality that is 
thwarted by the available tools of observation, language, and practical 
reason. But they do find themselves in an equally fundamental quan-
dary. They are engaged in the pursuit of a morally, upright life that cov-
ers ritual, belief, social engagement, and individual responsibility. And 
the key answers to these day-to-day practical questions are exposed to 
idiosyncratic choices that change rapidly as the modern world throws 
up its challenges in rapid succession. If the juggernaut is an accurate 
metaphor of social life in the modern world, then the shifting sands of 
a textualist approach can only be imagined. More recently, the support 
for violence faces a similar contradiction that sees the meaning of Islam 
being thrown from one side of the political fence to another.
Even though the textual approach is inherently problematic when 
it comes to values, it still has a powerful appeal. Unlike any other ap-
proach in modern Islam, the textualist approach captures the power 
of indigenous identity and authenticity. In a globalizing world that 
threatens to wipe out differences, the textualist approach appeals to 
the founding documents of early Islam, and provides a sort of secu-
rity and a semblance of indigenous propriety. This text is ours and our 
projects based on these texts are justified since it is our cultural herit-
age. Such an appeal to authenticity cannot be dispelled out of hand. 
Cultural uniqueness is very much part of a global world that threatens 
to erase differences. The original texts of Islam restore uniqueness and 
specificity to Muslim projects.
It is not surprising to note how texts underline and promote the 
identity politics of the day. It has generally been ignored that Muslim 
governments used the textual approach even before the waves of Is-
lamization in the 1970s. Initially, the politics of authenticity was a voice 
of protest against a colonial occupier in the period between the two 
world wars. Soon after national independence, post-colonial govern-
ments seized upon its magic to claim authenticity and exclusivity in 
the world of nations. Whilst Islamic protest groups took to the streets 
in the 1970s, Muslim governments themselves had already wielded the 
same card at international forums from the 1960s. They systematically 
appealed to exemption from international human rights charters on 
the basis of cultural specificity.4 The Islamic revolutionaries hardly real-
ized the extent to which the politics of authenticity was a script of the 
powerful as it was of the powerless. Texts cut both ways, and as such 
suit the identity politics that Muslims have engaged in for most of the 
modern period. 
Another important feature of the textualist pattern is its amenability 
to a personalist approach to religion. Appealing to texts stresses the 
transparency of the tools used to construct the ideology, the belief, and 
practices associated with Islam. The texts appear both accessible and 
amenable to a modern DIY approach to religion. And contemporary so-
ciety has the technology to make these texts available in print, Internet 
sites, and multi-media formats. One can read one text, have it delivered 
to an email address, mobile phone, or fax on a daily basis. Accessibility 
of texts provides the basis for a profoundly personal approach to reli-
gion. The individualist approach of the texts does not reside in a deeply 
personal attitude to the spirit of God. But it conveys a powerful sense of 
immediacy in following a religious discipline. 
The promise of texts
The reformers of the nineteenth century promised that a return to 
the texts of early Islam would help Muslims to enter the modern world 
with dignity and respect. They ascribed the decline of Islam to the dead 
weight of a tradition that had accumulated over the original wisdom. 
This particular attitude spread across Muslim societies, challenging a 
myriad of different traditions and patterns that had developed over 
centuries. As we face the challenges of the twenty first century, how-
ever, this call for a return to texts has itself 
become a tradition of modernity. 
This new tradition is embroiled in the 
politics of identity of the modern world. It 
yields very little reward at providing a clear 
ethic or set of values. But its inability in this 
regard is substituted by the substantial 
claim it makes in the name of authentic-
ity and indigenity. And its appeal lies in 
the substantially personal approach to 
religion that it provides for many Muslims. 
Contradiction, authenticity, and individu-
alism are not consistent with each other, 
but they make a powerful combination in 
the right context. 
Hassan 
al-Turabi, 
Khartoum, 
11 July 2005 
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Mohammad Khatami
The Philosopher President
Seyyid Mohammad Khatami was born 
in Ardakan in the central province of 
Yazd in 1943.  He is the son of Ayatol-
lah Ruhollah Khatami who founded 
the seminary there.  Khatami finished 
his primary and secondary schools 
in Ardakan and then attended Qom 
Seminary in 1961. It is noteworthy that 
before finishing his seminary stud-
ies he received a bachelor’s degree in 
philosophy from the secular University 
of Isfahan, a relatively rare experience 
among Shii clergy at the time. In 1969 
Khatami entered another secular in-
stitution of higher education, the University of Tehran, from which he 
earned a master’s degree.  Later he returned to Qom seminary to attend 
philosophical classes with renowned religious scholars such as Ayatol-
lah Motahhari. Khatami was a political activist in the Islamic movement 
before and during the revolution of 1979. 
Khatami was elected to represent the people of Ardakan and nearby 
Meibod in the first session of the Islamic Majlis in 1980, and in 1981 
Ayatollah Khomeini appointed him as the head of the influential Kay-
han newspaper. In 1982, he became the Minister of Culture and Islamic 
guidance. During the 1980-1988 war with Iraq, he served in different 
capacities including deputy and head of the Joint Command of the 
Armed Forces and chairman of the War Propaganda Headquarters. In 
1989 Khatami again became the Minister of Culture and Islamic Guid-
ance during the presidency of Hashemi Rafsanjani, but after three 
years, and under pressure from conservative forces, he chose to resign 
his post rather than struggle to stay in power.
Reason occupies a central position in Khatami’s thought. As a Shia, he 
firmly believes in the concept of justice and accordingly finds freedom 
of choice to be both closely intertwined with reason, and indispensa-
ble to its exercise. Since reason presupposes a notion of human agency 
and entails freedom, Khatami maintains that Islam has always been a 
religion with the potential to achieve human liberation. However, the 
widespread and chronic conditions of tyranny in Islamic lands after the 
era of the so-called Righteous Caliphs prevented the realization of this 
potential. As a result of this historical tyranny, in Khatami’s view, the 
ideas pertaining to freedom and human rights among Muslims have 
remained suppressed and never had a chance to develop. 
Khatami’s own discourse and agenda professedly aim at reversing 
this trend through an interpretation of Islamic sources. For this reason 
he has elaborately discussed the notion of freedom. He maintains that 
a major task of the prophets of monotheistic religions had been to re-
move the internal and external bonds of servitude from the hands and 
feet of the people, and help them to attain freedom, which is the most 
noble desire of all humans throughout history.  Historically, whatever 
came into conflict with freedom, Khatami maintains, was damaged 
or defeated. Even righteousness, when it countered freedom, was 
harmed.  Justice, faith, progress, or social justice, when they opposed 
freedom they all suffered. Medieval Christianity and Communism were 
both defeated because in the name of religion and the idea of social 
justice they opposed freedom.  
Yet, freedom for Khatami is not absolute.  Every society sets some 
limits on freedom. In an Islamic state, no one has the freedom to say 
anything she or he pleases as no other state allows such an abso-
lute freedom. Freedom of speech that might disrupt the foundations 
of Islam and oppose the rights of the public cannot be allowed.  But 
within these limits, everybody is free to express their views. During 
Khatami’s tenure there was an attempt to implement these ideas: criti-
cal journals and newspapers were permitted to be published in the 
Islamic Republic. Films and books that 
presented an unorthodox point of view 
also were allowed to be promulgated, 
despite the conservatives’ fierce oppo-
sition and the closure of many newspa-
pers and journals and banning of films 
and books.
Khatami paid significant attention to 
women’s rights in general and to their 
rights for political and social participa-
tion. He proposed establishing institu-
tions such as political parties, trade un-
ions, and associations to realize their 
civic engagement, even though his 
success in practice has been very limited.  Yet, even on the ideational 
level, Khatami has revealed some reservation on women’s right to par-
ticipate in their society and state.  He acknowledges that women need 
to increase their presence in the public sphere to realize their poten-
tials, yet maintains that such activities detract from their essential role 
in the family. 
As a philosopher and social thinker, Khatami’s success seems much 
greater in the shaping of Iranian political culture than the concrete re-
forms in the legal realm and 
in institution building dur-
ing his eight years of presi-
dency. On the other hand, 
despite his attempt to de-
rive a genuine discourse on 
modern human empower-
ment and freedom through 
interpreting Islamic meta-
physics as well as western 
modern thought, according 
to Khatami the carrier and 
beneficiary of this empow-
erment and freedom is not 
the individual.  Very much 
like some of his revolution-
ary intellectual forefathers 
such as Ali Shari’ati, Khatami 
has castigated the individual 
very often as he equates in-
dividualism with license and 
denounces it as capitulating 
to the appetites and desires 
of the individual.
Yet, it would be unwar-
ranted to consider Khatami’s 
eight years of presidency as 
total failure.  To be sure, he 
surely promised much more 
than he could deliver in terms of expansion of 
freedom and human and citizenship rights. Nev-
ertheless, the expansion of discourse on rights 
and freedoms and democracy has promoted the 
tenets of civil society in Iran by raising popular 
expectations and the demand for its implemen-
tation.
In his speech at the UN General Assembly 
in September 1998, Mohammad Khatami 
proposed to analyse the principle elements of 
American culture in terms of Puritan history 
and influence. Similarly, in an interview with 
CNN, he invoked Tocqueville’s Democracy in 
America to highlight the religious foundations 
of American democracy, a gesture that caused 
a vexatious envy among some American 
politicians and political pundits. In this essay 
the author argues that such references reflect 
not just Khatami’s erudition but also highlight 
central tenets in his political philosophy.1
Farzin Vahdat is currently teaching at the International Studies Programme at Vassar College.
Email: favahdat@vassar.edu
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1. This article is partly based on a longer paper, 
“Religious Modernity in Iran: Dilemmas 
of Islamic Democracy in the Discourse of 
Mohammad Khatami,” Comparative Studies 
of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East 25, 
no. 3 (2005).
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Society & the State
T H I J L  S U N I E R
The Western Mosque
Space in Physical Place
The acquisition of places of worship 
has always played a crucial role in re-
ligious emancipation processes. Re-
ligious groups, once settled in a new 
environment, have put major efforts in 
organizing accommodations for prayer. 
Historically, places of worship have 
constituted the most controversial and 
symbolically laden arenas with respect 
to religious emancipation. Although 
political empowerment, networking, 
and organizational activity are also 
important aspects of that process, and 
although legal arrangements consti-
tute crucial landmarks in the emancipation of religious “outsiders,” the 
symbolic significance of places of worship cannot be overestimated. 
Places of worship, especially when built for that purpose, “objectify” re-
ligious presence in ways that reach beyond physical appearance and 
urban planning. In several cases initiatives to build a new mosque have 
aroused fierce debates about the place of Islam in society. While the 
first mosques were rebuilt garages, houses, or factory halls that did not 
visually stand out as Muslim buildings, new purposely built mosques 
attract not only more visual attention, but also have become prime 
signifiers of the process of localization of religious 
newcomers.1
Most studies on the acquisition of mosques 
have either treated it as a marker of religious insti-
tutionalization, or as a test case for the formal re-
lation between state and religion. In much of the 
immigration literature, the building of mosques is 
perceived as the result of the growing cultural di-
versity that characterizes Western European cities 
since the Second World War. Muslims arriving as 
migrants have built up a religious infrastructure, 
which was perceived as a sign of religious conti-
nuity with their countries of origin. Such instanc-
es of institutionalization have unleashed a more 
principal debate about the position of religious 
minorities in Western European nation-states. The 
extent to which they actually facilitate or discour-
age the institutionalization process can be con-
sidered within a structure of opportunities that 
harks back to earlier debates in many nineteenth 
century nation-states about the relation between 
state and religion.2 In such an approach, identi-
ties, both of religious newcomers and of the host society often seem to 
be fixed categories. As a consequence, many studies on the construc-
tion of mosques do not look beyond formal arrangements. 
Places of worship and the symbolization of space
I contend that any thorough understanding of the establishing of 
mosques should analyse the conceptualization of public space as a 
locus where identities are reconstituted. Negotiations about places of 
worship have always triggered debates about the character of public 
space in which authenticity, historicity, and representation are key con-
cepts.3 This goes way beyond religious issues. Negotiations about the 
construction of a mosque are embedded in a principle discussion about 
the conceptualization of space and the question who is “local,” the ar-
ticulation of contextualized identities, and discourses of in-, and exclu-
sion as “categories of practice.” To capture these different dimensions, 
it is useful to make a distinction between “place” and “space.” In relation 
to mosques, “place” starts off as a “religious” issue. A group of Muslims 
collects money to build a mosque in 
order to be able to perform religious 
duties. When they take action and ne-
gotiate with local administrators, place 
also becomes an administrative cat-
egory linked to urban zoning planning, 
bureaucracy, and legal arrangements. 
Place, as the final outcome of the ne-
gotiation process, is then the balanc-
ing of religious demands and adminis-
trative procedures. In the Netherlands, 
creating a place for mosques has often 
been realized as an almost purely ad-
ministrative formality. Many cases of 
negotiation, however, have turned into a long struggle for recognition, 
and this is where I would propose the term “space.” Space is a discursive 
contentious field that is linked up with a particular problem definition, 
the production of locality, embedded in specific power and political re-
lations and by definition something that resolves in the public sphere. 
Islam as a public affair
Today, partly due to the recent changes in the political climate to-
wards Islam, the construction of mosques has been transformed into 
a public issue that brings about much more than just administrative 
procedures. Mosque construction is simultaneously the creation of 
new spatial categories, the product of human agency. For many Mus-
lim organizations a big, purposely built mosque signifies recognition 
and communicates religious identity. There are several projects in the 
Netherlands that are designed with these motives in mind. But bigger 
does not necessarily mean better. There are also cases in which the par-
ties involved agreed on a design of the mosque that merges with the 
physical and social environment rather than sticking out against the 
surrounding community. This is not necessarily a compromise between 
opposing demands, but rather about the reconceptualization of space 
and identity. For a proper understanding of these processes, the actual 
design and the architectural specificities are less relevant than the dis-
course in which negotiations are embedded. 
One of the most ambitious plans in the Netherlands was the realiza-
tion of a huge complex consisting of a central mosque, sporting fa-
cilities, conference halls, etc. initiated by the Turkish Milli Görüs move-
ment in the Amsterdam district De Baarsjes. Officially named The West-
ern Mosque, the construction of which started in 2005, is being built 
in the style of the Amsterdam architectural school. At the launching of 
the plans the chairman of northern branch of Milli Görüs Netherlands 
announced: “We do not want an ugly big white pastry in our neigh-
bourhood, as you sometimes see when they build a new mosque. Our 
mosque will be completely in the style of the “Amsterdam School,” such 
that fits perfectly in the neighbourhood and becomes a real Dutch 
mosque. That should be the future of all mosques in this country: in 
line with the physical and social environment.” Some have discarded 
the statement as pep talk for a Dutch audience. I strongly doubt that. 
The lengthy negotiations about the mosque project were instrumental 
for a process in which the northern branch of Dutch Milli Görüs devel-
oped from a Turkish political organization that sought to increase their 
support among Turkish immigrants into one that plays a crucial role in 
the shaping of a Dutch-rooted Islam. The mosque project envisioned 
not an alien element in a Dutch environment but the redefinition of a 
Dutch neighbourhood. Their rank-and-file is not anymore considered 
as Turkish aliens but as Dutch citizens-to-become. Thus initially the 
mosque project was the object of a power struggle between rivalling 
Turkish Islamic fractions, in the process it became a symbol of the defi-
nition of a “Dutch” Islam. 
Today the mosque 
organization 
has become 
instrumental in 
bringing together 
several parties in 
the neighbourhood.
Negotiations about the construction of the 
Western Mosque in Amsterdam started some 
ten years ago. While local politicians voiced 
their fear that Islamic immigrants would take 
over the neighbourhood, the local mosque 
organization immediately resorted to legal 
rights. This lack of trust has been overcome 
during the past ten years. Though the 
design of the mosque may still be seen as a 
compromise between opposing parties, the 
process of building the mosque led to a firm 
entrenchment of the organization in the local 
community.
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At the time when Milli Görüs bought the plot and the premises of a 
former garage in the early 1990s, the organization was still firmly con-
nected to the German headquarters in Cologne and to the Turkish Wel-
fare Party. The party was involved in a fierce political struggle with the 
Turkish secular state about the status of Islam in Turkish society. From 
the early 1970s onwards, several Turkish Muslim organization have 
struggled for gaining influence among the newly arrived immigrants. 
Initially this struggle was a purely Turkish affair, transplanted to the 
European host societies. The construction of houses of worship was an 
obvious and strategically very effective means to attract people and to 
build up rank-and-file. When the Turkish state-backed Diyanet gained 
increasingly influence among Turkish immigrants in the late 1970s, 
Milli Görüs decided to set up organizations as well to counterbalance 
this influence. Many of the Turkish mosques in Europe came into being 
as a result of these organizational activities. 
The organization of Turkish Islam 
At the time of the initial plans of the Western Mosque in the early 
1990s, the future of migrant youths was one of the most pressing is-
sues that occupied both Muslim leaders and the municipal authorities 
and politicians. There was a pressing need for more youth facilities in 
the neighbourhood and Milli Görüs claimed that their plans would in-
clude accommodation for sport and other activities with which they 
could attract young people and keep them off the street. Although 
there were people in the municipality who were not principally against 
such a complex with facilities, shops and a mosque, there was also a lot 
of objection. The traditional leftist migrant organizations, but also the 
established welfare institutions considered the plans as a dangerous 
development. An Islamic organization such as Milli Görüs could gain 
a disproportionate influence in the neighbourhood. Due to its critical 
stance towards the radical secularism that dominates Turkish political 
culture, Milli Görüs was often branded as a “fundamentalist” organi-
zation. Already at that time, long before 9/11, the traditional Turkish 
population, with its grim socio-economic future, was considered an 
easy target for radical Islamic politics. Very negative articles appeared 
in the newspapers and journals about the “obscure” objectives of Milli 
Görüs.
Also internally the project aroused a lot controversy. Some of the 
younger leaders of Milli Görüs, raised in the Netherlands and very fa-
miliar with the political mores, considered the whole initiative a test 
case for the development of a much more independent organizational 
structure. Formally speaking the Dutch branch of Milli Görüs was ac-
countable to the German headquarters, which in turn had a strong link 
to the Turkish mother branch. Many of the young leaders, however, 
deemed the situation in Dutch society a much more relevant point of 
reference for their political agenda, than the ties with the party in Tur-
key. In the course of years this resulted in a gradual rift between sub-
branches of Milli Görüs in the Netherlands. The southern branch em-
phasizes the strong link with Turkey, whereas the northern branch con-
siders Dutch society as their prime operational field. The controversies 
around the Western mosque have been momentous in this process.
When we take a closer look at the difficult and protracted negotia-
tions, we can see how the parties involved developed their strategy 
and how the project rendered a highly symbolic significance. At the 
start of the negotiations some ten years ago, local municipal politicians 
vigorously objected to the very idea of such a big religious structure 
in the neighbourhood. They perceived it as an invasion of Islamic im-
migrants taking over the neighbourhood. The mosque organization, 
on the other hand, initially operated very formally, resorting to legal 
rights. And although the resulting mosque may still be depicted as a 
compromise between two opposing parties,4 the “hidden” processes 
taking place both within the municipality and the local branch of Milli 
Görüs are striking. When Theo van Gogh was murdered in November 
2004, Milli Görüs, rather than being treated as an adversary, was imme-
diately included by the authorities as a partner against radicalism and 
criminality. Today the mosque organization has become instrumental 
in bringing together several parties in the neighbourhood. The so-
called “contract with society” that had been signed by several parties in 
the Baarsjes following the tensions after the Van Gogh murder, was an 
attempt initiated by the local municipality to create a common “modus 
operandi” in cases where radicalism thrives. The contract serves as a 
blue print for proper citizenship. Although the initiative may well be 
dismissed as a mediated public event initiated by the local govern-
ment, it is also a redefinition of locality. Such ritual events can only be 
understood as processes of localization with an axiradius that exceeds 
the local community. 
In April 2006 the conservative German headquarters of Milli Görüs 
dismissed the board of the northern branch of the Dutch organiza-
tion and installed a more subservient board. By that time, the previous 
board had become well-known for its fresh ideas, its cooperativeness 
and open-mindedness towards Dutch society. They had become well-
known public figures, frequently appearing in media performances. 
The replacement of this liberal board by more conservative members 
of Milli Görüs therefore triggered negative reactions. As an observer 
concluded: “The loot is hauled. The fundamentalists take over.”5 I do 
not subscribe to that conclusion. As I stated above the protracted ne-
gotiations about the mosque project have been instrumental in bring-
ing about political changes within Milli Görüs. The most crucial aspect 
of these changes is the firm entrenchment of the organization in the 
local community. The German headquarters can only superficially in-
fluence that process. If we take a closer look at the 
actual negotiation process over the past years, it 
becomes clear that the initial goal, the building of 
a new mosque, has unleashed so many issues that 
concern the whole neighbourhood, its inhabit-
ants and its public spaces, that an unfortunate 
but relatively trivial “takeover” can not possibly 
turn the tide. The Western Mosque has become a 
project of De Baarsjes, not anymore solely of Milli 
Görüs.
Thijl Sunier is Senior Lecturer in Cultural Anthropology at the University of Amsterdam. 
His fields of expertise include Islam in Europe and Anthropology of Religion.
Email: J.T.Sunier@uva.nl
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K O N R A D  P Ę D Z I W I AT R
New Muslim Elites 
in The City
The City Circle, set up in 1999 by a group 
of young Muslim professionals, some of 
whom work in London’s financial dis-
trict (the City) is one of many Muslim 
organizations established in different 
cities of Britain, and of Europe, by the 
generations of Muslims born on the 
continent, who on the one hand do not 
want to discard the religious heritage of 
their parents and on the other, do not 
feel comfortable within the existing or-
ganizational structures.1 The key point 
of reference for these new organizations is not the region of origin or 
some foreign agency, but the national and local context. While engag-
ing in work with different actors of the country’s civil society they are at 
the same time becoming more “ecumenical” in their attitudes to coop-
eration with Islamic religio-political movements different from their own. 
The most telling is probably the current cooperation of the young British 
Muslims involved in the production of the magazine Q-News (Brelwi sym-
pathies) with organizations such as FOSIS or YMOUK (Ikhwan Muslimun 
and Jamaat-i Islami sympathies) in the organization of the Radical Middle 
Way project.2 
Notably, one of the biggest transformations in recent years within Islam 
in Great Britain, as well as in larger Western Europe, is that it has ceased to 
be only the religion of immigrants and is now becoming a religion of Eu-
ropean-born citizens. The generational change marks not so much differ-
ence in the legal citizenship status of Muslims, as in identity, participation, 
and understanding of civic rights and duties. While the first generation of 
immigrants were often unable to play active roles 
in the public life of the wider society due to lack of 
cultural resources (e.g. poor knowledge of the re-
ceiving country’s language or lack of education), 
their offspring is often quite well equipped with 
these tools. These young Muslims not only better 
understand the political and administrative proc-
esses of their country, but also are often eager to 
make use of this knowledge and their civic rights. 
New Muslim elites
Citizenship is crucial to the identity of 120 young 
Muslim Londoners from various ethnic and cultural 
backgrounds who are actively involved in running 
the City Circle’s activities. In contrast to the majority 
of Muslim organizations in the country the Circle re-
frains in its name and promotion material from di-
rect references to religion or religious community, 
clearly preferring the reference to the occupational 
category—employees of the City—or to the larger 
category of professionals. Its assumed religiously 
neutral status does not only enable the association 
to build up close links with other Muslim and non-Muslim groups and 
organizations, but also to involve in its activities Muslims from various 
ethnic and sectarian backgrounds, for example, by inviting them to its 
weekly sessions. The City Circle likes to describe itself as “an open circle of 
minds who want to promote the development of a distinct British Muslim 
identity and to assist the process of community cohesion and integra-
tion.”3 As such it constitutes an important part of the new Muslim elite4 
that has emerged in London in recent years and that tries through various 
projects to contribute to tackling such issues faced by the Muslim popula-
tion like, for example, educational underachievement or lack of role mod-
els, and thus at least partially solve the problem of collective uncertainty. 
This elite consists of people who very often have cut their Islamist teeth 
in all sorts of university Islamic Societies 
or in one of many Muslim youth organi-
zations and after completion of their 
studies decided to remain active in the 
Muslim civil society. Their approach can 
be on the whole described as construc-
tive engagement with the local and na-
tional institutions and is well captured 
in the following statement by one of 
its members: “We are not interested in 
conversions, but in convergence. We, 
communities together; convergence on 
shared interests, shared values, shared objectives and shared future” (In-
terview with Sajid). 
In contrast to the majority of first generation Muslims the core members 
of the Circle, British-born Muslims, possess a number of crucial means that 
allow them to choose between different courses of action and to move 
beyond the formal to more substantive forms of citizenship. Their case 
upholds the thesis of Verba et al. who argue that the level of involvement 
in voluntary activities depends on three kinds of resources: time, money, 
and civic skills, and that when inputs of time and money are coupled to 
civic skills, then people become not only more likely to participate but 
also more likely to be effective when they do.5 The last resource, namely 
civic skills, is precisely what the first generation of Muslims who lived 
their formative years outside Europe, lacked. Those born in Europe, on 
the other hand, even if they do not manage to gain substantial amounts 
of cultural capital in the form of educational qualifications (institutional-
ized cultural capital), they still possess much wider knowledge, than their 
parents, of the mechanisms how the European societies work, acquired 
during the process of socialization (embodied cultural capital).6 Members 
of the new Muslim elites possess usually not only substantial amounts 
of the embodied cultural capital, but also the institutional form of it. All 
the core members of the City Circle for example finished universities and 
often the most prestigious ones, such as University College of London or 
Cambridge or Oxford.
Key activities and main motivations
Among the projects carried out by the City Circle, the educational 
ones—career guidance for students; Saturday school consolidating 
students’ knowledge in National Curriculum subjects; and Jannah 
Club teaching children Quran and Arabic—occupy the most important 
place.7 These projects have the same objective, that is, “to create a bal-
anced and sensible individual” (interview with Shazad). All of them also 
spring up from the same negative assessment of the current situation 
of Muslims in the country and in particular from analysis showing the 
poor performance of Muslim children at schools. “Intellectually we are 
backward, economically we are backward. Look where all indicators are. 
Muslims have to learn so much!”—notes one of the Circle’s members 
(interview with Sajid). However, it is not only the willingness to improve 
the performance of Muslim children at schools that is driving members 
to get involved in the above mentioned projects. Almost all persons in-
terviewed talked also about a strong desire to share their personal suc-
cess with others, as Sajid puts it: “If we have made it, [achieved personal 
success] we need to try to transfer these skills back to the community 
and help others below us to get there as well.
Although the educational projects are the flagship of City Circle, it 
is its Friday-sessions that have popularized the association among the 
wider public. The aim of these weekly gatherings frequented, on aver-
age, by around 100 people is to act as a forum of debate and discussion 
on the issues concerning the country’s Muslim population. Although 
the vast majority of speakers and listeners at these sessions are Mus-
lims, it is not uncommon to find among the panellists, as well as among 
The members of the new Muslim elites 
emerging in European cities possess a number 
of crucial means that allow them to choose 
between different courses of action and move 
beyond the formal to more substantive forms 
of citizenship. This article follows the discursive 
practices of the City Circle, to analyse how its 
members play a role in deconstructing media 
myths about Islam and solving problems of 
collective uncertainty among young urban 
Muslims in London. 
“[W]e need to 
… transfer these 
skills back to the 
community and 
help others below 
us to get there 
as well.”
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the audience, non-Muslims. For example, one of their gatherings after 
the 7 July bombing devoted to “the criminal distortion of the Islamic 
texts” was being filmed by the BBC Panorama; while 2 weeks later Roger 
Mosey, BBC Head of Television News, was under a storm of questions 
from the audience trying to explain “how BBC sees the world.” Recently, 
and in particular after the 9/11 and 7/7 terrorist attacks, the City Circle 
debates have started to play not only a role of important intra-commu-
nity debate forum, but with more and more broadsheet newspapers re-
ferring to the opinions expressed during these sessions8 they have also 
begun to influence the larger discourse on Islam in Britain. Thus, ironi-
cally the organization that does not make any claims of representing 
Muslim population in the country or to speak on its behalf, has played a 
significant role in shaping the debate on the possible causes and results 
of the terrorist attacks in London. In this way the Circle has been able to 
counter the attempts of hijacking the discourse on Islam in Britain by 
some groups and to propose more complex views of the facts. 
Making Islam a less lonely place
Not only do the Circle’s weekly gatherings contribute to enriching 
the debates on Islam and provide many of its participants with intel-
lectual and spiritual nourishment, they are also very important vehicles 
of social networking among young Muslim professionals in the global 
city. Actually, the desire to get to know other Muslim professionals has 
been one of the root causes behind setting up the organization. This 
is evident for instance in the following account of one of its founding 
members: “initially it was more like people getting together for a bit of a 
lecture but really to go out afterwards for curry. Because nobody knew 
anybody. In London it is difficult to connect with people 'cause it is such 
a huge city.” Although the main outcome of the networking within the 
organization is building bonding social capital, as the majority of friends 
that members of the Circle make through the meetings and projects are 
Muslims, it also enables building bridging social capital (particularly at 
the institutional level) as the organization is closely cooperating with a 
number of non-Muslim bodies (e.g. Fulbright Commission).
The City Circle with its weekly sessions does not only make Islam a “less 
lonely place” as one unmarried member put it, but also provides them 
with an alternative to drinking culture that is the most popular way of 
socializing among young Britons. Obedience of the Islamic prohibition 
of drinking alcohol entails “refusal of commensal-
ity” and “rejection of social intercourse,”9 and in 
practice means exclusion from a very important 
part of British culture. Practising Muslims are thus 
forced to search for other means of socializing that 
would comply with Islamic instructions. The desire 
to create vital alternatives to drinking culture has 
been in fact one of the most commonly advanced 
explanations by the respondents for setting up the 
association, as made clear in the following account 
by a member: “While I was doing my work I always 
felt as you was wearing a straight jacket because I 
did not participate in pub culture and the rest of 
it. So I very strongly felt the need of finding a halal 
alternative, where we Muslims could hang out and 
chill out without being concerned about alcohol.” 
Although the Circle has not solved the problem of 
halal ways of socializing for all concerned young 
Muslim Londoners, it has definitely provided some 
of them with an important substitute. 
The emergence of groups similar to the City Circle 
in other parts of Europe (e.g. Presence Musulmane 
in Brussels) allows one to hope that the numerous 
problems faced by Muslim populations in Europe 
will be debated openly and addressed adequately. 
The new Muslim elites growing in European cities 
are challenging classical notions of citizenship not 
only by claiming public recognition of their same-
ness, but also of their difference. With the assist-
ance of citizenship, which is today one of the major 
discourses of entitlement, they have been follow-
ing the footsteps of ethnic minorities, women, gays, 
and lesbians in seeking space for their heritage and 
values in both the public and private sphere.
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Ramatoulaye
Brotherhood in Transition
Ramatoulaye is a town of about 5,000 
inhabitants, situated some 30 kilo-
metres from Ouahigouya, the former 
capital of the Moaga Empire, regional 
headquarters of the French colonial 
administration. Ramatoulaye was first 
founded as a simple village, around 
1920 by Aboubaker Savadogo, a man 
who had received the Tidjani Order 
wird. The present-day city was built by 
his son Mohammed, who succeeded 
Shaykh Aboubakr at his death in 1945. 
Ramatoulaye, since then, has been 
steadily growing. The site has acquired 
a considerable symbolic dimension, 
becoming one of the central shrines of Islam in Burkina and, beyond 
that, in western Africa.
Today, however, Ramatoulaye has to meet a number of challenges if 
it is to sustain and augment its spiritual centrality and socio-political 
legitimacy. On the Islamic front, it faces competition from the “twelve 
bead” Tidjani Order and from Wahhabi currents. It also finds itself 
caught up in a religious bidding war, especially with active Christian 
evangelical movements. Above all it has to play its hand wisely in its 
relationship with the semi-authoritarian Burkinabé regime, which uses 
religion as well as tribal social forces to consolidate its popular legiti-
macy. Accordingly, the Ramatoulaye brotherhood has carried out a se-
ries of redeployments, which can best be seen in the light of modern 
African history and the presence and role of Islam.
Colonization and the Tidjani Order
The colonization of Western Africa, which picked up speed in the sec-
ond half of the nineteenth century, was a major cause of the destruction 
and de-legitimization of existing social structures, thereby, creating the 
conditions for an increase in the legitimacy of Islam as a means of col-
lective identity. In addition, unification of territories, road building, and 
modernizing means of communication allowed faster and wider circula-
tion of persons and ideas. The result was a new phase of the expansion 
of Islam during the colonial period between 1850 
and 1950. During this turbulent period, the Tidjani 
Order took up different positions in regard to the 
colonizing power. Some leaders originated jihad-
ist movements, like that of Hajj Umar in the mid-
nineteenth century. In reaction to the catastrophic 
results of this jihad, which led to armed conflict be-
tween Muslims, some leaders collaborated, within 
certain limits, with the colonizing power. 
One branch of the Tidjaniyya, in the Volta basin, 
distanced itself from this political context. It strong-
ly emphasized the spiritual nature of the Sufi mes-
sage and practised a sort of “spiritual” resistance 
as a protest against the colonizers. At Nioro in the 
Sahel, Shaykh Hamallah, who had received the Tid-
jani wird, initiated a variant (at the beginning of the 
1920’s) referred to as the Tidjaniyya of the “eleven 
beads.”2 Through reciting 11 times the Jawharat al 
kamâl (pearl of perfection) in the dikhr, he distin-
guished his variant from the classic Tidjani practice 
of reciting it twelve times. According to the Hamal-
list tradition, it was Shaykh Tidjani himself who re-
cited the pearl of perfection 11 times. This return to 
11 recitations thus signifies a return to the sources 
of the Tidjaniyya and its spirituality. An esoteric in-
terpretation reported by Hampate Bâ 
also indicates that the figure 11 is that 
of pure spirituality, of communion with 
God, whereas the figure 12 is that of the 
temporal engagement. This symbolic 
gesture indicated that it was necessary 
to spiritualize the Tidjaniyya path and re-
lieve it of all terrestrial encumbrances. 
The French colonizers would term 
this variant “Hamallist,” and the term 
remains in use today. The French saw 
Hamallah and the Hamallists as danger-
ous opponents of colonial policy. Their 
repressive response increased after 
1940 under the Vichy regime. Hamallah 
was imprisoned, later deported to France, where he died in 1943. Hamal-
lism boasted important figures in Western Africa such as Diarno Boka 
Tall, the “sage of Bandiagara,” a title bestowed by Hampaté Bâ, who had 
himself converted to Hamallism. In Upper Volta, Hamallism was spread 
through three people who received the wird and who were designated 
muqaddem (representatives) by Hamallah himself. One was Moussa 
Aminou, established in Diori in the northern part of Upper Volta, in the 
Sahel region. He launched a jihad in 1949, which lasted exactly 24 hours 
before being bloodily put down and he himself killed. The second was 
Abdoullaye Doukouré who introduced Hamallism among the Peuls from 
his base in the town of Djibo. The third was Aboubaker Savadogo who 
received the Tidjani wird and was then named muqaddem of the “eleven 
beads” by Hamallah in 1923. 
The construction of a Shaykh and a utopia
Shaykh Aboubaker, the founder of Ramatoulaye, completed his Qu-
ranic studies in 1908. After a ten-year pilgrimage, which led him to the 
holy places and later to Ghana, he returned to his village having received 
the Tidjani wird. He was thrown out by the animist chiefs, whose prestige 
had been shaken by Aboubaker’s preaching, which they felt undermined 
ancient beliefs (ancestor cults, foundations of traditional power). Abou-
baker then began to formulate the project of building a holy city for pure 
Muslims, which he called Ramatoulaye.3 Numerous of the faithful joined 
the Shaykh.
Ramatoulaye underwent colonial control and repression, especially 
after the Shaykh’s adoption of Hamallism. Shaykh Aboubaker was im-
prisoned, his adepts were dispersed and Ramatoulaye was destroyed. 
Aboubaker was freed in 1947 following changes in French colonial policy. 
As described in one of the interviews, “He was given (a sentence of ) ten 
years. They took five of them. God took the rest.” Aboubaker died a few 
months after being released. His successor and son, Muhammad Sava-
dogo, successfully imposed his authority in 1945 just before his father’s 
death and instituted a new phase of the brotherhood, which consisted of 
a complete institutionalization of the charismatic nature of the founder. 
First, Shaykh Muhammad changed the patronym Savadogo (very current 
in Yatenga province) to that of Maïga, in reference to a Muslim ancestor. 
He thus constructed a long Islamic lineage and at the same time inaugu-
rated a dynasty of Shaykhs. He then redesigned the city and the zaouyya, 
which includes the tomb of the founder. In 1962, he set up the great 
mosque, which can hold a thousand persons, copied from the mosque of 
Nioro, and designated it for Friday prayers. The city was divided into four 
quarters whose names all refer to the Islamic world: Mecca, Medina, Fez, 
Dar as Salaam. 
Today Ramatoulaye, the “city of the Shaykh,” ruled by the Shaykh’s jus-
tice has in its population third and fourth generation residents. These resi-
dents are very vocal about Ramatoulaye’s attractions: “We came to find 
the truth.” “We came to follow the Master.” The Shaykh “had Islam.” Follow-
Religious movements are playing a new role of 
social consolidation in many African countries. 
In these contexts of “insecure modernization”1 
religious groups and images provide followers 
new bases for social solidarity, as well as 
identity and moral references. Similarly, new 
expressions of African Islam which, while 
founding themselves on the old tariqas, carry 
out modernizing transformations in an attempt 
to respond to contemporary situations and 
expectations. This is the case for the “eleven 
bead” variant of the Tidjani Sufi Order, whose 
spiritual centre is the “city” of Ramatoulaye in 
western Burkina Faso. 
[T]he attraction of 
Ramatoulaye [is] 
the city’s ability 
to present itself 
as a successful 
social model, quite 
apart from its holy 
character.
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ing the Shaykh also bears fruit: “When we converted to Islam, 
parents refused (us) their daughters. So the Shaykh provided a 
woman,” as the story of a first-hour adept is told. If one comes 
here, one must do “what is commanded,” for “the Shaykh has 
instituted the law.” “We have peace in our hearts” because 
the Shaykh has offered “a paved road to salvation.” The city is 
made holy by the presence of the Shaykh, as by the rhythm 
of prayers and the dhikr held in the purest Tidjani tradition. 
However, this local holiness is male. Women are confined to 
the domestic sphere, even excluded from the daily agricultural 
work so many African women perform. In September 2003 we 
saw TV antennas appear on the roofs of a few houses. It is as if 
the masculine (and Shaykh) power was obliged to bend a little 
to accommodate modern needs.
Present challenges
The proclamation of Burkinan independence in 1960 led 
Ramatoulaye, along with many other religious forces, to take 
a position in the new order of an independent nation-state. 
Its resistance to colonization gave the brotherhood credibility, 
but nonetheless several years were needed before Ramatou-
laye understood how it should position itself in the context of 
a new state. In 1985, under Sankara’s regime, the brotherhood 
was suspected of plotting. The other Hamallist branch, led 
by Abdoullaye Doukouré from Djibo, a few dozen kilometres 
from Ramatoulaye, rapidly gained a foothold in the capital of 
the Burkinabean State, close to the new power. Only upon the 
death in 1987 of Mohammed Maïga did the current Shaykh launch a strat-
egy of gaining visibility in Ouagadougou, the capital. From that point, a 
true political exchange took place. Ramatoulaye contributed to the legiti-
mization of the regime ruling Burkina Faso, and in turn was legitimized 
by the central government. The change of status was reflected in the par-
ticipation of the President—a Catholic—in the Mawlid festivities in 1990. 
Conversely, in 2002 the Shaykh was part of a delegation received by the 
President on the occasion of the “day of pardoning,” a critical moment in 
recent Burkinabean history.
Education is the new concern that Ramatoulaye is eager to take ad-
vantage of. It poses interesting questions since education is situated at 
the intersection of different contemporary logics. The weakening of the 
Burkinabean State, following sanctions imposed by international agen-
cies, created new incentives for privatization of the educational system. 
The state, which has become a member of the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference, has agreed to recognize “Franco-Arab” schools in response to 
pressure from Muslim associations. Ramatoulaye hastened to use these 
new possibilities. With financial assistance from the Libyan Islamic Call, a 
“Franco-Arabic” high school was opened at Ramatoulaye, which included 
a teacher-training programme. In 1998, the government accredited the 
school. The teachers, young inhabitants of Ramatoulaye, have finished 
their studies in various Islamic universities (al Azhar, Zitouna, Damascus) 
through grants offered by the Libyan Islamic Call. Participation in this 
“modern” form of education, in contrast to classical forms of Quranic edu-
cation, has placed the brotherhood in the mainstream of the country’s 
efforts toward development, while also confirming its membership in the 
new “locality” which is the nation-state.
Through the development of these schools we see at Ramatoulaye a 
process, often observed in African countries, of an increasing Arabization 
among intellectuals and middle-level white-collar workers. This is only 
partly attributable to the role played by the Quranic schools and the clas-
sical madrasas. It is also a matter of Arabization accompanied by literacy. 
Arabic is no longer only a means of oral expression in symbol and ritual, 
and Arabic script and writing a devotional form transmitted by the perish-
able calligraphy of Quranic schools. Arabic is now a spoken language and, 
even more importantly, a written language which has become a source 
of normativity. This process of globalization of a written sacred language 
introduces new dynamics and challenges to the charisma of the Shaykh, 
traditionally rooted in the person of the Shaykh, and sets him in competi-
tion with scholars of the written word and daily pragmatic norm.
Furthermore, the growth of the population and the presence of institu-
tions of learning raise the question of whether the city should be enlarged, 
or should be restricted to its current size, of about 5,000 inhabitants. An 
enlargement of the city would seem to require more mosques. But “there 
must be only one path, therefore one single mosque” in the words of an 
interviewee. Making the city larger would imply an increase in various ac-
tivities, thereby creating a risk that norms which govern the unity of the 
city might be disturbed. Certainly, with the arrival of the third generation, 
the question will be to see if Ramatoulaye will be able to respond to the 
needs of the young men of today and to the suppressed aspirations of its 
women. This is perhaps the greatest challenge of the future, now that the 
pioneers of the Shaykh’s generation are disappearing gradually.
Finally, the Tidjani, like all the brotherhoods, are typical participants in 
the dynamic of globalizing Islam, which while procuring their own expan-
sion as a brotherhood introduces innovative features. One novelty, for ex-
ample, is their introduction to global networks of the Libyan Islamic Call, 
just as the other branch of Hamallism is integrated into the wider Saudi 
network. Ramatoulaye itself appears to be at the beginning of a process 
of globalization properly so called. The radial influence of Ramatoulaye 
has begun to affect various localities and even to go beyond Burkina. 
Members from neighbouring countries (like Mali, Niger, Ghana, Benin) 
participate in the pilgrimage of Mawlid, one of the greatest moments in 
the life of Ramatoulaye. Diplomatic representatives 
of these countries also attend, as well as members 
of other branches of the Tidjani. It is certainly not to 
be attributed solely to the mystical aura of the cur-
rent Shaykh, who appears to be more a nimble po-
litical figure than a mystic. Rather, the attraction of 
Ramatoulaye may lay in the city’s ability to present 
itself as a successful social model, quite apart from 
its holy character: “If you come in clear-minded 
fashion, you will obtain that which you seek. And 
then you will testify to others …” It is precisely these 
very challenges and opportunities that will deter-
mine Ramatoulaye’s future prosperity or its mere 
survival. 
View at 
Ramatoulaye 
from the 
Mosque
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Notes
1. See: P. J. Laurent, Les pentecôtistes du Burkina 
Faso. Mariage, Pouvoir et guérison (Paris: 
Karthala, 2003), 448.
2. Hamallism has often been studied by 
colonial administrators as well as academic 
researchers. See for example: B. Savadogo, 
Confreries et pouvoirs. La Tijaniyya 
Hamawiyya en Afrique occidentale (Burkina 
Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger): 1909-1965 (Aix 
en Provence: University de Provence, 1998). 
3. Research on Ramatoulaye is directed and 
administered by Felice Dassetto and Pierre 
Joseph Laurent (CISCOW/CISMOC and 
LAAP) at the Catholic University of Louvain-
la-Neuve with the collaboration of Tasseré 
Ouedraogo. The project has included several 
site visits and a hundred interviews made 
between 2003 and 2006.  
See: http://www.cismoc.ucl.ac.be/.
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Centre for Interdisciplinary Research on Islam in the Contemporary World (CISCOW/ CISMOC) at 
the Catholic University of Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium. 
Email: dassetto@anso.ucl.ac.be
Pierre Joseph Laurent is Professor at the Unité d’anthropologie et sociologie and the Laboratoire 
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M AT T E O  F U M A G A L L I On 13 May 2005 the security forces of 
Uzbekistan reacted to a protest demon-
stration that had gathered in the cen-
tre of Andijan, a town of about 320,000 
people located in the Ferghana valley 
region of post-Soviet Uzbekistan. The 
previous night a group of armed men 
had assaulted the local prison and 
freed several hundred inmates. Among 
them were twenty-three local entre-
preneurs that the authorities had jailed 
over the summer of 2004 on the charge 
of being part of the “Islamist” organiza-
tion Akromiya. They were awaiting an 
imminent verdict. Demanding their release, local citizens had assem-
bled in the town centre several times in the preceding months, to no 
avail, but incidentally also exciting no particular reaction by the local 
authorities. In the morning of 13 May, the insurgents moved on to oc-
cupy the local city council (hokimiyat). At the same time a crowd of 
thousands took to the streets protesting against the government, as 
they had done many times in previous months. Then, abruptly, gov-
ernment forces began a swift crackdown on the demonstrators. Chaos 
ensued. Curfew was imposed, the region was sealed off from the rest of 
the country, and strict security measures were enforced. Indeed, order 
was restored at a very high price.
In the days following the events a large number of people fled the 
country. Most of them found temporary refuge in neighbouring Kyr-
gyzstan. At the same time demands for an independent investigation 
voiced by human rights organization were vehemently rejected by Uz-
bekistani authorities. Disputes over the course of events, the rationale 
behind government crackdown, the identity of the protesters, and es-
pecially the count of the victim opened a chasm between the Uzbek 
official version and that of international organi-
zations. The relations between this post-Soviet 
Republic and Western states who, under the pres-
sure of human right organizations had demanded 
that Tashkent allowed an independent investiga-
tion, reached the lowest point since independ-
ence.1 In short, the events of 13 May 2005 marked 
the climax of months, even years, of mounting 
tensions in post-Soviet Uzbekistan. The ruth-
less crackdown on the Andijan demonstrations 
together with the events of the preceding night 
should not be taken in isolation: understanding 
the context in which events have unfolded and 
their broader ramifications is essential. 
State violence and violence against
the state
In the weeks following the Andijan events, the 
government justified its actions as a necessary re-
action to tackle a militant insurgency, organized 
by Islamic radical organizations. The protesters, 
but also international human rights organizations, 
countered the claim by arguing that unarmed ci-
vilians, including children, were being shot at. 
There is neither consensus as to what really hap-
pened nor why.2 That hours of intense 
shooting and street fight and killing 
occurred is not under dispute by any 
side; what is contested is the number 
and identity of people left dead on the 
ground. According to an official inves-
tigation 187 people, mostly “terror-
ists” died, whereas according to inter-
national human rights organizations 
many more, mostly unarmed, civilians 
lost their lives because of government 
action. What actually happened still re-
mains wrapped in mystery, largely as a 
result of the Uzbekistani government’s 
refusal to allow an independent investigation into the dynamics of 
events. 
The aftermath of the Andijan events was defined by a “war of figures.” 
The dawn of 14 May 2005 was truly a “dawn of the living dead” because 
of this irreconcilability between the two positions. Hundreds of Uzbeks, 
if not a thousand or more, were counted dead by some (human rights 
organizations), but never died according to others (Uzbek state author-
ities). Although there are insufficient verifiable sources to prove the 
exact number of casualties, by situating the events within the broader 
developments of state-society relations in Uzbekistan it becomes not 
only clearer how and why this eruption of violence occurred, but also 
what the short and medium-term implications will be. 
One cannot make sense of this particular set of Andijan events with-
out looking at the larger picture of the post-independence difficul-
ties experienced by both state and society. Though the government 
allowed a limited multiparty system to develop soon after independ-
ence, democracy remained at a mere façade level, with power and de-
cision-making being the domain of closed elite circles. The economic 
downturn plunged most Uzbeks in poverty while privatization ben-
efited only a few. With the state failing to act as social safety net, many 
ordinary citizens had to resort to alternative means to cope with eco-
nomic duress.
Thus, as Kandiyoti noted, the key to understanding “Andijan” lies 
in the breakdown of the social contract between state and society 
whereby the latter is experiencing a “crisis in provision, legitimacy and 
security.”3 The background to the 2005 tragic events lies mostly in the 
convergence of impoverishment of large sections of the population 
(economic insecurity), the lack of safety valves for “letting pressure go” 
(social insecurity), the state’s fear of any form of opposition and sub-
sequent clampdown on it, and a decline of state authority and legiti-
macy (political insecurity). All of these factors have created a state of 
fear and powerlessness among the population which, deprived of any 
legal outlet for airing grievances has leaned towards various forms of 
opposition, some “silent” and non-violent, others more intolerant and 
violent. A glance at the post-independence era suggests that Uzbeks 
have typically resorted to limited forms of protest, due to over-arching 
structural constraints. When these have taken place, they have tradi-
tionally taken the shape of street demonstrations and pickets. Hence, 
taken in isolation, the lead-up to the Andijan events could be read as a 
typical example of “coping strategy.” 
Nevertheless, it would be a misrepresentation to simply depict the 
relation between the government and its citizens in terms of violent 
state oppression and peaceful resistance. In rare, though visible cases, 
The violent crackdown of a large demonstration 
by government forces in Uzbekistan in 
May 2005 spurred many controversies. The 
government tried to legitimate its actions 
by insisting that it had acted against radical 
Islamists and terrorists, but other sources 
claimed that unarmed civilians, including 
children, were massacred. Although tragic, 
it should be stressed that the events did not 
represent a break with the past. Rather, they 
should be read as part of an on-going struggle 
between popular forms of resistance and state 
articulation of a discourse of terrorism. 
[T]he group’s 
successful attempts 
to provide real-
life alternatives 
… blatantly 
demonstrated 
the shortcomings 
of the regime.
State Violence and 
Popular Resistance
in Uzbekistan
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radicalized elements of society have re-
sorted to violence. Such radical dissent 
has been articulated in the language 
of Islam, as it is a key marker of Uzbek 
identity and a popular frame for po-
litical mobilization. During the 1990s, 
the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan 
(IMU) posed an increasing threat to the 
administration of president Karimov, 
which culminated in the assassination 
attempts in 1999 and clashes between 
Uzbek government forces and the IMU 
in 2000. These attacks were not frag-
ments of government imagination, but 
real experiences of anti-government 
militancy, of violence against the state. 
Moreover, Hizb-ut Tahrir, a transnation-
al Islamist organization, also banned in 
Uzbekistan, has been reported to gain 
in popularity in recent years. Although 
this growing appeal of Islamist move-
ments understandably unsettles the 
government, it should be stressed that 
manifestations of violent opposition 
remained the exception rather than 
the rule. 
The Andijan events, regardless of 
one’s own reading of them, were thus 
not an isolated episode of resistance and/or repression in post-Soviet 
Uzbekistan. The bitter irony is that the entrepreneurs under arrest did 
not engage in any known violent activities. They were part of a group 
or network that became known as Akromiya, whose members were en-
gaged in mutual help activities and happened to share strong religious 
beliefs. Pooling resources for the common good constituted a way of 
getting around intense economic pressure from the state. It is likely 
that the group’s successful attempts to provide real-life alternatives 
to the failures of the government made them an even larger threat to 
the Karimov regime as they blatantly demonstrated the shortcomings 
of the regime. This suggests that the Andijan events have less to do 
with radical Islam, however much strength this may have gained in the 
country in recent years, and more with the state’s incapacity to comply 
with the expectations of its part of the social contract.
What can be seen here is the convergence of a discourse about “ter-
rorism” propagated by the government, and the actual activities of op-
position groups that are or are not violent. Explicitly linked to Islamic 
radicalism according to the authorities, but seen as an association of 
pious local entrepreneurs by others (including human rights organiza-
tions), Akromiya is perhaps more realistically an “informal association 
of like-minded individuals, mostly young entrepreneurs … [intent in] 
pooling their resources for the benefit of their communities.”4 This 
does not detract from the possibility that radicalism may have become 
a more popular option for disgruntled elements of Uzbek society, but 
calls for qualification of the government-articulated thesis that Islamic 
radicalism might be the “culprit by default” of recent insurgencies in 
the country. 
The intensity of the May 2005 crackdown has not just instigated a 
sense of fear among the population, but also raised the question as to 
whether instead of being a source of security for its citizens, the state 
may have become the main source of insecurity. This sentiment was 
well captured during an interview held with an Uzbek citizen who 
had assisted to the events in Andijan: “[w]hen the people are hungry 
and rebel against the state, it is not terrorism, but when the state kills 
its own people, then that is terrorism!”5 This seems to suggest that 
the very definition and popular perception of what constitutes ter-
rorism has become blurred over the years. Although only few Uzbek 
citizens condone violence, the statement returns the accusation of 
terrorism back to the very actor that has branded any form of op-
position as being part of a terrorist threat. Whether such threats are 
real or imagined has lost its significance as the government’s (increas-
ingly incredible) discourse of stability and security has become the 
defining element in state-society relations. In this light the Andijan 
events should be viewed in terms of continuity rather than dramatic 
change. 
What next?
So, what awaits Uzbekistan and its citizens? However tragic, the Andi-
jan events do not represent a rupture with the past. Quite the contrary, 
they “merely” constitute the latest episode in the deterioration of state-
society relations. State and society have begun to isolate from each 
other. While the former now tends to see any instance of popular ex-
pression as evidence of an imminent threat to its survival, the latter has 
developed an explicit distrust and fear of the state. Repeated episodes 
of popular protest and more rare, but increasingly frequent, violent 
outbursts of resistance point to a state increas-
ingly out of tune with its own population. 
By cracking down in such a ruthless way, along 
with generating a sense of widespread fear across 
the population, the government reaction may 
have achieved the objective of sending a mes-
sage that similar acts of resistance would not be 
tolerated. For months, in fact, protest remained 
dormant. Gradually, however, new acts of pro-
tests resurfaced in the country, over the sum-
mer of 2005 in Samarkand and with women-only 
peaceful demonstrations across the streets of 
Andijan in January 2006. More than a year after 
Andijan state and society have not shown signs 
of reconciliation. Any more wait, let alone failure 
to do so, will only prolong scenarios of instability 
when change ultimately occurs. 
Notes
1. In fact they had already soured since the 
start of the so-called “colour revolutions” 
in other post-Soviet republics since 2003 
(Georgia, Ukraine), which president Karimov 
perceived as aiming to effect regime change 
and, therefore, threaten his position in 
power. 
2. Thus S. Akiner’s Violence in Andijan 2005: 
An Independent Assessment (Washington DC, 
Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Silk Road 
Papers, 2005) represents the account most 
sympathetic to the government’s version 
of the events. By contrast, Human Rights 
Watch, Bullets were falling like Rain: The 
Andijan Massacre 13 May 2005 (Report vol. 
17, 5(D), July 2005) renders those views that 
are most different from it. The International 
Crisis Group, Uzbekistan: The Andijon 
Uprising (Asia briefing 38, 25 May 2005) 
gives a balanced account of the events, 
background, and immediate consequences.
3. D. Kandiyoti, “Andijan: Prelude to a 
Massacre,” Open Democracy, 20 May 2005, 
(http://www.opendemocracy.net). 
4. International Crisis Group, Uzbekistan: 
The Andijan Uprising, 2.
5. The interview was held on 22 July 2005, 
in Osh, Kyrgyzstan.
Uzbek refugees 
from Andijan in 
a tent village, 
Jalal-Abad 
province, 
Kyrgyzstan, 
15 May 2005
P
H
O
T
O
 B
Y
 V
L
A
D
IM
IR
 P
IR
O
G
O
V
 /
 ©
 R
E
U
T
E
R
S
, 
2
0
0
5
Matteo Fumagalli is Lecturer at the School of Politics and International Relations, University 
College Dublin, National University of Ireland.
Email: matteo.fumagalli@ucd.ie
I S I M  R E V I E W  1 8  /  A U T U M N  2 0 0 6  2 9
Image not available online
The transformation of war into polic-
ing, and therefore its de-militarization 
is something that has been widely rec-
ognized, not least within the U.S. armed 
forces themselves. In 2004, for instance, 
the “Final report of the independent 
panel to review Department of Defense 
detention operations” dealt with the in-
cidents of prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib 
precisely by placing them in this context. 
It argued that the emergence of global 
terrorism and its “asymmetric warfare” 
made the “orthodox lexicon of war,” like 
state sovereignty, national borders, uni-
formed combatants, declarations of war 
and even war itself irrelevant, for today 
“the power to wage war can rest in the hands of a few dozen highly moti-
vated people with cell phones and access to the Internet.”1 Furthermore, 
“the smallness and wide dispersal of these enemy assets make it prob-
lematic to focus on signal and imagery intelligence as we did in the Cold 
War, Desert Storm, and the first phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The 
ability of terrorists and insurgents to blend into the civilian population 
further decreases their vulnerability to signal and 
imagery intelligence. Thus, information gained 
from human sources, whether by spying or inter-
rogation, is essential in narrowing the field upon 
which other intelligence gathering resources may 
be applied.”2
Criminalizing the enemy
What all this means is that a place like Abu Gh-
raib was suddenly transformed into something it 
was never meant to be, an interrogation centre 
that was part of a new form of warfare in which 
“the distinction between front and rear becomes 
more fluid.”3 In other words, the novelty of the glo-
bal war on terror was represented at the prison by 
the virtual collapse of distinctions between inter-
nal and external enemies, as well as between front 
and rear lines. Quite apart from the ineptitude ex-
hibited by all concerned with the prison, then, as 
well as the infractions committed by some among 
its staff, the abuse at Abu Ghraib was important 
because it threw light upon the new role assumed 
by military detention, which was no longer to 
process front-line suspects quickly for distribu-
tion to judicial bodies in the rear, but rather to 
hold them for extended periods in order to extract urgent or “action-
able” information that might prevent future acts of terror, a function 
which is effectively one of policing because it turns enemy actions into 
criminal ones. Extracting information from prisoners of war, of course, 
is no new thing, but to do so in the theatre of war by intertwining and 
even confusing the jurisdiction of the army and the CIA is a departure 
from standard practice. For the very presence of the CIA at Abu Ghraib, 
signalled the introduction of rules outside traditional military logic as 
well as jurisdiction. Hence, a facility like Abu Ghraib lost its traditional 
function of providing one service in the linear logic of military deploy-
ment, something like an old-fashioned factory line, to become a multi-
tasking node within a non-linear or network logic.
It was this very criminalization of enemy actions that had led to the 
partial suspension of the Geneva Conventions, which included the 
President approving, in principle, the use of torture for al-Qaeda and 
Taliban detainees in Afghanistan and 
at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba. Precisely 
because such detainees did not seem 
to fall under the formal, public and 
state-centred categories listed by the 
Geneva Conventions they could be de-
scribed as unlawful combatants, enemy 
combatants, or unprivileged belliger-
ents. The debate generated by these 
developments, of course, has focused 
on the fact that such new enemies ap-
pear to possess no legal status at all, 
being defined neither as soldiers nor 
as civilians, neither as foreign subjects 
nor as domestic ones. This was exactly 
the concern expressed by the Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross as well as by the U.S. Supreme Court, 
since the government did not even have a negative definition for such 
combatants, i.e. those who could not fall into their ranks.4 
What the debate did not take into consideration, however, is the 
fact that the suspension of any juridical definition for this new kind of 
enemy ended up pushing him from the public status of foreigner and 
soldier to the private one of domestic and civilian ambiguity. Because 
this enemy had no legal status under international as much as domes-
tic statute, in other words, he existed underneath the law rather than 
under it. While a criminal, after all, enjoys rights because he possesses 
juridical status, this new enemy is not classed as a criminal, but rather as 
someone criminal-like. What this did was to transform the landscape of 
war into one of civilian and, therefore, of ethical life because the enemy 
was now increasingly given his due, not by right, but as a gift or favour. 
Treated thus he became a mere human being rather than prisoner of 
war properly defined, which meant that his captors, too, were suddenly 
and ironically defined merely as human beings and not as soldiers sub-
ject to a set of positive regulations. The historical precedent for such a 
status is that of slaves, who also existed underneath the law governing 
free men as much as criminals, becoming therefore merely human be-
ings along with their masters.5 For what could be more human than 
social relations governed by ethical rather than juridical practices?
Civilian ethics and the military
All this is made very clear by the U.S. presidential memorandum of 
February 7, 2002, which suspends certain articles of the Geneva Con-
ventions while at the same time emphasizing the need to adhere to 
their principles. “As a matter of policy,” the President declared, “United 
States Armed Forces shall continue to treat detainees humanely and, to 
the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a man-
ner consistent with the principles of Geneva.”6 In other words these for-
merly juridical duties of military experience have been turned into the 
ethical prescriptions of an ambiguously civil life, becoming discretion-
ary and, therefore, gift-like. The place evacuated by the language of 
the law, then, is occupied by the vocabulary of ethics precisely because 
neither legal obligations exist nor even a clear doctrine regarding the 
treatment of detainees. Given this, it is not incidental that the “Final 
report of the independent panel to review Department of Defense de-
tention operations” should recommend that all “personnel who may be 
engaged in detention operations, from point of capture to final dis-
position, should participate in a professional ethics programme that 
would equip them with a sharp moral compass for guidance in situa-
tions often riven with conflicting moral obligations.”7
Instead of reading the recommendations of the independent panel 
either as a lot of eyewash, or as routine ways of addressing routine 
military problems, I see them expressing a genuine attempt to deal 
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Global War on Terror
as De-Militarization
This essay argues that the emergence of al-
Qaeda as a new kind of enemy has resulted 
in the paradoxical de-militarization of the 
war waged against it. The much-publicized 
incidents of abuse at the U.S. detention centre 
of Abu Ghraib provide an example of the way in 
which the Global War on Terror has increasingly 
become a criminal rather than military 
operation. By reclassifying Iraqi prisoners 
into “criminal-like” enemies they became 
mere human beings rather than prisoner of 
war properly defined, which meant that their 
captors, too, were ironically defined merely as 
human beings and not as soldiers subject to a 
set of positive regulations.
[T]he global war 
on terror was 
represented … by 
the virtual collapse 
of distinctions 
between internal 
and external 
enemies.
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with a novel situation—one which includes the troubling 
insertion into military life of an ambiguously civilian space 
of ethical rather than juridical existence. “Some individuals,” 
states the report, “seized the opportunity provided by this 
environment to give vent to latent sadistic urges. Moreover, 
many well-intentioned professionals, attempting to resolve 
the inherent moral conflict between using harsh techniques 
to gain information to save lives and treating detainees hu-
manely, found themselves on uncharted ethical ground, with 
frequently changing guidance from above.”8 As if to support 
this position, the “Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention 
Facility and 205th Military Intelligence Brigade” even quotes 
Staff Sergeant Ivan L. Frederick II, one of the soldiers accused 
of the most egregious abuse, telling colleagues who rescued 
one of his victims, “I want to thank you guys, because up 
until a week or two ago, I was a good Christian.”9 This was 
well before any photographs had surfaced from Abu Ghraib, 
or any investigation launched. 
The emergence of such new spaces within the cultural and 
institutional life of the armed forces is neither accidental nor 
unplanned, for the prison we have been looking at in Bagh-
dad marks one site in which the eminently private, civilian, 
and even ethical vision for the military proposed by the U.S. 
Secretary of Defense has achieved its crude beginnings: “We must trans-
form not only our armed forces but also the Defense Department that 
serves them—by encouraging a culture of creativity and intelligent risk-
taking. We must promote a more entrepreneurial approach: one that 
encourages people to be proactive, not reactive, and to behave less like 
bureaucrats and more like venture capitalists; one that does not wait 
for threats to emerge and be ‘validated’ but rather anticipates them be-
fore they appear and develops new capacities to dissuade and deter 
them.”10
Both the Armed Forces and the State Department had opposed the 
President’s suspension of certain articles in the Geneva Conventions, 
arguing not only that these were sufficient to deal with the enemy 
threat, but also that “to conclude otherwise would be inconsistent with 
past practice and policy, jeopardize the United States armed forces 
personnel, and undermine the United States military culture which is 
based on a strict adherence to the laws of war.”11 Apart from the re-
percussions of this suspension in terms of international law as well as 
of international reputation, which were primarily the concerns of the 
State Department, the military was concerned with the fragmentation 
of its own culture that such partial suspensions of juridical uniformity 
represented. And indeed a whole new world of private or civilian prac-
tice soon hove into view, or rather out of view, within the armed forces. 
For example, interrogation techniques, as well as moral liberties that 
had been permissible in Afghanistan and Guantanamo Bay, where the 
relevant articles of the Geneva Conventions had been suspended, were 
introduced into Iraq, where they were still in force, through “a store of 
common lore and practice within the interrogator community circulat-
ing through Guantanamo, Afghanistan and elsewhere.”12
The juridical fragmentation and privatization of military life was com-
pounded by its institutional fragmentation and privatization, given the 
presence of private contractors or the CIA at a facility like Abu Ghraib, 
all working under different rules. Naturally, the absence of legal or 
doctrinal uniformity, plus the sheer multiplicity of guidance, informa-
tion, and authority present, created areas of confusion, negligence, 
and criminal opportunity in the prison.13 All this, of course, would be 
avoidable once a doctrine governing relations between these various 
elements was formulated and enforced. What seems to be unavoidable 
even under the most serene of conditions is the military’s cultural and 
institutional fragmentation, signalled most disturbingly, not by the 
infiltration of private contractors and the CIA into its domain, but by 
the spread of private or civilian practices among its own troops. This 
is not a matter merely of temporary exigencies having to do with the 
particularities of time, place or resources, but apparently marks a new 
paradigm of war that has emerged since the attacks of 9/11. It is in this 
light that the deference accorded at Abu Ghraib to non-commissioned 
officers who had civilian correctional backgrounds becomes signifi-
cant.14 For no matter how accidental or temporary it might have been, 
such deferral points to the private, civilian, and even ethical nature of 
new military practices—which, paradoxically, end up treating foreign 
enemies like but not as domestic criminals.
Unlike many commentators on the incidents of abuse at Abu Ghraib, 
who, like those accused of it, blame such incidents on orders given 
from above, I suspect that American military culture itself had little to 
do with the sadistic fantasies of the soldiers involved. This is why the 
two official reports on these episodes are so concerned with the frag-
mentation of command structures, the private world of unauthorized 
behaviour, and the military risk they represent. Indeed the apparent 
tolerance of abuse among some of the superiors of those accused, as 
well as of their colleagues who did not participate in it, poses signifi-
cant risks to military discipline, as the reports acknowledge by recom-
mending punitive measures and additional training. The reports also 
make it very clear that the new paradigm of war announced by the at-
tacks of 9/11, which entailed, among other things, suspending the tra-
ditional laws of war, are transforming the American armed forces in an 
unexpected fashion by breaking down some of its familiar structures 
in ways like opening it up to multiple sets of rules as well as to private 
contractors and other civilians.
I want to bring this set of reflections on Abu Ghraib and the trans-
formation of American military life to a close by pointing out the chief 
repercussion that al-Qaeda’s jihad has upon its enemy’s identity and 
functioning: the problem posed by asymmetric warfare to convention-
al deployments of force. This problem is described very succinctly in 
the “Final report of the independent panel to review Department of 
Defense detention operations,” which states that asymmetric warfare 
“can be viewed as attempts to circumvent or undermine a superior, 
conventional strength, while exploiting its weaknesses using methods 
the superior force can neither defeat nor resort to itself.”15 While this 
definition recognizes the structural impasse posed by  al-Qaeda, whose 
organization, mobility, and aims no longer bear much comparison to 
those of guerrilla or terrorist groups in the past, it does not consider 
the ways in which such asymmetrical warfare has, in fact, changed 
the armed forces. But does not the collapsing of military distinctions 
between the external and internal enemy, or the 
front and rear line, mirror the global jihad’s own 
collapse of the distinction between the near and 
far enemy, or the military and civilian one? Does 
not the juridical, cultural, and institutional frag-
mentation of the U.S. armed forces mirror that of 
al-Qaeda? And does not diverting military life into 
private, civilian, and even ethical channels mirror 
a similar diversion in the lives of Islam’s holy war-
riors?
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Lebanese Shia Women
Temporality and Piety
For many Shia Muslims in Lebanon 
since the late 1970s—particular prac-
tices of piety have become part of a 
discourse that is held up as an alterna-
tive to notions of a secular modernity. 
In this process, an identity has been 
forged that is understood to be both 
pious and modern, and where notions 
of piety and modernity are interde-
pendent on one another.2 Within this 
context, ideals of public piety—or 
public expressions of religious commit-
ment that are interpreted in contextual 
ways—have had particular ramifica-
tions for women. This is in part because of gendered markers of religi-
osity like the headscarf, but more importantly, because public piety has 
emerged in relation to a set of gender ideologies that highlight the 
ways that locality is firmly embedded in its transnational dimensions. 
In what follows, I will touch upon the interconnections among local 
and transnational gendered linkings of piety to modernity, female role 
models from Shia religious history, and ideas about temporality. 
The link between notions of piety and modernity is rooted in a Leba-
nese Shia mobilization around religion that began in the 1970s. The 
dominant gender ideologies in circulation amongst pious Shia have 
emerged through these historical processes and in the Lebanese con-
text of sectarian coexistence. Over this period of transformation, the 
meaning of “modernity” in the pious Shia cultural sphere came to in-
clude three elements: being “civilized” as opposed to backward, mate-
rial progress, and spiritual progress—which meant cultivating particu-
lar religious understandings and practices that were characterized as 
more “authentic” than supposedly older or “more traditional” forms. For 
women in this community, the result has been that to be considered a 
modern woman in most contexts, one must also be visibly pious in very 
specific ways. To begin to look at the ways women demonstrate these 
qualities simultaneously, let us turn to contemporary reformulations of 
the behaviour of Sayyida Zaynab at the Battle of Karbala. 
Zaynab as role model
Ashura, the annual commemoration of Imam Husayn’s martyrdom at 
Karbala, is a key element in the transformations of religiosity that have 
taken place in Lebanon. One of the myriad ongo-
ing changes in Ashura commemorations has been 
a two-part shift in the ways that ideal womanhood 
is portrayed. First, there has been a decrease in 
emphasis on Sayyida Fatima accompanied by an 
increased emphasis on Husayn’s sister, Zaynab. In 
pious women’s testimonies about the influence 
of these figures on their lives, Fatima has taken a 
background role, despite continued emphasis on 
her stoicism and strength by religious scholars. In-
stead, lay women focus on Zaynab as the dominant 
female figure of Ashura, emphasizing her presence 
at the battle and her role as the community’s leader 
following Husayn’s martyrdom. 
Second, there has been a reformulation, in 
Ashura recitations, of Zaynab’s behaviour dur-
ing and after the battle. Portrayals of Zaynab as 
buried in grief or shedding copious tears over the 
dead and dying gave way to representations that 
emphasized her courage, strength, and resilience, 
and highlighted her leadership role. This reinter-
pretation of Zaynab’s role is both embodied in the 
increased participation of women in 
Ashura commemorative practices and 
the model for women’s greater public 
participation in the community more 
generally. 
When the notion of “role model” 
comes up in relation to Islamic re-
ligious and/or political groups, it is 
frequently followed by assumptions 
about the forms of temporality that 
must be structuring the lives and ex-
pectations of people who draw upon 
religio-historical figures for inspiration. 
In particular, the idea frequently arises 
that looking to a figure like Zaynab implies or demonstrates a “looking 
backward,” a desire to “return” to an earlier time period, or an under-
standing of time as circular and therefore, non-modern. In response to 
such assumptions, I argue that in this community there exist multiple 
notions of temporality simultaneously, including both a modernist no-
tion of time as linear progress to a potentially attainable yet unknown 
future and a notion of time as—not quite cyclical—but paradigmatic. 
Temporal readings
The Battle of Karbala’s relationship to time can be read in at least 
two ways in its contemporary representations in Lebanon. On the one 
hand, time here may be understood as nonlinear. This reading empha-
sizes a notion of time similar though not identical to that described by 
Reinhart Koselleck as a temporal framework in which “the future could 
bring nothing fundamentally new” because the end of the world was 
expected.3 In the Christian contexts in which Koselleck’s theorizing is 
rooted, this relates to the enduring nature of human beings as sinful 
until Judgment Day. However, in the Shia worldview emphasized in the 
Lebanese context, this non-new future is instead related to the conti-
nuity and constancy of a battle between good and evil that is consist-
ently foreshadowed and re-instantiated in different eras. This was often 
articulated to me as the idea that “there is a Yazid and a Husayn in every 
time, in every nation, in every era.” 
This represents a paradigmatic reading of Karbala, as opposed to a 
narrative reading. Paradigmatic, not as the origins of Shia resistance 
against evil, but as the paradigmatic instance of this resistance, under-
stood as an ever-repeating type of event, an always-foreseen battle of 
good against evil that will not be resolved until Judgment Day. This is 
not about a return to Karbala, but rather, about using Karbala in paral-
lel, to emphasize the morality of one’s stance, and an identification with 
the side of good in the good-evil binary. Contemporary Shia battles, 
like those against the twenty two-year Israeli occupation of Lebanon 
or the Israeli attack on Lebanon in July 2006, become yet another in-
stance of the universal moral battle for which Karbala represents the 
paradigm.
The second possible reading of the Battle of Karbala’s relationship to 
time instead highlights the notion of an unknown and unpredictable 
future—what Koselleck and others describe as “modern time.” Here 
Karbala is the point of origin for a linear historical narrative, the loca-
tion of the beginning of the history of the possibility of Shia Resistance, 
as well as the locus of inspiration. The next step in this telling of the 
narrative involves partial rupture, where centuries of historical time are 
skipped over in a catapulting move to the early 1980s and the begin-
nings of the history of the Lebanese Islamic Resistance in its contempo-
rary and local manifestations. This rupture is not one of time itself, but 
one of narration, where the “missing” centuries are understood to exist 
outside the particular telling of the history of the Lebanese Islamic Re-
sistance, as commonly narrated.
Among Shia Muslims in Lebanon, piety has 
become a central marker of modernity. The 
author argues that, perhaps unexpectedly, 
it is women who are allotted the greater 
responsibility of representing modernity in all 
its dimensions, including the material. As part 
of their mandate to represent and facilitate 
their community’s progress, pious Shia women 
are encouraged to move into public roles and 
spaces. These processes demonstrate the 
coming together of the material and spiritual 
domains as well as the transformation and 
partial blurring of gender divides.1
For women in this 
community, … 
to be considered a 
modern woman … 
one must also be 
visibly pious in very 
specific ways.
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In the second reading, the events of Karbala and the be-
haviour of the role models of Husayn and Zaynab function 
as a literal model—to be drawn upon by many of my Shia 
interlocutors as role models for moral behaviour inter-
preted through the lens of the contemporary world. Char-
acteristics associated with them were to be emulated in 
the present, in order to shape the future, characteristics such 
as bravery and sacrifice for one’s community. In the first 
temporal framework, the martyred Imam and the contem-
porary martyred fighter are seen as lives in parallel, as par-
ticipating in the same battle. In the second, the martyred 
Imam is viewed as inspiring values that lead to similar par-
ticipation in the contemporary moment. 
Gendering temporal frameworks
In this community, both these notions of time and 
both these understandings of the role of Husayn and 
Zaynab as models for, or in, the present coexist. Yet their 
relative emphasis is gendered in particular ways. When 
men are called upon to fulfil the public piety ideal, it is 
most often in relation to the resistance to occupation, 
and when their participation is recognized, it is most 
often framed as a paradigmatic instance of continual 
resistance. In other words, Lebanese Shia fighters are 
frequently equated with Husayn in discourse and in me-
morialization practices. 
In contrast, when women are called upon to participate, or are recog-
nized for their participation, it is more frequently cast in the framework 
of linear progress of the community into an unknown but inevitably 
more “developed” future—drawing instead on “linear” temporal frame-
works identified with modernity. Women activists are not equated with 
Zaynab. Zaynab is looked to for inspiration, and values associated with 
her are adapted to the current context. 
One may note the contrast of this gendering of temporal frameworks 
to that described by Partha Chatterjee in relation to colonial India. 
Chatterjee’s analysis is one in which the material and the spiritual were 
also both key elements in ideas about modernizing the community, but 
in that case, Bengali women were delegated the maintenance of the 
spiritual, while the material development was conceptualized as the 
domain of nationalist men. Women’s spiritual responsibility was linked 
to a gendered division of space into public and domestic spheres. Even 
with nineteenth century shifts in gender norms that facilitated elite 
women’s emergence into public spaces, the gendered nature of the 
spiritual-material divide remained.4
In contrast, the Shia Lebanese case, located in a neo-imperialist con-
text of the late twentieth and early twenty first centuries, demonstrates 
the coming together of the material and spiritual domains without a 
similarly prominent gender divide; and where such a divide can be dis-
cerned, through notions of temporality, it is women who are allotted 
the greater responsibility of representing modernity in all its dimen-
sions, including the material. Furthermore, as part of their mandate to 
represent and facilitate their community’s progress, pious Shia women 
are encouraged to move into public roles and spaces. This contrast 
raises questions about the limits of comparison of colonial and postco-
lonial contexts to contemporary theorizing about gendered responses 
to neocolonialisms and neoimperialisms in the Middle East and else-
where.
Gendering piety and modernity
Women’s public activism in emulation of Zaynab takes many forms. 
The most visible can be seen in the thousands of women who volun-
teer with Islamic social service organizations. In addition, more Shia 
Lebanese women are formally employed than before, and the types 
of employment have diversified widely. A third area where Zaynab’s 
example is applied today draws on her ideal attribute of outspoken-
ness, as Lebanese Shia women contribute to the continual process of 
religious reform through daily conversations and debates about the 
proper interpretations of religious meanings and practices. 
Women’s public participation is a key element in the way that Zaynab 
provides a normative model for public piety and for the ideal moral 
woman, a woman who is conceptualized as both pious and modern. 
The activist lesson of Karbala, in its application in daily life, provides a 
framework for these expressions of piety, and indeed, insists on public 
activity as a part of piety. In this context, to be pious according to such 
standards is a large part of being modern. Women who did not express 
piety “properly” were considered “backward” and in need of education 
to bring them into their proper role in the progressivist narrative of 
community development. 
While it can be argued that this is true to a certain extent for both 
women and men, public piety marks women most visibly. This gen-
dering is related to a number of factors: the new visibility of women 
in public spaces, especially in relation to how women’s activities and 
words are embodied and marked as women’s; the way that this new 
visibility provokes discussion of change in domestic relationships; and 
finally, the gendered temporal frameworks structuring the emulation 
of Karbala-based role models, so that women have become the repre-
sentatives and agents of linear progress in ways that men have not.
This gendered temporal difference is related to the way that women’s 
public piety is marked as crucial to the community’s external visibility. 
Shia women’s public piety is central to their signifying their communi-
ty’s modernity within a transnational discursive field. The status and 
image of Muslim women is one of the most consistent and contentious 
issues that arose during my field research, in passionate and often, un-
solicited responses to Western discourses about Muslim women. Gen-
der norms are critical because of both local and international concern, 
as well as local concern about international concern. As one woman 
put it, “a woman is the example for everything. A culture is judged by 
the level of its women.” 
Public participation has come to provide an externally visible marker 
of morality and modernity by which women can be judged within the 
community, and by which the community can be judged internation-
ally. The social importance of this is magnified because women’s par-
ticipation and its promotion are taking place in a discursive field where 
gendered notions of modernity are negotiated. Piety and modernity 
are thus linked on two levels: in the first, because the forms of piety 
that require women’s public participation are locally understood as 
both modern and as a crucial aspect of commu-
nity progress. And in the second, because those 
same forms emerge in response to, or dialogue 
with, transnational discourses about gender and 
modernity. 
Notes
1. This is a much-condensed version of a 
paper presented at the University of Texas, 
Austin on 16 February 2006. Since then, the 
community described here has come under 
intense Israeli attack. 
2. This is elaborated in Deeb, An Enchanted 
Modern: Gender and Public Piety in Shi‘i 
Lebanon (Princeton University Press, 2006). 
3. Koselleck, The Practice of Conceptual History 
(Stanford University Press, 2002).
4. Chatterjee, The Nation and Its Fragments 
(Princeton University Press, 1993).
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Religious Mediators 
in Palestine
The rule of law in the Palestinian terri-
tories must be addressed in its histori-
cally unique context. Complex forms of 
legal pluralism have obtained in Pales-
tine since Ottoman times. After 1967, 
the judiciary was subjected to exter-
nal control through Israeli occupation 
and military rule. However, following 
the signing of the Oslo agreements in 
1993/4, a secular judiciary was reinsti-
tuted under the auspices of the Pal-
estinian Authority, as well as a sharia 
court system whose role was, however, 
reduced from that of a general tribunal to that of a forum dealing 
with personal status issues. This dual system was superimposed on 
a long-standing network of customary institutions of conflict resolu-
tion, based on lineage or tribal councils, collective land administration 
assemblies, and public reconciliation committees. These institutions 
have not only endured the political upheavals of the twentieth cen-
tury, but, in recent years, also seen their roles diversified, transformed 
and perhaps reinforced through the absence (until 1993) and present 
debility of the Palestinian proto-state, the very existence of which is 
now threatened. In this complex and versatile field of conflict resolu-
tion, new actors have appeared while classical players are taking on 
new roles.
Since the eruption of the second Intifada in September 2000, an 
on-going process of spatial and social fragmentation has taken place. 
Firstly, the construction of the separation fence/wall, destined to be-
come a 640 kilometres long barrier, annexes de facto large portions of 
territory while severing the Palestinian communities, fields and fami-
lies. Secondly, some 540 checkpoints and hundreds of settlements 
have turned the West Bank into a patchwork of ghettos whose only 
access to each other is through an Israeli military checkpoint. Thirdly, 
parallel to the above-mentioned processes, the systematic weakening 
of the apparatus of the Palestinian Authority (PA), combined with the 
disintegration of the military wings of various political factions into 
dozens of militant groups, has not only weakened the judicial and po-
lice systems, but, more importantly, undermined more classical con-
flict resolution mechanisms based on kinship and other forms of social 
proximity. Thus, throughout the West Bank and Gaza Strip, new actors, 
notably da‘iyyat and qudah, have stepped in to fill the breach in concil-
iatory mechanisms and save the now isolated communities that form 
the nation from total chaos by appealing to the only remaining con-
necting principle, namely the common reference to “Islamic values.” 
Yet female da‘iyyat and male qudah differ significantly with regard to 
the gendered definition of their sphere of intervention in homes, inac-
cessible to men, and religious institutions, such as mosques, as well 
as interpersonal networks, charities and governmental institutions, 
notwithstanding their spatial and modes of operation. In the light of 
the present polarization between a secular bureaucracy, dominated 
by Fatah (the recently defeated ruling party), and the newly elected 
Hamas government, until now, such conciliatory mechanisms have 
played a key role in maintaining a high degree of social coherence in a 
nation that has never formed a state yet has experienced four decades 
of occupation. Whether this solidarity will persist is, however, an open 
question. 
Male religious leaders as mediators
Despite the relative decline of the sharia judiciary, the qadi of the 
personal status court, as a public figure, still retains a considerable de-
gree of moral influence in his community. His authority in the context 
of extra-formal conflict resolution mechanisms transcends his adminis-
trative and legal attributes. In contrast 
to many qudah in Ottoman Palestine, 
who were transferred every year so 
as to preclude local involvement, the 
contemporary qadi in the Palestinian 
Territories tends to be a full-fledged 
member of the community. This em-
beddedness has far-reaching implica-
tions, influencing spheres beyond the 
domain of personal status and affect-
ing significant aspects of social prac-
tice, community life, and political en-
counters.
In the current Palestinian social context, the qadi emerges as a key actor 
not only in regulating relations within and between families or descent-
based groups or those bound by matrimonial alliance, but more impor-
tantly as a community leader approached in his capacity as an imam, a 
preacher or simply a “respected person,” to sponsor a solution or initiate 
a settlement. It seems that respectability, trust, and wisdom are the main 
attributes, which legitimize the intervention of particular person as a me-
diator acceptable to opposed parties. The fact that these same qualifica-
tions are prerequisites for the qudah, appointment in the formal system 
of the sharia court puts him in a pre-eminent position in matters of con-
flict management as compared with other intermediaries. This standing 
must today be understood in a context of weakness of the formal judicial 
system, which, as a consequence, tends to empower the qadi and permits 
him to occupy a greater space than he enjoyed earlier. Hence, his exercise 
of active authority renders his resolutions suitable for settling most sorts 
of conflicts between community members or groups without major ob-
jections being raised.
The centrality of his role should not, however, lead one to underestimate 
either the role of networks that crosscut or overarch the kinship-based 
relations of community members, bonds of patronage and dependency, 
or any other system based on formal justice, whether secular or religious. 
Indeed, there are several authorities or actors to whom individuals can 
turn for assistance before asking the qadi to intervene. These include 
kin, friends, neighbours, and family or lineage elders, including makhatir 
(sing. mukhtar),1 extended family councils, police officers or relations of 
influence in Palestinian Authority institutions. Salha, a poor, 34-year-old 
widow, approached a qadi to resolve a dispute with her brother-in-law 
over a “high” payment promised to her by an insurance company after 
the death of her husband. The brother-in-law wanted to use his guardi-
anship over her children to profit from their father’s insurance. Had the 
dispute been between two Gazan notables, it is doubtful that the case 
would ever have reached the qadi. The matter would, of necessity, have 
been settled en famille. Once the case had been presented to the qadi, 
a specific range of options emerged, ranging from the judge’s refusal to 
consider the case at all, through opening the road to a “customary” solu-
tion to his formulating of a legal decision that would gravely affect Salha. 
In practice, qudah most often opt for an “inventive,” median solution that 
avoids irrevocable consequences for the parties from their kin and soci-
ety at large. Only a systematic exploration of the contextual decisional 
process in cases involving fundamental moral principles would enable us 
to understand the qudah’s socially and ethically situated practice. After 
listening to Salha, the qadi contacted her family’s mukhtar. The next day, 
both agreed to resolve the dispute at the council. For more than a week, 
they kept up negotiations with the family’s powerful figures. Holding the 
uncle responsible through the hamula was a way of exerting pressure on 
him through the collectivity. Eventually, through mechanisms of nego-
tiation, persuasion, and agreement, a solution was reached that allowed 
Salha to keep her children and receive the insurance payment and even 
obliged the brother-in-law to pay their nafaqa to her.
The spatial and social fragmentation of 
the Palestinian territories has not only 
weakened judicial and police systems, but 
also undermined classical conflict resolution 
mechanisms based on kinship and other 
forms of social proximity. In this context, new 
religious mediators are gaining ground. The 
author shows that by appealing to “Islamic 
values” as the only remaining connecting 
principle, these new legal actors have played 
a key role in preventing the disintegration of 
now isolated communities.
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The study of the qudah, extra-formal intervention thus presupposes dis-
tinguishing a number of spheres of potential intervention beyond his 
formal role in the sharia court. All social and power resources are differen-
tially available to the qadi according to time, context, and the social sta-
tus of parties. They converge to model specific decisions, thereby setting 
limits to his moral authority.
Female sub-mediators
The phenomenon of da‘iyyat arose in the Palestinian Territories more 
than a decade ago, after the emergence of the Palestinian Authority and 
the challenges it posed to the political and social operation of the Islam-
ist movements. Over time, the role of the da‘iyyat has been significantly 
transformed from that of educators advocating Islamic values in mosques 
and charity centres to active involvement in various issues related to com-
munity and social life, including interventions in public and private con-
flicts.
These voluntary activists often come from a middle class background 
and enjoy a high level of education; most have a BA or higher degree in a 
variety of specializations such as medicine, agriculture, architecture, and, 
obviously, Islamic studies. Despite denying any explicit political commit-
ment, a number of informants indicate that they are attached to the social 
infrastructure of the main Islamic political party (Hamas) or, to a lesser 
degree, of the Islamic Jihad movement.
In the course of their activism, da‘iyyat meet hundreds of women from 
various regions, generations, statuses, and classes. They often take the 
lead in introducing women from different backgrounds to each other and 
design shared teaching programmes and various activities for different 
communities, which indicates the importance of social networking for 
their activism. Part of their daily agenda is to follow their “clients” to their 
homes; they regularly pay visits, both at times of crisis and of celebra-
tion. Their female “clients,” in response, make them privy to their intimate 
problems as well as more “public” conflicts. This might be the most in-
teresting question in the study of the roles and actions of da‘iyyat, their 
modes of intervention in the social conflicts submitted to them by their 
female “clients.” The preliminary data indicate that the motivation for their 
intervention in social conflicts is not public status; rather, their interven-
tion is veiled behind their religious activity. They seem to prefer confining 
themselves to the role of sub-mediators between the parties to a dispute 
and the principal mediators, i.e., those “wise” men who share with them 
both their religious background and willingness to resolve communal 
conflicts. Studying their activism may therefore provide us with further 
insights regarding the careful gender division of labour, political vs. non-
political activism, and the public-private division. 
The variety of cases in which da‘iyyat intervene is vast: domestic dis-
putes, sexual harassment and assaults, adultery, inheritance, financial 
disputes, land disputes, etc. The male leaders of the community do not 
seem to feel threatened by their activism, unlike their reaction to other 
outspoken feminist activists. Despite their advocacy for women’s rights 
(regardless of what that means), their religious background and Islamic 
perspective ensure them a positive reception in the community. The in-
terventions of the da‘iyyat, may, I believe, (as in the case of their coun-
terparts, the qudah) fill the gap left by the increasing vulnerability of the 
formal justice system of the Palestinian Authority. Further, the fact that 
these new actors have gradually earned the people’s trust may also sig-
nify a degree of scepticism with regard to the neutrality, influence, and 
legitimacy of other informal systems. 
The da‘iyyat have a particular method of dealing with community dis-
putes including those related to political conflicts between Hamas and 
Fatah. For example, in 2004, a sixteen-year-old young man was arrested 
by the preventive security force (one of the many security branches func-
tioning in Gaza) on the basis of his membership of Hamas and his involve-
ment in preparing crude bullets. His mother was one of the followers of Dr. 
Salma, who is one of the most active da‘iyya in Gaza. Dr. Salma, who does 
not deny her sympathy for Hamas, however has good relations with Fatah 
(then the ruling party) through her kinship with a high-ranking official in 
the Ministry of Islamic Endowment (awqaf). She approached him with the 
argument that the first half should not imprison the second half of the 
nation. This is Dr. Salma’s conception of the polarised political matrix in 
Gaza between Fatah and Hamas. The man, on his part, approached the 
top security head to release the boy, astonishingly using the same argu-
ment as Dr. Salma: “it is unfair for one half of the nation, which dominates 
the political scene, to imprison the other half.” After several attempts by 
the Shaykh of awqaf, the boy was released and returned to his mother. 
What is significant and requires deeper theorization, which unfortunate-
ly is beyond the scope of this short article, is Dr. Salma’s advice to the 
mother: “Our God works for our good, even if His decisions seem to be 
illogical to us. Your boy may or may not come back. We should work hard 
to release him, but if we cannot do so, we have to look beyond our agony. 
God may want to teach us how to be patient, compliant, and accommo-
dating through such tests.” Thus, while doing her best to release the boy, 
Dr. Salma’s advice to the mother was that of acceptance and confession. 
This approach is not unique in the discourse of da‘iyyat. They teach their 
followers to work hard to improve their living conditions, but at the same 
time they train them to accept the hardships of being truly pious. 
In conclusion, there is a need to examine not only the roles of these 
new actors in conflict resolution but also the position they occupy vis-à-
vis other justice systems. Thus, their interventions 
should not be perceived as a linear process; rather, 
they should be viewed in their emergence, devel-
opment, transformations, and shifts, in terms of the 
objectives of the parties involved and their terms 
of settlement. There are areas of overlap and inter-
section, or, alternatively, conflict and contradiction 
in the course of disputing and resolution. This im-
plies the need to document conflicts through their 
entire duration so as to understand at which stage 
particular institutions are invited to intervene, the 
reasons for their success or failure, and the choices 
to be made by both disputers and mediators.
Note
1. Literally, the “selected person.” In 
contemporary Palestine, one must 
distinguish between makhatir designated 
according to the principle of locality and 
those designated on the basis of descent. 
The former act on behalf of the sharia 
court and the civil authorities, mainly in 
marriage-related disputes. The descent-
based makhatir are not recognized by the 
authorities; they are designated by their kin 
to mediate in conflicts within and between 
wider patrifocal descent groups.
Nahda Shehada holds a lecturer position in Gender, Culture, and Development at the 
International Institute for Social Studies (ISS) in The Hague. She was a postdoctoral researcher 
at ISIM between January and September 2006.
Email: nahda@iss.nl
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J O S E P H  A L A G H A
Hizbullah’s Promise
In the aftermath of August 2006, belief 
that war had simply “erupted” because 
of a few captured soldiers was shaken. 
Israel’s insistence that its actions were 
legitimate “defensive” responses to Hiz-
bullah’s kidnapping of two soldiers lost 
its credibility triggering suspicion that 
it served as a pretext for launching a 
long-planned war intended to under-
mine Hizbullah’s influence as both a 
militant and democratic political play-
er. Notwithstanding, Israel seriously misjudged its own capacity and 
Hizbullah’s strength. Likewise, Hizbullah committed a strategic mistake 
in miscalculating the intensity of Israeli response, apparently assuming 
that holding Israeli soldiers would ultimately lead to a swap operation 
with Lebanese prisoners. Acknowledging misjudgement, Nasrallah 
later stated that the soldiers would not have been kidnapped if the 
devastating outcome were foreseen.
Although the origins of war should not be reduced to the prisoner 
question, their importance in processes of legitimation highlights 
the symbolic significance of prisoners for both parties. By attempting 
to take or liberate prisoners, both aimed not only to display military 
power, but also to demonstrate commitment to their populations. Un-
derstandably then, the destruction of Lebanon resulted in a victory for 
Hizbullah. Indeed, though some Lebanese question the wisdom of Hiz-
bullah’s action, nevertheless 
Hizbullah emerged from this 
crisis much more popular 
than before.
Promises and
deliveries
While Hizbullah’s kid-
napping of Israeli soldiers 
should in part be seen as a 
gesture of support to the In-
tifada after the June Israeli 
incursion into Gaza, it was 
also prominently related 
to some morally charged 
statements Nasrallah had 
made six years earlier. He 
had made a public “faithful 
promise”: “We are people 
who don’t leave their prison-
ers behind.” Pragmatically, 
then, the kidnapping aimed 
at liberating Lebanese pris-
oners of war in Israeli jails. 
Moreover, by acting on the 
prisoner question, Hizbul-
lah reinforced its status as 
a militant Islamic resist-
ance movement, one which 
seemed to be shaken by its 
participation in the demo-
cratic political process. 
Undoubtedly, the Israeli response was devastating. Israel imposed 
a triple blockade on Lebanon virtually isolating the country from 
the outside world. Large parts of Lebanon’s infrastructure were 
destroyed and its economy came to an almost standstill. The war 
resulted in more than one million displaced, 1300 dead, and 3000 
wounded. By attacking Christian areas Israel plausibly aimed at sow-
ing a wedge between the Lebanese and Hizbullah, in order for Hiz-
bullah to be blamed for the misfortunes that befell Lebanon. Israel 
repeatedly stated that its war targeted Hizbullah and not the Leba-
nese population. 
However, inside Lebanon few blame 
Hizbullah for the misfortunes. Instead, 
Hizbullah emerged as the hero of re-
construction. Soon after the ceasefire, 
Hizbullah’s civil institutions spearhead-
ed relief efforts and started rebuilding 
damaged homes. While the Lebanese 
state is considered too fragile and cor-
rupt to deal efficiently with the de-
struction, Hizbullah is well renowned 
for its probity and integrity in conduct-
ing public affairs. Indeed, Hizbullah honoured its words and delivered 
on its promises of handing out cash donations to all of those whose 
homes have been partially or completely destroyed. 
Attempting to defuse the crisis, the Lebanese cabinet—including its 
two Hizbullah ministers—unanimously endorsed PM Sanyura’s seven 
points, one of which mentions that the state enjoys absolute monopoly 
over the use of force; a proposition that Hizbullah had persistently re-
sisted. Moreover, after its rejection of the UN draft resolution because 
it fell short of demanding an Israeli withdrawal, and in an attempt to 
influence the wording of the new resolution to Lebanon’s advantage, 
the cabinet unanimously approved deploying Lebanese soldiers to the 
border region with Israel. This seemed to constitute a genuine policy 
shift rather than a rhetorical move since Hizbullah’s earlier discourse 
had vetoed sending the army to the south. The cabinet also approved 
the 2006 UNSC Resolution 1701, which calls, among other things, for 
the cessation of hostilities and Hizbullah’s disarmament, by a political 
process, rather than by military force, as Kofi Annan clarified. In these 
decisions, Hizbullah’s two ministers voted “yes”. Nasrallah asserted that 
accepting the deployment of the army to the south (a repeated Israeli 
demand) would “serve national interest since the strength of Lebanon 
is in its resistance and national unity.” This policy targeting more na-
tional integration and Lebanonization, aims at portraying Hizbullah as 
a progressive social movement and mainstream political party.
Prospects
Most likely Hizbullah not only survived this war, but also enhanced its 
domestic, regional, and international fame. Domestically, it showered 
its supporters with “Iranian” petrodollars and honoured its promise of 
immediately rebuilding the war damages. Also, Hizbullah achieved the 
respect of many Lebanese by agreeing to deploy the army to the south 
and accepting 1701, which would pave the way for discussing not only 
disarmament, but eventually dismantling its military wing once Israel 
relinquishes the Sheba Farms. Regionally and internationally, Hizbullah 
boosted its pan-Arab and pan-Islamic credentials by scoring a victory 
against Israel, a victory unattained by any Arab army. Israel aiming to 
eradicate Hizbullah’s military wing, succeeded only in cutting its tail. 
Hizbullah emerged victorious by shedding off its skin, but keeping its 
body intact. Its capacity for mobilization coupled with its theory of 
martyrdom and religious ideology, on the one hand, and its integra-
tion into the Lebanese public sphere, on the other, serve as guarantees 
to its survival throughout the wind of change.
After the 34-day war in Lebanon, both Israel 
and Hizbullah claimed victory. With over one 
million displaced, 1,300 casualties, many more 
injured, and imperceptible changes in the 
status quo, such victory cries seem out of place. 
Looking beyond strictly military parameters, 
however, Alagha argues that the war resulted 
in greater political prominence of Hizbullah, 
enhanced prestige of its leaders, and even 
increased national integration. 
Joseph Alagha is Assistant Professor of Islamic Studies at the Lebanese American University. 
His Ph.D. dissertation The Shifts in Hizbullah’s Ideology: Religious Ideology, Political Ideology, 
and Political Program appeared with Amsterdam University Press (2006).
Email: jalagha000@yahoo.com
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Religious Labelling
How & Why “Immigrants” 
became “Muslims”
discussions about Islam seem to be the 
means by which Western societies dis-
cuss their recent and not yet fully under-
stood evolutions and tendencies.
In this context, immigrants are in-
creasingly seen as Muslims, rather than 
as workers, students, parents, children, 
etc. In other words, society tends to de-
fine them by their (pre-supposed) iden-
tities rather than by their social roles. 
Thereby, the category of diversity, but 
also those of otherness (if not extrane-
ousness) and even incompatibility, are 
being re-introduced in situations where 
such categories had previously been ex-
cluded because they no longer made much sense. For instance, second 
generation new Europeans, who can no longer be considered immigrants 
and in fact have become less and less “other,” are now being “Islamized,” 
which means that they may well become reconstrued as “other,” different, 
and even extraneous.
This debate has progressively invaded the public space in several Eu-
ropean countries: in politics, media, certain religious considerations, and 
popular essays. But elements from the public debate have entered so-
ciological praxis and analysis as well. Though the Montecatini Workshop 
only partially succeeded in its attempt to attract new researches and new 
researchers on these issues (many of the proposals submitted fell out of 
the framework of the workshop theme), nevertheless it managed to offer 
a high calibre of presentations and discussions that have permitted an 
extraordinary rich debate on the different national cases.
Discussions in the public sphere about 
Islam in Europe have become more 
and more crucial in defining the sym-
bolic integration of Muslim communi-
ties. Cultural conflicts related to Islam 
in the public space have erupted in 
many countries of Europe, mainly over 
Islamic symbols that have become in-
creasingly visible. Moreover, the con-
tent of discussions on immigration 
has tended to shift to the cultural and 
symbolic level: political actors, media, 
intellectuals, all focus their attention 
on some presupposed Islamic specifi-
cities. The immigrant, in many variable 
scenes, has progressively become “Muslim,” both in his/her perception 
by the host societies and in his/her self-perception.
Clearly, the use of the religious argument in the public debate has led to 
the marginalization of other social issues, and many questions are more 
and more frequently debated on religious grounds. Immigration, in a 
word, tends to be “islamized.” Reactive identities (i.e. identities defined in 
opposition to others) become more salient and “act” specifically as such 
in the cultural, political, and religious field—both for the immigrants and 
for the autochtonous populations.
It becomes important, then, to analyse the process by which the discus-
sion on the presence of immigrants has gradually shifted towards iden-
tification on religious grounds, particularly as far as Islam is concerned. 
However, though much attention (including that of the academic insti-
tutions: studies, researches, papers, dissertations, etc.) has been given to 
Muslim individuals and communities in Europe, relatively little research 
has focused on the “other side” of the processes of integration. 
The reasons for this change are manifold. Some are connected with the 
world of migrations, and the process of progressive stabilization and set-
tlement of migrants in the different countries, particularly with the pas-
sage from the first generation of migrants to succceeding generations of 
new Europeans. Then there are reasons connected with the emergence 
of Islam as a disruptive element, also on the symbolic plane: as a global 
geo-political actor from the local crises connected with Islam (Afghani-
stan, Algeria, Bosnia, Palestine, Chechnya, and many others) up to tran-
snational Islamic terrorism and the impact of the terrorist attacks upon 
the Twin Towers, and then, still in the West, the attacks upon Madrid and 
London); as an instrument and interpretative category (from Bernard 
Lewis and Samuel Huntington onwards, in a very widespread literature, 
especially its more popular versions); and as a social and political actor 
of ever greater importance, particularly in the countries of origin of the 
European immigrants. 
But there are also long-term reasons internal to the European West, 
which are not only specific to Islam but also more in general to the posi-
tion of religion in society. The last thirty years in particular have led to a 
radical transformation of the religious “field” in various European coun-
tries, which have become more and more religiously plural. These chang-
es were taking place in a period during which the presence of religion in 
the public sphere was, in contrast to earlier periods in the recent history 
of Europe, experiencing a resurgence. This resurgence was connected as 
much with processes of globalization and their cultural consequences 
as with the effects of the increasing visibility of “religion” in the media. It 
may even seem that in public discussion Islam has taken on a crucial role 
among other religions precisely because it is perceived to represent the 
most conspicuous case of “traditional” religion, resisting to be exclusively 
relegated to the private sphere. The debate on Islam, with the historical 
and symbolic overload it carries with it, has started to dominate public 
discussions about the “pluralisation” of Europe. Consequently, the public 
Over the last ten years or so, migrants to 
Europe who used to be labelled as Moroccans, 
Turks, Algerians, Pakistani, and so on, have 
increasingly come to be labelled in religious 
terms. This article provides a brief analysis 
of how and why this transformation of public 
discourse in European contexts has taken 
place, and discusses the consequences of 
defining immigrants with Muslim background 
in terms of an essentialized religious identity. 
The current text is based on the workshop 
“Public Debates about Islam in Europe” held in 
March 2006 in Montecatini. Details about this 
workshop can be found on page 56.
Stefano Allievi is Professor of Sociology at the University of Padua.
E-mail: stefano.allievi@unipd.it
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G Ö R A N  L A R S S O N  
“Muslims” in Swedish 
Media and Academia
A large number of surveys and polls 
from various parts of Europe clearly 
demonstrate that Islam and Muslims 
are often perceived negatively and as 
a problem in Western societies. This is a 
strong indication of a division between 
“Us” and “Them,” i.e. between non-Mus-
lims and Muslims. This gap is often 
explained by global events, such as 
the terror attacks on the United States 
on 11 September 2001, the murder of 
Dutch film-maker Theo van Gogh in 
November 2004, the London bombings 
in summer 2005, and the publication 
of and responses to the Muhammad 
cartoons in Jyllands-Posten, as well as the negative and biased media 
coverage of Islam and Muslims in general. Although a large number 
of independent academic studies and interviews with Muslims dem-
onstrate that the media often use negative and stereotypical images 
in depicting Islam and Muslims, it is essential to analyse whether, and 
if so how, academic studies are also contributing to the image of Islam 
and Muslims in Europe. In this article, therefore, I focus on similarities 
between media and academics portrayals of Islam and Muslims living 
in Sweden. From a more general point of view, however, my text should 
be read as a call for a more self-critical discussion of how and whether 
academics are also contributing to the portrayal of Muslims in accord-
ance with religious categories. 
Even though academic studies often function as 
a vital counter-weight and an important resource 
for journalists who are writing about immigra-
tion, religious communities, Islam and Muslims, I 
argue that it is essential to be self-critical and ask 
whether academic studies may not actually be 
enhancing, even creating, stereotypes of them. 
When journalists call on experts in the universi-
ties, they are mainly asking for statistical figures 
and numbers or for quotations that could be used 
to support the claims made by the journalists: the 
latter seldom ask for more complex or conflicting 
examples or illustrations. As a result, the Muslim 
community (the term is used here as a collective 
label for a large number of different communities) 
is generally described in both public and academ-
ic debates as a religious community, even though 
most Muslims living in Sweden are secularized. 
According to the most widely circulated figures, 
the number of individuals with a Muslim cultural 
background in the country is estimated to be ap-
proximately 250,000 or 300,000. These figures are 
only rough approximations, since it is forbidden to 
include religious affiliations in official statistics in 
Sweden. Regardless of the problem of calculating 
how many people have a Muslim cultural back-
ground, academic studies and information pro-
vided by Muslim organizations indicate that the 
great majority of Muslims are secularized. None-
theless Muslims are presented and discussed in religious categories 
when they are debated in the public discourse. How does this selectiv-
ity affect Muslims’ self-perceptions, and how does this way of depicting 
the Muslim community influence how non-Muslims understand the 
Islamic presence in Sweden? Although this is a relevant question that 
needs to be raised, it is very difficult to find a clear answer supported 
by hard facts. However, by comparing 
the discursive techniques by which the 
Swedish media and the academic com-
munity have depicted Islam and Mus-
lims, it becomes possible to identify 
both similarities and differences. 
Swedish perceptions
of Islam and Muslims
Both media studies and a large 
number of surveys have demonstrated 
that in public debates Islam and Mus-
lims are often perceived as different 
and non-Swedish. According to the lat-
est report of the Swedish Integration 
Board (2004/2005), two-thirds of those surveyed felt that Islamic values 
are not compatible with the fundamental values of Swedish society; 
30 percent were categorically negative, and others answered that such 
values are “to a great extent” not compatible.2 Approximately 54 per-
cent responded negatively to the statement that “Swedish Muslims are 
like Swedes generally,” and 37 percent were opposed to mosques being 
built in Sweden. Regarding the veil, 35 percent were against Muslim 
women wearing veils on the street, and only 24 percent approved. The 
most negative attitude was reported towards women wearing veils on 
ID cards; 66 percent were against this and only 10 percent in favour. 
These results are not exceptional or unique: similar results are also in-
dicated in earlier surveys and polls. Against this background, Muslims 
have become the immigrant par excellence in the official debate over 
immigrants in Sweden. 
When journalists report on Islam and Muslim affairs, it is often violence, 
war, and conflicts that are their main focus.3 Although this is not neces-
sarily the journalists’ intention, the indirect message to the audience is 
that Islam is a violent religion and that Muslims are more prone to vio-
lence than believers of other religions. The Muslim identity or affiliation 
becomes stigmatized by the overwhelmingly negative media coverage 
of Islam and Muslims. Although it is difficult to establish a clear link be-
tween the output of the media and public opinion, there is a striking 
correspondence between, for example, television news content and the 
attitudes of Swedes towards Islam and Muslims. To what extent it is pos-
sible for a journalist who wants to keep his or her job to challenge exist-
ing stereotypes is an open question. Whatever the answer, it is obviously 
easier and safer for a journalist to adjust to the prevailing norms. Growing 
competition, less time to do research, and shrinking budgets have also 
changed the conditions in which news and reporting are produced. It is 
also clear that the news is often selected, repeated, and reused on a global 
scale because control over the media has become more concentrated in 
the hands of a small number of global news agencies. Thus it has become 
more difficult to present news reporting that questions or challenges the 
prevailing order and the agenda of the dominant news agencies. As al-
ready mentioned above, the extent to which media producers are willing 
to support articles and reports that are in conflict with the opinions of the 
readership, news agency owners and advertisers, requires more research 
before it can be answered satisfactorily. However, if the great majority of 
consumers in Sweden see Muslims primarily as religious, the media will 
consequently present reports that more or less correspond to this image. 
There is little or no room to present a more complex and heterogeneous 
picture, which, for example, might show that the Muslim community is 
divided along a large number of political, ethnic, religious, and secular 
lines. Muslim identity is also a flexible category that often includes sev-
eral identities or hybridizations (especially among young Muslims who 
are on the one hand born and raised in Sweden but on the other are also 
accustomed to Muslim traditions). From this point of view many young 
Even though academic studies often function 
as a vital counter-weight to media portrayals 
of immigration, religious communities, 
Islam, and Muslims, the author stresses the 
importance of being self-critical and of asking 
whether academic studies may not actually be 
enhancing, even creating, similar stereotypical 
depictions. This article traces the similarities 
between media and academics portrayals 
of Islam and Muslims living in Sweden and 
argues that academics should be wary of 
too easily adopting religious labels when 
the topics under discussion have little to do 
with religion or faith.1
[T]he Muslim 
community … is 
generally described 
… as a religious 
community, even 
though most 
Muslims living 
in Sweden are 
secularized.
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Muslims have hybrid identities, including Muslim and “Swedish” compo-
nents as well as religious and secular outlooks. This complexity is seldom 
analysed, discussed, or presented by the media. 
Although the findings above are pessimistic, it should be stressed 
that it is very difficult to demonstrate a clear relationship between 
what the media publish about Islam and Muslims and the opinions of 
the public. For example, do the media have a driving effect on the opin-
ions of their readership, or do they merely reflect and repeat public 
opinion? From this point of view, media and communication studies 
often indulge in a debate about the so-called “chicken and egg” prob-
lem, i.e. what is the driving force of the debate? It is also obvious that 
different audiences interpret the message in different ways, depend-
ing on their knowledge and personal experiences of Muslims. Still the 
media play an important role in the formation of the society, especially 
when the latter becomes more ethnically and religiously segregated 
and the distance between people of Muslim cultural backgrounds and 
ethnic Swedes is increasing. From this point of view, the media are of 
great relevance for how both non-Muslims and Muslims understand 
Islam, Muslim identities and Western society. It should not be forgotten 
that Muslims are also affected by, for example, the portrayal of the West 
by Arabic, Turkish, and Persian satellite channels. 
What about academic studies of Islam and Muslims? 
If the media have focused on the negative cases (Islamic fundamen-
talism, terrorism, violence, patriarchal structures, jihad, etc.), most 
studies of Islam and Muslims in Sweden have focused on organiza-
tional structures, conversion, freedom of religion, etc. As my annotated 
bibliography on literature on Islam and Muslims in Sweden—Islam och 
Muslimer i Sverige: En kommenterad bibliografi—amply illustrates, most 
academics have not studied the negative cases.4 Although this is an im-
portant observation that shows an essential difference between media 
coverage and academic studies, most researchers on Islam and Mus-
lims in Sweden have also neglected to focus on processes of seculari-
zation, internal variations within the Muslim community, generational 
differences, hybrid identities, etc. From a critical point of view, most 
studies have been based on earlier and well-known facts and figures: 
until now, innovative research has mainly been carried out by doctoral 
candidates. The lack of empirical research could partly be explained by 
the economic situation in the Swedish academic milieu (today it is ex-
tremely difficult to obtain funding for empirical research, a problem 
that is not, of course, unique to researchers on Islam and Muslims). But 
it also seems that many researchers have been reluctant to leave their 
safe university environments and go out into the field to collect new 
empirical data. To evaluate and interpret the debate over Islam, it is also 
essential to collaborate with other researchers who are engaged in the 
study of Islam and Muslims in Europe, as well as to take part in research 
carried out by academics in, for example, media and communication 
studies (especially if we want to analyse the impact of new information 
and communication technologies such as the Internet, satellite televi-
sion and the lesser medias, such as cassettes and pamphlets). 
Because of the situation described above, I argue that we have a fairly 
low knowledge of what is actually going on inside the Muslim com-
munities in Sweden. For example, we lack studies of Islamic sermons, 
the reception of fatwas, the impact of international theologians on 
the Swedish Muslim context, or generational and gender differences. 
There are, of course, important exceptions to my negative presentation 
and conclusion, such as Jonas Otterbeck’s study of the Swedish Mus-
lim journal Salaam, Anne Sofie Roald’s studies of Muslim women, and 
David Westerlund’s studies of sufism. My critique should therefore not 
be read as a criticism of my hard-working colleagues in Sweden—on 
the contrary, they have laid the foundations for the study of Islam and 
Muslims in the country—or as an excuse for my own shortcomings in 
this area (I am very much a part of the academic tradition described 
above). Rather, this article is a call for more thorough empirical research 
on Islam and Muslims in Sweden and for greater collabora-
tion between Swedish and international researchers.
From a general point of view, I argue that it is both necessary 
and important for academics who are engaged in research 
on Islam and Muslims in Europe to adopt a more self-criti-
cal approach and ask if and in what ways we are contribut-
ing to the portrayal of Islam and Muslims. For example, by 
neglecting processes of secularization, or internal variations 
within and between the generations, we are running the 
risk of becoming either defenders of Islamic traditions and 
interpretations, or single-minded researchers on Islam and 
Muslim cultures who simply repeat the prevailing views of 
the public debate. Thus, instead of single-handedly blaming 
the media for all the problems, it is essential to evaluate how 
and whether the academic study of Islam and Muslims is 
also contributing to their stereotypical portrayal in Sweden. 
Notes
1. This article is based on a paper presented at 
the workshop "Public Debates about Islam in 
Europe." See page 56 for further details.
2. This survey is based on a questionnaire 
sent to 4000 people randomly selected 
from among the population (aged 
16–78); 2577 answers were returned. See 
Integrationsbarometer 2004 En rapport om 
allmänhetens inställning till integration, 
mångfald och diskriminering 2003 och 2004 
(Norrköping: Integrationsverket, 2005).
3. Cf. Håkan Hvitfelt, “Den muslimska faran: 
Om mediebilden av islam,” in Mörk magi 
i vita medier: Svensk nyhetsjournalistik om 
invandrare, flyktingar och rasism, ed. Brune 
Ylva (Stockholm: Carlssons, 1998), 72–84.
4. Göran Larsson, Islam och Muslimer i Sverige: 
En kommenterad bibliografi (Göteborg and 
Stockholm: Makadam Förlag, 2004).
Göran Larsson is a postdoctoral researcher in the 
project LearnIT, which is supported by the Swedish 
Knowledge Foundation. He is currently working at 
the Department of Religious Studies and Theology, 
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Email: goran.larsson@religion.gu.se.
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C H R I S  A L L E N The words “Islam” and “Muslim”—both 
interpretative and associative—are no 
longer banal, harmless or simple givens 
that can be neutrally employed with-
out some ideological content being 
disseminated: their mere employment 
conjuring and informing a myriad of 
different, typically negatively evalu-
ated understandings and meanings. It 
is interesting therefore that in the past 
few months, the term Muslim has been 
seen to be identifying, informing, and 
adding a new dimension to a group in 
society that has been subjected to vari-
ous myths and processes of stereotypification in the media over the 
past three decades. The social group in question is that of young black 
males: the new dimension being identifiable in the media’s reporting 
and coverage associated with the “Muslim Boys” street gang. 
Converts to crime
Of the Muslim Boys, little factual evidence is known although it 
would appear that they formed over two years ago when a “hardcore” 
of African-Caribbean Muslim converts began violently “taxing” the local 
criminal community, being initially dubbed the Taliban Terrorists. Com-
prising mainly ex-convicts with a history of serious crime, the gang’s 
members began following an austere form of Islam—having embraced 
the religion whilst in prison—that it is alleged they sought to use to 
fashion a criminal network with a higher purpose on the outside. Op-
erating primarily in south London, whilst some media reports have de-
scribed the gang’s numbers as being in their hundreds, those, such as 
the Metropolitan Police’s Detective Chief Superintendent John Coles, 
are much more sceptical, suggesting that even a hundred might be an 
exaggeration. Nonetheless, he does confirm the gang’s involvement in 
at least two execution style murders and a growing number of assaults, 
robberies, and firearms offences. They are also suspected of involve-
ment in the shooting of a policeman in December 2005.1
That which is known about the Muslims Boys is therefore far from 
categorical and at times, even contradictory. Yet the increasingly sen-
sationalist media coverage and the ever more hyperbolic discourse 
written about the gang prompts a number of 
pertinent questions about the Muslim Boys. Why, 
as a phenomenon, have they been able to find 
resonance in the media and the social spaces 
beyond? To answer this question, it is necessary 
to ask to what extent the gang is reflective of all 
that it is being alleged of; whether it is possible 
that the gang has merely tapped into the anxie-
ties and fears about Muslims and Islam that exist 
in society to bolster their own stature and status; 
and finally, whether they are in reality little more 
than the media further articulating the same fears 
and anxieties that it has historically attributed to 
young black males but more contemporarily with the meanings associ-
ated with the monikers of “Muslim” and “Islam.” 
In considering the first of these sub-questions, one of the most 
recurrent news stories has been concerning the gang’s alleged 
practice of “forced conversions,” conversions that are said to be en-
forced at gun-point. It is further alleged that the murder of Adrian 
Marriott, a young student, was an unwanted consequence of such a 
conversion, being reported by the media in two ways: the first as a 
consequence of him refusing the gang’s ultimatum “convert or die,” 
the second as an example to others who might choose to refuse 
Islam.2 As the London Evening Stand-
ard explained in the words of alleged 
gang member Winston: “You got to be 
Muslim to be in our group … If you 
not down with Muslim, we visit your 
home, maybe strip you naked in front 
of your fucking mother, we put a gun 
in your mouth. We give you three 
days [to convert], then, if you not 
down with it, we fucking blow [shoot 
you].”3 Whilst the claims and allega-
tions of those such as “Winston” might 
be somewhat questionable, with the 
actuality of a murder having been 
committed, those same claims and allegations cannot therefore be 
entirely refuted.
An urban al-Qaeda?
There is actually only one concrete fact known about the Muslim 
Boys: that they are a street gang that has been involved in a number 
of violent and drug-related crimes and murders in the south London 
area. The gang is therefore a worrying reality but one that cannot be 
substantiated either way as to whether or not they are capable of, or 
indeed undertaking, all that is being alleged of it.
One of the recurrent themes that emerge in the media is that the 
Muslim Boys are a criminal vanguard of religious extremists. Reflecting 
the growing reputation of the gang and the media’s acknowledgement 
that Islam can be transnational, so it has been suggested that the gang 
is seeking links beyond south London to potentially more dangerous 
organizations and networks, going beyond the realm of drugs and fire-
arms. This view is voiced by Lee Jasper, one of the Mayor of London’s 
senior advisors, who is concerned that the leaders of the Muslim Boys 
could be a criminalized front for terrorist extremists.4 Whilst links have 
previously been made to criminal networks in the Caribbean, never 
before have black gangs in the UK been directly associated with or 
perceived to be involved in terrorism. Somewhat unsurprisingly, in a 
post-7/7 climate such suggestions have found resonance despite lack-
ing any real substantiation. Seeking to find any justification for such 
an interlinkage, one local newspaper used the words of Camila Bat-
manghelidjh, leader of a youth charity in Camberwell, south London 
as categorical evidence following her remark that many of the children 
she dealt with—many who were likely to become part of south Lon-
don’s gang underclass—were similar to suicide bombers: “They get to 
the point where they don’t care if they live or die … They don’t have 
empathy. They’ve lost touch with their humanity. That’s why they’re so 
dangerous … They can’t feel anything at all.”5
Despite Detective Chief Superintendent Coles responding that “we 
have found no evidence whatsoever of a link to terrorism” this has 
failed to abate the media’s pursuit of such links, one that has recently 
culminated in the national daily newspaper, The Mirror, running a front 
page headline “The jail run by al-Qaeda.”6 Alongside an image of Osama 
bin Laden, the article detailed how Belmarsh prison in south London, 
notorious for holding those arrested under anti-terrorism legislation 
since 9/11, had allegedly become the Muslim Boys’ stronghold where 
“violent Islamic extremists are terrorizing inmates … as they trawl for 
al-Qaeda recruits.” Once again the issue of forced conversions was re-
current where an alleged leaked report stated, “They force prisoners to 
accept the Muslim faith—those who refuse suffer assaults. They prom-
ise potential converts protection from other prisoners and staff …”
What is important to note is that despite the article apparently being 
concerned with the Muslim Boys, it is far from specific, suggesting 
a much wider frame of reference than merely the gang itself. So the 
This article focuses on the rise of the “Muslim 
Boys” gang, from its origins in prison and the 
streets of south London through street crime 
and forced conversions to a media discourse 
alleging links with international terrorism 
and al-Qaeda. Paradoxically, the absence of 
reliable factual evidence only seems to have 
enhanced the power of discursive labelling. The 
author shows how the word “Muslim” is being 
used both by the gang and the media and how 
in this process stereotypes about Muslims as 
well as young black males are being amplified   
and reified.
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Muslim Boys …
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activities and practices of all Muslims without differentia-
tion were being called into question, as for example when 
the leaked report alleged that Islamic “religious meetings” 
and “services” were nothing more than al-Qaeda recruit-
ment meetings. Considering Belmarsh’s notorious security, 
it is highly questionable—even downright nonsensical—
whether “top members of al-Qaeda” are allowed to preach to 
Muslim inmates at Friday prayers each week. Nonetheless in 
codifying the problem, the newspaper quoted a member of 
prison staff saying: “None of the staff has a clue what they’re 
talking about … [they] could be planning a major terrorist 
attack but the officers wouldn’t know. We can’t even tape 
the service and get it translated because it is against human 
rights. It’s frightening.” 
The banner of Islam
The construction of the islamized discourse with regard 
to the Muslim Boys, has become something of a cause for 
concern in certain south London Muslim communities. Fol-
lowing the negative coverage received after “shoebomber” 
Richard Reid was identified as having prayed there—Reid 
himself a revert to Islam of African-Caribbean heritage with a 
criminal past—the Brixton mosque recently sought to avert 
any problems, potential or otherwise. Following the murder 
of a young black man, Solomon Martin on New Years Eve 
2005, another linked to the gang, the Brixton and Stockwell 
mosques publicly denounced any association with any such 
groups or activities. Without naming the Muslim Boys specif-
ically, the mosque declared that these “criminals masquerad-
ing as Muslims”7 were threatening the good name of Islam, 
giving some credence to the possibility of the gang tapping 
into the anxieties and fears associated to Muslims and Islam. 
Despite the denouncement however, the recurrence of the 
Muslims Boys fails to go away: at another local mosque in 
Thornton Heath, gang member Marcus Archer was arrested 
and subsequently convicted of possession of firearms after 
being arrested by armed police having been seen handing a 
gun to a friend before entering the mosque to pray.8
As regards their tapping into social anxieties and fears, this 
would also appear to be what is being suggested by Toaha 
Qureshi, chair of the Lambeth Muslim Forum, who suggests that far 
from being sincere Muslims, the gang are instead “camouflaging them-
selves in the banner of Islam.”9 Such an explanation would appear to 
have some validity, although in recognizing this one has to make some 
assumptions—whether fairly or otherwise—about how sincere those 
gang members are in their adherence to Islam. This again cannot be 
substantiated from what is known and so again, this question also re-
mains unanswerable.
“Boyz-n-the-Hood”
The gap between fact and fiction is therefore extremely difficult to 
identify and even more so to differentiate between. The final point 
about the practice of the media is potentially the most complex, name-
ly that the myths surrounding the Muslim Boys may be nothing more 
than an extremely localized “story” being propelled into a globalized 
and hybridized spectacle. Utilizing the increasing problematization of 
Britain’s Muslim communities since 2001,10 intensified by both 9/11 
and 7/7, it might be that this problematization is being employed to 
further reinforce the representations that have been associated with 
young black males in the media since the 1970s. It therefore seems that 
it is the myths about the Muslim Boys that are problematic, simultane-
ously reifying the contemporary problematization of Muslim communi-
ties and the historically rooted criminalization of young, black males. In 
this way, two separate yet equally dangerous sets of stereotypes, those 
of radicalism, violence, and terrorism (Muslims) and criminality, vio-
lence, and “gangsta” culture (young black males) find form and become 
strengthened. Whilst Stuart Hall noted three decades ago that “race” 
had come to signify the crises in society—the “moral panic”—it seems 
that now it is race, augmented by religion that is providing today’s 
“moral panic”: an “arena in which [today’s] complex fears, tensions and 
anxieties … [are] most conveniently and explicitly [being] projected 
and … worked through.”11 As such, those young black males that are 
being identified as “Muslim”—taking into account the aforementioned 
Reid and also the Jamaican-born 7/7 bomber Germaine (Jamal) Lind-
sey—might be merely the latest manifestation of a historical discourse 
that has repeatedly racialized, criminalized, and perpetually problema-
tized myths and stereotypes about this marginal-
ized and demonized social group. 
It is therefore suggested that whilst it is highly 
unlikely that the Muslim Boys present the size or 
scale of threat that some sources are suggesting, 
the utilization of the Muslim tag does confirm 
how such words and descriptors can no longer 
be neutrally employed: conjuring and informing 
a myriad of negatively evaluated understandings 
that contemporarily strike fear not only into the 
communities within which such a gang might be 
operating but also in the readerships and wider 
socio-political spaces within which those media 
sources are also being disseminated. Aside from 
the realities or otherwise of the Muslim Boys and 
their foreseeable (mediatized?) future, what this 
episode—whether ongoing or possibly even al-
ready concluded—allows is an insight into the 
way in which the discourses of stereotypification 
and societal demonization inherent within rac-
ism and, more recently, Islamophobia are always 
moving: constantly maintaining a protean nature 
and rarely, if indeed ever, remaining static and un-
changing.
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P AT R I C K  J O R Y
From “Patani Melayu” 
to “Thai Muslim”
It would appear a simple question: 
who are the people at the centre of 
the conflict in Thailand’s southern 
border provinces? The Thai and Ma-
laysian governments, the media, many 
academics, and the general public who 
have contributed to the mountains of 
words produced about the violence 
that has taken place over the last two 
years, seem to agree: “Muslims.” The 
Thai Government will often add an ad-
jective to this collective name to affirm 
this group’s nationality, “Thai Muslims.” 
Thus merely through the use of these religious labels to represent the 
actors involved in the conflict, it is difficult for many people to imag-
ine it to be otherwise. The result is a depressing one. On Thai Internet 
web-boards—a useful source for gauging uncensored public opinion 
nowadays—one can read quite virulent anti-Muslim attacks. 
Yet if the conflict were essentially religious then hundreds of thou-
sands of “Muslims” all over Thailand outside the border provinces 
would surely rise up in mass revolt against the Thai state in a gesture 
of solidarity with their co-religionists. But they do not. If not, why then 
is this conflict consistently talked about today using religious terminol-
ogy? The answer can be found in the suppression 
of official references to the distinct ethnic Malay 
identity of the population of the border provinc-
es, in favour of the generic term, “Thai Muslims.” 
The consequence of this re-labelling has been 
that the essence of the conflict, a clash between 
competing Thai and Patani Malay nationalisms, 
has been lost amidst explanations of the conflict 
in religious terms. 
From “Malays” to “Thai Muslims”
Historically, both in the discourse of the Thai 
state as well as that of its adversaries in the South, 
the people of the former Patani sultanate were 
usually referred to as melayu (Malay). Even during 
the reign of the modernizing king Chulalongkorn, 
who oversaw the abolition of the Patani sultan-
ate and the definitive absorption of the territories 
of the former sultanate into the Thai state under 
the 1909 Anglo-Siamese Treaty, the Thai court ha-
bitually and un-selfconsciously referred to the re-
gion’s inhabitants as Malay. The King once stated 
that he hoped to eventually achieve a situation where “even though 
they are Malays and of a different faith … [they] are Thais in sentiment 
and outlook just as any other Thai …” Thus it seemed possible then, still 
under the Absolute Monarchy, for the Thai government to recognize 
dual ethnic identities within one state, “Thai” and “Malay.”
Likewise, the Thai state’s antagonists in the south following the Sec-
ond World War also spoke of and for the “Malays.” Ibrahim Syukri, au-
thor of a popular nationalist history of Patani published in 1948 titled 
Sejarah Kerajaan Melayu Patani (History of the Malay Kingdom of Patani) 
called for the recognition of the “nationality [of the population of Pa-
tani] as a “Malay people.” Following the end of the Second World War, 
as Malay nationalism was gathering momentum across the border and 
Thailand was forced by the British to give up its irredentist annexa-
tions during the war, including the northern Malayan states, a group 
of Malay leaders in the Patani region submitted a petition to the British 
requesting the British Government to “have the kindness to release our 
country and ourselves from the pressure of Siam.” Patani, they pointed 
out, “is really a Malay country, formerly 
ruled by Malay Rajas for generations.” 
Moreover, the political ideology of the 
most prominent of the region’s separa-
tist organizations that sprung up soon 
after has been the national liberation 
of the “Patani Malays.”
Until recently then, the majority pop-
ulation of this region was commonly 
referred to in ethnic terms—as Malays. 
It is indeed remarkable how little refer-
ence there was to their religious iden-
tity. How then, have the subjects of the 
conflict been transformed from “Malays” into “Muslims”? 
First, since the era of de-colonization and the rise of Malay national-
ism in British Malaya, the Thai government has actively sought to avoid 
references to the Malay ethnic identity of the subjects of the region. 
It feared that with the new, post-colonial logic of nation-based states, 
recognition of the people of the region as “Malay” might give credibility 
to demands for a separate Malay state, either based on the territories of 
the old Malay sultanate of Patani, or through union with the other Malay 
states of British Malaya, which were now preparing for independence 
from Britain. Under the assimilationist policies of national integration, 
which began in Thailand from the beginning of the Second World War 
and held sway through to the 1990s, Malay ethnic identity as expressed 
in terms of language, dress, education, history, and custom has been 
consistently discouraged by the state. The government has attempted 
to replace it with a religious label, “Thai Muslims” or “Thai Islam” in the 
hope that this linguistic change would contribute to the overall goal of 
assimilation. Thus for Thai governments since the Second World War, 
the only possible identity officially acceptable for the “Patani Malays” 
within the Thai nation-state was as “Thai Muslims.”
Islamization in Malaysia 
Another contributing factor has been the politicization of Islam 
amongst the Malays in neighbouring Malaysia. Although this process 
first became clearly visible in the 1970s, its seeds were sown with the 
establishment of the state of Malaysia and the legal definition of Malay-
ness. One of the components of Malay identity as defined by the Ma-
laysian Constitution was “a person who professes the religion of Islam.” 
Following Malaysia’s independence in 1957, therefore, to be a Malay—
and thereby eligible to the special privileges accorded to “Malays”—le-
gally one must be a Muslim. Yet up until the 1970s Islam was marginal 
to most discussions of Malay identity. Reading Mahathir’s controversial 
book, The Malay Dilemma, first published in 1970, one year after bloody 
race riots, it is striking that Islam receives hardly any attention. The bulk 
of the book concentrates on Malay cultural traits that were supposedly 
responsible for the “dilemma” in which, according to Mahathir, the Ma-
lays now found themselves—that is, a majority in an ethnically plural 
country and politically dominant, but seemingly unwilling to use that 
dominance to improve their disadvantaged social and economic posi-
tion because of a cultural predisposition for tolerance. 
Ironically it was Mahathir who, upon becoming Prime Minister in 
1981, began to implement a policy of Islamization. A year later he 
co-opted the former Muslim student activist Anwar Ibrahim into the 
government. Between them a policy emerged which viewed Islam as 
the answer to “social ills”—corruption, laziness, materialism, drug ad-
diction, promiscuity, incest, child abuse—which appeared to be more 
prevalent among the Malays than the other ethnic groups, and which 
were blamed on the government’s policy rapid economic development. 
It is from this era the government began to promote Islam as a solution 
to these problems and to extol Malays to follow more closely the teach-
A violent insurgency in the ethnically Malay 
Muslim region of southern Thailand has 
claimed over a thousand lives since 2004. 
Although the conflict between the country’s 
southernmost provinces and the Thai state 
dates back at least a century, recently the 
ideology in which the conflict is expressed has 
changed markedly. Whereas a generation ago 
the goal was “liberation” of the ethnically Malay 
population from the former sultanate of Patani, 
today the spirit of the movement is expressed 
predominantly in Islamic terms. 
With the spectre 
of communism 
finally put to rest 
as an ideology 
of resistance … 
radical Islam has 
taken its place.
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ings of Islam. Islamic discourse in Ma-
laysia, therefore, became dominated 
by the government, and the two key 
figures in the Islamization of Malay so-
ciety were the Western-educated Ma-
hathir and Anwar, rather than trained 
Islamic scholars. Thus when Patani Ma-
lays look today to their Malay brothers 
in Malaysia they see a more Islamized 
Malay identity.
A third factor behind the represen-
tation of the conflict in the south in 
religious terms has of course been the 
so-called global “Islamic revival” since 
the 1970s, and particularly the way in 
which Islam has become an ideology of 
resistance. Its prestige grew even fur-
ther with the end of the Cold War, the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and with it 
international communism, which dealt 
a deathblow to most Marxist-inspired 
resistance movements in the develop-
ing world. The extraordinary political 
and economic consensus we live under 
today that Fukuyama termed with a 
troubling sense of finality, “the end of 
history,” that is, liberal democracy and 
free market capitalism, means there is no longer a credible leftist pro-
gramme of resistance available to groups for whom the existing status 
quo is unbearable. With the spectre of communism finally put to rest 
as an ideology of resistance, for certain groups of Muslims radical Islam 
has taken its place.
Despite the fact that some Patani Malays are known to have fought 
in Afghanistan, that some have been trained overseas in “jihadist” gue-
rilla warfare, and that people in the region have links with “Islamist” 
movements elsewhere in the world, almost every serious study of the 
conflict shows that the grievances that have given rise to the conflict 
are entirely local. The fact that Islam plays a much more prominent role 
in the rhetoric of the people of the region is certainly partly related 
to the global Islamic revival that has also influenced the Muslims of 
the southern Thai border provinces. But it is even more related to the 
critical problem of needing to find an effective ideology of resistance in 
the, post-Cold War, globalized environment, to help provide meaning 
and perhaps also a resolution to one of the region’s most intractable 
conflicts. 
“De-culturalization” of Islam in Southern Thailand?
Amidst this Islamic discourse we might well ask, to what extent does 
a Patani Malay ethnic identity still exist among the local population of 
Thailand’s southern border provinces? Anecdotally it is said that flu-
ency in the distinctive Patani Malay dialect among the young has de-
creased compared to a generation ago, and that competence in Thai 
has increased. A half-century of assimilationist policies has certainly 
had some effect. Many people from the region travel to Malaysia and 
some to Indonesia for educational and employment, which exposes 
them to an alternative “Malay” cultural milieu. Another cultural influ-
ence in the region that has increased is Arabic, as students return from 
their studies in the Middle East, or as a result of funding provided by 
Arab states for religious and educational purposes.
Numerous studies point to social problems prevalent among the 
youth in the region, including drug addiction, and involvement in vio-
lence and petty crime. One wonders whether one of the sources of the 
violence might be an identity crisis among young men of the region 
resulting from the obliteration of Patani Malay identity over the last 
century, the resistance to the full adoption of a Thai identity given its 
association with discrimination and oppression, and the attraction of a 
radicalized Islam to fill the void. According to Olivier Roy,1 one of the 
reasons for the turn to extremism among some young European Mus-
lims is their rejection of the traditional culture of their parents, their 
inability to find acceptance in the mainstream cultures of Europe, and 
their refuge in a purified, reconstruction of an “imagined” Islam: “Islam-
ic radicalization is a consequence of ‘de-culturalization’ and not the ex-
pression of a pristine culture.” Roy’s argument thus raises the question 
whether a similar phenomenon of de-culturalization, albeit caused by 
different factors, may be partly responsible for the radicalism in Thai-
land’s south. His characterization of radical European Muslims could be 
equally applied to the militants of Thailand’s south: “The generation 
gap, coupled with a sense of disenfranchising […] individualization of 
faith, self-teaching, generation gap, rejection of authority (including 
that of religious established leaders), loosening of family ties, lack of 
socialization with a broader community (including the ethnic commu-
nity of their parents), and withdrawal towards a small inward-looking 
group akin to a cult: all these factors show the extent of the process of 
deculturation of the radicals.”2
If a Patani Malay identity is indeed in crisis, then that may also ex-
plain why the separatist organizations such as Patani United Libera-
tion Organization, the Barisan Revolusi Nasional, and Bersatu, whose 
political ideologies were originally based, as argued above, on national 
liberation tinged with socialism rather than Islam, seem only tangen-
tially involved in the conflict that has erupted since the beginning of 
2004. Despite repeated claims by the government, it is quite unclear to 
what extent, if at all, separatism is a goal of the militants. Indeed, one of 
the most extraordinary aspects of the whole conflict is the ambiguity 
regarding the objectives of the militants, which is perhaps a symptom 
of the confused ideology of the movement in the midst of the void left 
by the obliteration of Patani Malay identity.
Thai national identity thus stands out from that of many of its South-
east Asian neighbours. Whereas Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, even 
Myanmar, have accepted the existence (at least conceptually, if not 
in practice) of dual identities, national and ethnic, since independ-
ence, Thailand maintains an essentially assimilationist model of na-
tional integration. It is revealing that one of the responses to the crisis 
in the south was to renew official nationalist campaigns to promote 
“Thainess.” In the words of one of the most popular nationalist propa-
ganda songs: “underneath the Thai flag the whole population is Thai.” 
And within official discourses of Thainess while there is a place for Mus-
lims, it appears there is no place for Malays.
Patrick Jory is Coordinator of the Southeast Asian Studies Programme, Walailak University, 
southern Thailand. 
Email: jpatrick@wu.ac.th
Note
1. Olivier Roy, “A Clash of Cultures or a Debate 
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(Spring 2005): 6-7.
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Media & Representation
L É O N  B U S K E N S  For centuries orientalists had at least 
two important sites to visit in Leiden: 
the University Library, and Brill’s Book-
shop. Many scholars combined their re-
search in the famous Legatum Warneri-
anum collections with the acquisition 
of books, both from the East and the 
West, at the bookshop, which was at 
only a stroll from the library. Brill’s was 
famous in the world of learning for its 
scholarly editions and for its catalogues 
of new and second-hand books. Univer-
sity libraries all over the world hold im-
portant collections acquired in Leiden. 
For me a visit to the antiquarian bookshop was always a treat. Its 
premises looked as if time had stood still for decades. The work of gen-
erations of scholars was gathered here, which contributed to an atmos-
phere of stateliness and solemnity. The shop’s austerity also inspired 
excitement. The persevering book hunter could always cherish hope 
that his quest for a new catch might be gratified. Many rare books could 
only be found here, sitting on dust covered shelves, often inscribed 
with dedications from one famous scholar to another, or adorned with 
marginal notes of an intellectual ancestor.
In February 2006 Mr Rijk Smitskamp, the present owner of the book-
shop, decided to close business after more than three centuries of serv-
ice to the world of learning. This decision marked the end of an era of a 
certain style of scholarship, in which the study of Muslim societies was 
dominated by a philological approach, for which the amassing of all-en-
compassing libraries, public as well as private, was 
an important tool. The vanishing of this prominent 
institution in the intellectual infrastructure of Lei-
den prompts me to give a short historical sketch of 
the relationships between the bookshop and the 
development of Islamic studies.1
History
In 1683 Jordaan Luchtmans established a pub-
lishing house cum bookshop at the Rapenburg, in 
the centre of Leiden which soon became famous 
for its scholarly publications in the fields of theol-
ogy, classics, and orientalia. In 1848 Evert Jan Brill 
acquired the firm and continued business under 
his own name. In 1872 the firm changed hands 
again, but its new owners A.P.M. van Oordt and F. 
de Stoppelaar retained the name Brill. In 1894 Van 
Oordt and De Stoppelaar decided to concentrate 
on publishing, and on dealing in books on orien-
tal and colonial studies, selling the rest of their stock, some 250,000 
volumes, to two former employees, who started their own bookshop 
and auction house. 
From the nineteenth century onwards Luchtmans and Brill became 
famous for their publications on oriental studies. Brill could print 
almost any text in any oriental language. Many of the editions and 
studies published by Luchtmans and Brill were the result of a close 
cooperation with eminent orientalists connected to Leiden Universi-
ty. For example, in 1732 Luchtmans published its first edition of a text 
in Arabic, a Life of Saladin, prepared by the Professor of Arabic, Albert 
Schultens. Brill undertook several prestigious projects with scholars 
from Leiden University and their foreign colleagues, such as the edi-
tion of a series of classical geographical texts in Arabic (1870-1894) 
and of the multivolume history of al-Tabari (1879-1901). In both ven-
tures the work of Michaël Jan de Goeje, Professor of Arabic at Leiden 
University, was essential. The publica-
tion of the first and second edition En-
cyclopaedia of Islam was also possible 
thanks to the offices of scholars from 
Leiden and Utrecht.
Oriental connections
Brill’s bookshop also sold foreign publi-
cations, which were otherwise difficult 
to obtain. Its catalogues, which were 
published from the end of the nine-
teenth century onwards, are important 
sources for our knowledge of the ma-
terials which orientalists could obtain 
for their studies. Again, the collaboration between Leiden scholars and 
Brill’s authors abroad with the bookshop proved vital: these gentlemen 
sent books from the East as well as their own books to be sold through 
the bookshop.
For example, Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje, who visited Mecca at the 
expense of the Dutch government in 1885, encouraged Brill’s to ac-
quire a fair number of copies of a famous work on the history of Is-
lamic conquests by Ahmad Dahlan, a mufti in Mecca and a close ac-
quaintance of Snouck, which had just been published in Mecca. The 
last copy from this stock was sold only this spring to a collector in the 
Arabian Peninsula. Snouck Hurgronje was also instrumental, together 
with M.Th. Houtsma and their Swedish colleague Carlo Landberg, in 
the acquisition of several collections of oriental manuscripts from Amin 
al-Madani, a learned shaykh from Madina, described in a series of cata-
logues issued between 1883 and 1889. One collection was sold to the 
Leiden library another went to Princeton in 1900. The trade in oriental 
manuscripts, in languages as diverse as Arabic, Ottoman, Persian, Ethi-
opian, Chinese, Mongol, and Tibetan, would become another specialty 
of Brill’s.
For more than a century the books from the estates of many famous 
European orientalists were sold after their death to Brill’s, which made 
them available again to their intellectual heirs. This resulted in monu-
mental catalogues, such as of the libraries of René Basset, Enno Litt-
man, Franz Taeschner, and Oscar Löfgren. Some of these collections 
were the beginnings of new university libraries. Thus, Joseph Schacht’s 
famous library on Islamic law was sold to Kuala Lumpur.
Early editions and manuscripts
When the present owner Mr Rijk Smitskamp, educated as a classical 
scholar, started to work at Brill’s in 1970, he gradually made himself ac-
quainted with the riches that had accumulated in the bookshop during 
more than a century. In the course of the years he transformed the en-
terprise from a firm dealing in second hand books into an antiquarian 
bookshop of renown, specialized in scholarly and rare works.
Unlike his predecessors he did not consider the old books as out-
dated and less valuable. He realized the importance of the large stock 
of nineteenth century publications and marketed these as antiquarian 
books of considerable interest and value. His extensive knowledge of 
the books offered for sale became more and more visible in the cata-
logues, both in the composition of the collections offered, and in his 
learned descriptions. His own specialty became the history of oriental 
printing in Europe, for which he created a monument in the three vol-
umes of Philologia orientalis (1976-1991).
One day an itinerant Turkish merchant in sheep’s intestines and pis-
tachio nuts, who in his youth had enjoyed an Islamic education, visited 
Mr Smitskamp in order to sell some manuscripts. During his tours in 
the Anatolian countryside he encountered old books in a largely for-
gotten script for which the owners did not have much use any more. 
For more than four centuries the city of 
Leiden has enjoyed a reputation in the study 
of Oriental languages and cultures. This 
fame was both linked to the scholars of its 
university, and to activities of printers and 
booksellers. Since 1683 a bookshop, which 
later became known as Brill’s Bookshop was 
one of the landmarks in this infrastructure 
of Oriental studies. The present owner’s 
decision to close shop in February 2006 is 
an occasion for reflection on the changes 
in scholarship on Muslim societies and the 
sources it uses.
English-language 
monographs based 
on “field work” have 
replaced editions of 
unique texts, full of 
exotic characters.
Vanishing Orientalism 
in Leiden
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After he had found out that these dis-
carded books turned out to be valu-
ables abroad, he sent for several years 
mailbags, full of manuscripts, to Leiden. 
A few years later he was followed by a 
Turkish professor and connoisseur of 
the Islamic heritage, who used his con-
tacts in Western Asia to furnish Brill’s 
with manuscripts.
As in the nineteenth century, Smit-
skamp invited Leiden University schol-
ars to contribute to lavishly produced 
catalogues, such as the famous cata-
logue 500 on Arabic manuscripts com-
piled by Pieter Sjoerd van Koningsveld 
and Qasim al-Samarrai in 1978. This 
collection, like many others since the 
1970s, ended up in the Near East.
Closing shop
In 1992 Messrs Brill decided to sell 
the bookshop, thus ending the ancient 
combination of the publishing and sell-
ing of books. At about the same time 
they had also given up the printing of 
books. Its famous printing house, with 
all its movable type of oriental scripts 
and the specialist knowledge of its ty-
pographers, which had given Leiden fame for centuries, was relinquished. 
Fortunately, Mr Smitskamp was so courageous as to continue business as 
an antiquarian bookseller under his own name.
However, in recent years important changes in the antiquarian book 
trade have come about by the spread of the use of the Internet. The publi-
cation of printed catalogues embodying the fruit of years of studying and 
collecting became somewhat obsolete, and in any case expensive, like 
the maintenance of prestigious premises in the centre of town. The com-
merce in books again requires new skills, such as the practice of electron-
ic marketing and sales.2 No successor dared to take over the venerable 
bookshop. At the last moment a booklover from the Arabian Peninsula 
bought the books on Islam and the Middle East, as the nucleus of a new 
scholarly library which he intended to establish.
At the end of 2005 Mr Smitskamp decided to close his bookshop with 
the publication of a catalogue of important works from the republic of 
letters (no. 653), to which his firm had been offering its services since 
1683. The remaining stock, the bulky result of centuries of bookselling, 
and including the valuable reference library studies compiled by Mr Smit-
skamp, will be auctioned in several sessions by Burgersdijk & Niermans, 
the firm established by two former Brill employees in 1894.3 
With the decision to close the Oriental Antiquarium a long tradition of 
dealing in books from and about the East has come to an end. Gone are 
the days in which a student, after a studious morning in the University 
Library, could walk leisurely to the Nieuwe Rijn, and browse for a book-
ish lunch. Its nooks and crannies, where on bright days incoming sunrays 
would transform the dust fluttering down among the towering bookcases 
into speckles of gold, held unexpected treasures brought together during 
three centuries by generations of scholars, printers, and booksellers.
Vanishing Orientalism
However, the closure of the bookshop implies more than the van-
ishing of a bibliophiles’ sanctuary. Almost simultaneously the orien-
tal reading room of the university library was closed, and its staff cut 
down. These developments are part of important changes in the aca-
demic study of oriental languages and cultures which have taken place 
in recent years. The concept of Orientalism as a designation of a field 
of study has come under severe attack. Since the publication of Said’s 
seminal essay in 1978, the term is rather looked down upon, as the sign 
of an old-fashioned, antiquarian approach to research, or the expres-
sion of bygone view of things political.
Philology, which flourished in the nineteenth and first half of the 
twentieth century, stressed the importance of the study of texts, es-
pecially in the form of collecting and editing of manuscripts. Brockel-
mann’s Geschichte der arabischen Litteratur, the Encyclopaedia of Islam, 
the Handbuch der Orientalistik, all published by Brill, are outstanding 
embodiments of this textual approach. During the last three decades 
social scientists have criticized the primacy of philology in the study 
of Muslim societies and gradually taken over its place. The Orient does 
not need a special branch of scholarship, but should be studied as all 
other human societies, using a diversity of disciplines, in which knowl-
edge of languages is only an auxiliary science. This is for example the 
approach which underlies the ISIM programme.
The production of books and articles shows these changes. English-
language monographs based on “field work” have replaced editions 
of unique texts, full of exotic characters. Meanwhile the Orient has 
changed from a passive object of research into a multitude of mod-
ern states, some of which hold considerable funds for research and 
the construction of new identities. Patrons from Arabia, Malaysia and 
Japan, who bought manuscripts as well as antiquarian European stud-
ies, made the Oriental Antiquarium flourish. The trade in oriental manu-
scripts changed drastically. On the one hand the removal of the written 
heritage of “traditional” societies was severely criticized. On the other 
hand prosperous states and private collectors from the East acquired 
a “proper” past and tradition in less well-off countries and at London 
auctions, sometimes for skyrocketing prices.
The techniques and instruments of the humanities have also been 
profoundly altered. Laptops and virtual libraries 
have replaced writing-desks and bookcases, just 
as shorter trips have come instead of lengthy ex-
peditions or stays as advisers for native affairs, 
which would be exploited during an academic 
career. Internet trading and digitalization have 
made books from all over the world much more 
easily accessible. A bookshop, which encompass-
es the entire Orient from a philological perspec-
tive, does not seem to be a viable institution any-
more in the light of a profoundly altered vision of 
scholarship.
In this light the history of three centuries of orien-
tal bookselling in Leiden is a source for reflection on 
course of scholarship in our field. The bookshop’s 
archives offer a unique image of changes in ideas 
about the study of Muslim societies, and as such 
deserve conservation and further exploration.
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Notes
1. See, for instance: J.T.P. Bruijn, “Collective 
Studies of the Muslim World: Institutions, 
Projects and Collections,” in Leiden 
Oriental Connections 1850-1940, ed. Willem 
Otterspeer (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1989), 94-114; 
J.M.Van Ophuijsen, E. J. Brill: Three Centuries 
of Scholarly Publishing. Since 1683 (Leiden: 
E. J. Brill, 1994); Jan Just Witkam, “A Giant 
Fades Away,” Ezelsoor: Newsletter of the 
Department of Book and Digital Media Studies 
(Leiden), Spring 2006, 1-6.
2. The electronic address of the bookshop is: 
www.oriental.demon.nl.
3. The catalogues of the successive auctions 
can be consulted at their website: 
www.b-n.nl.
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P H I L I P P  R E I C H M U T H  
&  S T E F A N  W E R N I N G
Pixel Pashas, 
Digital Djinns
The study of computer and video 
games (CVGs) is currently a discipline 
with a large spectrum of research ven-
tures, coming mostly from literary and 
film studies, cultural studies, pedagog-
ics, psychology, and computer science. 
The on-topic discourse still exhibits a 
binary segmentation into narratolo-
gists and “ludologists,” the latter focus-
ing on games as rule systems and cul-
tural aspects of ludic activity. Moreo-
ver, there is little homogeneity in the 
choice of analytical tools and terminol-
ogy, especially in less-covered areas 
such as digital game ethnography.1
The study of Orientalism or, more 
precisely, Oriental topoi and Orientalist rationales in CVGs requires an 
understanding of the specificity of interactive media and the logic be-
hind their production and distribution. First, the topography that the 
player traverses in the game, i.e. the parameters of spatial construction 
and orientation, is an impor-
tant factor that sets CVGs 
apart from narrative media 
(like film and literature) and 
links them closer to spatially 
oriented media like architec-
ture. Second, the rule-sys-
tem governing the player in-
teraction is a level on which 
cultural bias may be commu-
nicated. A semiotic reading 
of game rules can both be 
helpful to describe built-in 
signification and the game 
mechanisms as a projection 
space for player disposi-
tion. A rewarding approach 
for future research would 
be to explore representa-
tions of Oriental themes in a 
diachronic perspective with 
examples such as the Prince 
of Persia series (1989-2005). 
Design properties, like the badly implemented joystick controls which 
make the game frustrating at times, are communicated among players 
and thus, perhaps unintentionally, reinforce pre-existing ideas such as 
the association of the Orient with vertigo and hallucination.
Representations and re-representations
How does the “Orient” figure in computer and video games? Game 
producers draw from a rich field of Oriental topoi and representations 
that is well established in Western (and Japanese) culture; notions of 
an imagined Orient as a complex cultural metasign that “is” everything 
that can be associated with it, could be applied quite successfully. We 
thus often find adaptations of familiar motifs from popular literature, 
art, cinema, or even political discourse that appear on various levels. 
These include visual elements such as tiles, minarets, or localities such 
as deserts or bazaars (e.g. Breath of Fire 4, 2003), character concepts 
such as warriors-with-scimitars, evil viziers, dancers, or merchants 
(e.g. Prince of Persia, 1989), or narrative tropes such as travel narratives 
(e.g. Talisman: Changing the Sands of Time, 1987), but also contempo-
rary political representations (such as Commando Libya, 1986, or Ter-
rorist Takedown, 2004). CVGs are thus 
highly intertextual, taking up estab-
lished representations and reprocess-
ing them into an interactive medium. 
Additionally, interactiveness allows 
for innovative ways in which assump-
tions about the Orient can be invoked. 
Khalaan (1990), a strategy game about 
four caliphs competing for supremacy, 
tries to evoke a sense of “Oriental des-
potism,” by giving players extremely 
fine-grained, but also lavish large-scale 
control of vast armies and treasures. 
Magic Carpet (1994) is a 3D simulation 
of air combat on magic carpets.
Technical contingencies
Apart from intertextuality, a second major frame for assessing both 
structural parameters and potential effects of CVGs are technological 
contingencies. Accordingly, interactive media should be interpreted 
as products of code, both in terms of production, usage, and retelling. 
The act of playing a video game is usually described as a “cybernetic 
feedback loop,” i.e. as an input-processing-output cycle, both from a 
psychological and communication studies perspective. In other words, 
interacting with a CVG substitutes hermeneutic understanding for a 
kind of algorithmic text-processing; the gradual uncovering of the pro-
grammed game rules is an inextricable element of play.
Consequently, elements of Orientalism, whether audiovisual, narra-
tive, or other, must also be analysed against the momentum of tech-
nology. Many games with Oriental themes are showcases for particular 
technological achievements, be it new techniques of character anima-
tion (Prince of Persia, 1989), zoom effects (Arabian Fight, 1992), pre-ren-
dered cutscenes (Egypt III, 2004), digitized photographs blended with 
bitmaps (Khalaan, 1990), or large-scale deformable terrain (Magic Car-
pet, 1994). In the context of video game history, the theme of exploring 
mysterious, Oriental landscapes, often presented in the conventional-
ized form of travel narratives (e.g. Sinbad and the Throne of the Falcon, 
1987), starkly coincided with the 1980s’ technohistorical perspective of 
the computer as a “black box,” awaiting exploration and understanding 
at the hand of the user. As Claus PIAS argues, navigation in early com-
puter games derived from technical concepts such as graphs and inter-
connected nodes rather than from a hermeneutical approach to space 
popular in textual media. Often, stereotypical representations are 
derived from technical feasibility, an observation which would allow 
for a comparison with older media phenomena. For instance, John 
MacKenzie notes how Orientalist painters developed “rapid sketching” 
techniques to avoid “nuisances” like the colour bleaching due to the in-
tense desert sunlight and potential attacks, and used these sketches as 
mnemonic proxies for their final works.2 Digital games are constrained 
by production circumstances in a similar manner. “Libraries” of pre-pro-
duced, iconic “Oriental” objects are reused for economic reasons. Inter-
action patterns like the protagonist’s ability to “rewind” time in Prince 
of Persia: Sands of Time (2003) are first and foremost determined by new 
software techniques and later pass into the inventory of conventional-
ized representational topoi.
Thus, oriental stereotypes are often part of player dispositions, re-
cursively shaped by interactive and other media consumption. For in-
stance, adversaries in many Oriental games carry a scimitar. In films, 
this is a key feature identifying them as Orientals; in CVGs, it also car-
ries the technical reading of marking the figure as an enemy, so that 
the player can discern between “dangerous” and “harmless” figures in 
a cluttered screen space. When, upon death, the figure loses the scimi-
Arabian, one of the earliest computer games 
with a decidedly Oriental setting came out in 
1983. Structurally similar to Nintendo’s Donkey 
Kong (1982), the imaginary Orient permeates 
Arabian. The story is told as a “book,” consisting 
of the various scenarios as “pages.” Its hero, a 
scimitar-wielding, turbaned prince, fights his 
way through ships and castles against djinns 
and rocs, finally rescuing his princess, and 
the two fly away on a magic carpet. We thus 
encounter the Orient in Arabian on multiple 
levels: narrative setting, character design, and 
even in the game’s technical manual, which is 
filled with carefully-drawn djinns and other 
Oriental imagery.
Title screen 
from Arabian 
(1983)
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tar (such as in Arabian Magic, 1992), this is meant as a visual cue that 
this figure no longer poses a threat, not that it ceases to be Oriental. 
Even narrative contiguity is being technologically dissected and re-as-
sembled through storytelling algorithms which create emergent plots 
based on a formalist understanding of narrativity particularly suited to 
computer implementation. Recently, multiplayer games such as the 
Korean Silkroad (2005-6) aim at a collaborative retelling of Oriental nar-
ratives by allowing players from diverse personal cultural backgrounds 
to impersonate figures from their own imagination.
Political and societal backdrop 
Another interesting observation is a certain interdependence be-
tween computer games and the way political processes and events, 
along with their representations in Western mass media, shape the im-
agination of the region in the general public. Since CVGs are usually 
produced with their consumer base in mind, they tend to incorporate 
and reflect these imaginations as they change over time. An especially 
obvious case is the field of military simulation games, most of which 
put the player into the role of a (mostly US) military commander, foot 
soldier, tank driver, or fighter pilot in a number of different scenarios 
worldwide. In the late 1980s, against the backdrop of the first Palestin-
ian Intifada and the US bombings of Tripoli and Benghazi; these scenar-
ios usually included missions in the eastern Mediterranean (F-15 Strike 
Eagle II, 1989) or in Libya, which figured prominently in games such 
as the extremely violent Commando Libya (1986) with its notorious ex-
ecution scene, or Airborne Ranger (1987), the first tactical simulation 
game. After the Gulf War in 1991, the “Iraq theatre” immediately be-
came a prominent operational arena in military simulation games, such 
as the 1991 add-on mission disk for F-15 Strike Eagle II, where Iraq re-
placed the formerly rather diffuse “Mediterranean” scenario, and many 
other games, staying popular throughout the 1990s as the Oriental war 
scenario per se (Back to Baghdad, 1996, or M1 Tank Platoon II, 1998). In 
the second half of the 1990s, it began to be accompanied by other, in-
creasingly detailed Middle Eastern scenarios as the political backdrop 
changed, such as Yemen after the Yemeni civil war of 1994 (Apache 
Longbow, 1995), Somalia after the failure of UN operations (F-16 Multi-
role Fighter, 1998), or Afghanistan after the victory of the Taliban (Hind, 
1998). Since September 11, the focus shifted somewhat; recent games 
often focusing either on US special forces in Middle Eastern countries 
(Full Spectrum Warrior, 2003) or on counterterrorist operations (Terror-
ist Takedown series, 2004-05). Computer games as consumable goods 
with rather short market cycles thus allow conclusions on short-term 
conceptualizations and representations of the Orient among consum-
ers.
However, Edward Said’s hypothesis that the Western-imagined Orient 
is an ahistorical entity, that the Orient of the Arabian Nights and of Pal-
estinian suicide bombers are one and the same, does not hold well for 
CVGs. Games portraying a contemporary and a historical or fantastical 
Orient constitute separate categories. Few games exist where connec-
tions are drawn between Near Eastern settings and ancient, particular-
ly Egyptian mythology, as in the Metal Slug series (1996-2006), where, 
after fighting turbaned thugs in a Middle Eastern city, the players 
confront mummies in an Egyptian tomb; or in Daughter of the Serpent 
(1992), an adventure game revolving around ancient Egyptian magic 
set in a minutiously detailed nineteenth-century Egypt; however, these 
instances remain exceptions.
How can this approach contribute to Islamic Studies and related 
disciplines? Firstly, the use of Oriental representations in CVGs allows 
detailed examinations how these representations are deployed and in-
terconnected, especially regarding the reincorporation of established 
motifs from other genres, such as literature or art, as well as the adapta-
tion of this imagined Orient to the technical realities of the new interac-
tive medium—whereas in static, literary, or pictorial media the Orient is 
imagined, in interactive media it can be enacted. Secondly, CVGs allow 
Western representations of the Orient to be studied in terms of their 
consumption. While connections between consumption-driven popu-
lar entertainment culture and the use of Oriental representations are 
well known, “Orientalism” is still mainly understood mainly as a mode 
of cultural production rather than consumption. Games are interesting 
objects of study here whose consumption is well documented in many 
forms, ranging from sales figures and popularity rankings to reviews, 
“walk-through” solution guides, and the emergence of fan communi-
ties. We can thus see how representations are accepted, reinforced, 
modified, or rejected on grounds of technical innovation and detail, 
but also on grounds of familiarity and convergence with political con-
figurations and existing Orientalist subtexts in the target audience. An-
other aspect are their short product cycles, resulting in feedback loops 
where producers, intent on maximizing revenue, implement their own 
assumptions of their audience’s tastes, expectations, and consumption 
habits. Authorial intent and representational strategies within com-
puter games are thus subject to short-term retroactive influence from 
their consumers.3
Computer games as “neglected media”
As this argument suggests, CVGs should be discussed in a broader 
context of “neglected media.” Briefly, neglected media exhibit strong 
popular appeal and economic relevance, contrasted by a lack of cul-
tural prestige and scientific coverage. Often, they have a profound 
impact on the collective imaginary although this “passive” knowledge 
is seldom accepted as culturally relevant. Examples could include 
computer games, tabletop role-playing, trading card or board games, 
comic books, music videos, events, concerts, performances, or pinball 
machines, as well as corresponding paratextual material such as pack-
age designs or advertisements for games. It is methodologically useful 
to consider them from an explicit overarching “neglected media” stand-
point instead of viewing instances of them in the light of specialized 
disciplines such as, popular or fan culture studies or even more spe-
cific subfields4 which obstruct the view on general similarities in the 
mechanisms of cultural representation within these media. Orientalist 
representations tend to be reproduced in neglected media in more ex-
plicit and graphic forms partly because these media are considered less 
relevant in cultural discourse and thus less subject to media critique.
Key arguments presented here for CVGs can be applied to these 
media correspondingly. Firstly, in any medium that depends on state-
of-the-art technology, technological innovation will immediately im-
pact representations of cultural content such as the “Orient.” Secondly, 
since these media are aimed at a public whose own conceptions of the 
“Orient” are influenced by political and societal 
events, representations tend to reflect these po-
litical and historical contingencies rather than ex-
isting in an ahistorical space; historical tie-ins are 
equally understudied in computer games as in 
other “neglected media” such as events or comic 
books. Lastly, since most of these media operate 
in an economic context where profit is depend-
ent on consumption, patterns of media consump-
tions and usage are a promising way to study how 
representations of the “Orient” are reproduced 
and perpetuated.
US soldiers in 
an Oriental 
courtyard in 
Full Spectrum 
Warrior (2003)
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D A N I E L L E  K O N I N G
Anti-Evolutionism Among 
Muslim Students
In December 2004, local and national 
media were stirred by an incident at 
the Vrije Universiteit in Amsterdam. A 
group of Muslim students in the bio-
medical sciences were said to have 
carried out an essay assignment for the 
course “Man and Evolution” by uncriti-
cally copying anti-evolutionist scripts 
from supposedly anti-western Muslim 
sites such as www.harunyahya.com. 
Generally, teachers said, Muslim stu-
dents did not even want to consider 
evolution theory. The discussion spi-
ralled from a local concern over the 
scientific attitude of Muslim students to various national debates on 
Islam and integration and evolution versus Intelligent Design. It led to 
articles in multiple newspapers, analyzing the scope and nature of the 
“problem.”2 In the VU newspaper Ad Valvas, a discussion about science 
versus religion resurfaced. Van der Hoeven, minister of Education, Cul-
ture, and Science, started a national debate about the educational and 
scientific status of the Intelligent Design theory—among other reasons 
to enhance religious and cultural integration.3 In 
spite of this rather abundant media spin-off, the 
inspiring event seemed locally bound: no other 
Dutch universities reported to have problems 
with Islamic anti-evolutionism.4 
Can the essay incident be situated within a 
broader development of ideologies like anti-evo-
lutionism, defence of supernatural reality and an 
anti-scientific worldview among Muslim students? 
Moreover, how can the relatively intense response 
of Dutch politics and media to this incident, seem-
ingly displaced from its more familiar American 
or Christian context, be understood? In the fall 
and winter of 2004-2005, I conducted qualitative 
research among Turkish and Moroccan Muslim 
students of various disciplines in Amsterdam, 
participating in Islamic student organizations, 
classroom discussions, and student mosques and 
conducting over 25 formal interviews. The data 
gathered suggest that most of these students partially rejected and 
partially adopted evolution theory, affirmed various supernatural phe-
nomena, and had a largely positive view on science and its relation to 
Islam. Further, these religious convictions appeared to coexist with an 
active citizenship and embracement of democratic values.
Negotiations with evolution theory
Though a few students I interviewed simply negated the whole of 
evolution theory on the basis of its perceived incongruence with the 
creation account in the Quran, their vast majority constructed types 
of bridge models in which some aspects of evolution were accepted 
and others rejected. The construction of these models does not imply 
that the students experienced the encounter of two different accounts 
of origin as very problematic or disconcerting. On the contrary, they 
hardly recognized the implicit presence of evolutionary assumptions 
underlying studies like medicine, chemistry, and bio-medical sciences. 
Students in these disciplines were of course aware that they were re-
quired to take some courses and exams related to evolution theory, but 
they considered this quite unproblematic as they felt that external re-
production does not require internal acceptance. Many students even 
stressed they felt it important to learn about “Darwin’s theory” so that 
they could better understand, and argue with, its adherents. 
In the students’ bridge models, mi-
croevolution and the concept of “the 
survival of the fittest” appeared on the 
accepted side of the equation. Students 
reasoned that it is impossible to deny 
the logic and empirical backing of these 
concepts. They also connected micro-
evolution to theistic evolution, the idea 
that God has guided the adjustments in 
his creatures. Several students accept-
ed the Big Bang and believed that the 
Quran contains references to both the 
Big Bang and evolution theory. For al-
most every student I talked with, mac-
roevolution was on the negated side in the bridge models. In contrast to 
microevolution, macroevolution was connected to atheist aspirations. 
Arguments against macro-evolution concerned problems with the fossil 
record, the unlikeliness that the great number of mutations needed to 
create a new species would simply occur, the impossibility that chance 
produces and maintains the complexity of nature, the misinterpretation 
of Darwin’s original work, Darwin’s personal regrets about his theory, 
the arbitrary parameters of computer simulations of evolution, the em-
pirical evidence against the linear development of skull size, the unex-
plained extinction of dinosaurs, and the unknown “what” behind the Big 
Bang. Likewise, no student accepted the idea that human beings have 
sprung from apes. Arguments against this recent event in the evolution 
process involved questioning why apes still exist, pointing to inner and 
outer human-ape differences, suggesting that human beings used to 
look more like apes, and advocating the (supposedly Quranic) idea that 
during the time of the prophets, God, in his wrath, turned some wicked 
people into apes. More generally, the validity of evolution theory was 
relativized by emphasizing that it is “just a theory,” or “also a belief,” or 
that it is not, or not sufficiently, empirically proven.
Aside from its partial acceptance in the form of microevolution and 
theistic evolution, evolution theory was also partially embraced by 
means of some creative reinterpretations. A female Turkish student, 
for example, postulated the dualistic nature of humanity. She accepted 
evolution theory as the explanation of biological, but not of spiritual 
humanity. A Moroccan female student approached evolution theory 
as a potential divine ordeal. In her view, bones that support evolution 
theory could possibly exist by God’s will to test the faithfulness of his 
people: is their faith strong enough to believe in spite of the facts? An-
other Moroccan female student affirmed the validity of evolution by 
invoking it to explain the significance of the headscarf: the sex-orient-
ed male mind would necessitate protection of itself and others. Lastly, 
a male Turkish student saw evolution theory as a necessary theoreti-
cal interlude science has to pass through before it can reach ultimate 
truth, i.e. a scientific explanation of the Quranic account of origins. In 
short, the attitude of these Muslim students towards evolution theory 
was much more one of negotiation than downright rejection. 
Negotiations with supernatural claims
Roughly speaking, the source of the evolution-creation debate can 
cross-religiously be located in a tension of two philosophical presup-
positions: naturalism and supernaturalism. Concerning evolution the-
ory, the bridge models allowed students to maintain a crucial super-
natural element (God as creator) in coexistence with natural explana-
tions of life (e.g. micro-evolution, survival of the fittest, Big Bang). In my 
research I also investigated other aspects of the students’ worldviews 
that could possibly partake in this tension between naturalism and 
supernaturalism, assuming that tenets of their Islamic and academic 
learnings would mutually shape and alter one another. 
Supposed anti-evolutionist convictions 
among Muslim students in Amsterdam have 
been widely discussed in Dutch media. These 
discussions are often undergirded by the 
assumption that religious attitudes have 
concrete socio-political relevance, more 
specifically, that anti-evolutionism fosters 
disintegration and radicalism. However, 
research data show that most Muslim students 
creatively combine ideas about evolution and 
faith, thus prompting questions about the 
stereotypes that surface in public debates on 
integration in the Netherlands.1
[S]ocietal (including 
educational) 
integration does 
not require a 
secularization of 
the mind.
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In line with the acceptance of creation, it clearly stood out 
that the existence of God went unquestioned among the 
students. Atheism was strongly refuted. All students be-
lieved in angels, djinns, and devils, to which they applied 
both supernaturalist and naturalist characteristics. Espe-
cially for medicine students, hesitations on the true origins 
of psychiatric ailments stood out—are they djinns or genes? 
The view on miracles emerged from a mixture of natural 
and supernatural ingredients. On the one hand, students 
made clear distinctions between make-believe and authen-
tic miracles, used scientific explanations for and minimized 
the supernatural content of the miraculous, and had theo-
logical objections against it. On the other hand, students all 
accepted the miracles in and of the Quran, said to accept 
miracles without proof, and were theologically “forced” to 
embrace the potential of the miraculous because of God’s 
omnipotence. The supernatural origin and conservation of 
the Quran were unequivocally embraced. Lastly, all students 
believed in Judgment Day, heaven, and hell. Thus, though 
some naturalist traits could be traced in students’ religious 
ontologies, the acceptance of most supernatural claims was 
evident.
Negotiations with general science
As for the general attitude of Muslim students towards sci-
ence, I found that on the whole, students were unfamiliar 
with problematizing the relationship between Islam and science. Their 
rather “instant” view on science and religion consisted of positions 
granting religion either a superior or equally valid status to science. 
The former (superiority of religion) did not so much find expression in 
a rejection of the whole of Western science, but more so in questioning 
aspects of its cognitive validity and ethical soundness as compared to 
Islam. The latter (equality of science and religion) was argued for by 
emphasizing the similar structure and compatible content of science 
and religion, predominantly drawing on the Islamic emphasis on gain-
ing knowledge, the leading role of Islamic science in the Middle Ages, 
and the so-called scientific teachings in the Quran (e.g. its references to 
various scientific facts and theories such as the stages of embryonic de-
velopment, the distinction between salt and fresh water, the positions 
of the sun and moon, the composition of mountains, the source of rain, 
heliocentrism, the expansion of the universe, Einstein’s relativity theo-
ry, the beneficial health effects of breast milk, the digestive system of 
cows, the roundness of the earth, friction force, the amount of oxygen 
in the air etc.). Expressions of being anti-science or experiencing sig-
nificant tensions between Islam and science were wholly absent. 
The Dutch response 
In view of this larger context of Muslim students’ negotiations with 
evolution theory, supernaturalism, and science, how can the intense 
response of Dutch politics and media to the essay incident be under-
stood? Public discussions about evolution and creation, religion and 
science, and other Islam-related topics, often seem undergirded by the 
assumption that religious axioms and attitudes have concrete socio-
political relevance. More specifically, they seem to converge in the idea 
that anti-evolutionism is a societal problem, facilitating disintegration 
and radicalism. Three public figures may be mentioned here to illus-
trate this type of thinking. Ayaan Hirsi Ali, former member of Parliament 
for the right-winged VVD in the Netherlands and internationally known 
for her fight against radical Islam and Muslim gender inequality, often 
connects religious to socio-political views. For example, in a defence of 
her film, Submission, a provocative depiction of the position of female 
Muslims, she connects dogmatic renewal, de-absolutization of doctri-
nal claims, and a historic-symbolic reading of scriptures within Islam to 
the rise of a faith that embraces humanistic values and gender equal-
ity.5 A second example is Afshin Ellian, a Dutch-Iranian professor at the 
faculty of law in Leiden University and famous for his straightforward 
defence of human rights and sharp rejection of radical Islam. In one 
of his writings, he calls out to make jokes about Islam and to expose it 
to rational philosophical dissection, as he believes that such a critical 
approach would teach Muslims the concept of tolerance.6 Comparable 
linkages can be found in the thinking of Paul Scheffer, a social scientist 
at the University of Amsterdam and a prominent member of the Dutch 
Labour Party (PvdA). In a public lecture, he connects repression of re-
Still from www.harunyahya.com
ligious doubt to aggression, and suggests that viewing the Quran as 
God’s (literal) revelation obstructs Muslims’ attempts to integrate in the 
West, though he also distinguishes between the spiritual and political 
components of religion.7
The idea underlying these pleas is that religious cognition somehow 
translates itself into socio-political realities: irrationalism is linked to 
theocracy, philosophical absolutism to political oppression, and super-
natural myth to sloppy sociocultural integration. This type of thought 
echoes modernization theory and constructivist schools in the sociolo-
gy of knowledge. It is also connected to radical Enlightenment thought 
in which not just political religion but religion as a whole is strongly 
criticized. The common conviction in the media messages and these 
schools of thought is that socio-political change (or liberation) presup-
poses religious-philosophical change (or libera-
tion). In the context of such thinking, it is hardly 
surprising that an explicit anti-evolutionist stance 
of some Muslim students alarms journalists and 
ministers. 
The research data, however, suggest that nei-
ther a stark anti-evolutionism nor an anti-sci-
entific attitude is representative of Muslim stu-
dents. At the same time, students seemed to 
hang on to the supernatural tenets of their faith 
and did not accept evolution theory in its com-
plete form. From a Dutch secular perspective as 
outlined above, this may be considered a social 
problem. Ironically though, the Muslim students 
I conversed with were active participants in civil 
society, and passionately convinced of democ-
racy, religious pluralism, and equal gender rights. 
That these students combined such enlightened 
political views with enchanted beliefs in djinn-
caused psychiatric ailments, divinely spoken and 
flawlessly preserved holy scriptures, and the ne-
cessity of the breath of Allah to fuel the Big Bang, 
illustrates that societal (including educational) 
integration does not require a secularization of 
the mind. 
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A N N A  C .  K O R T E W E G
The Sharia Debate 
in Ontario
In late 2003, Syed Mumtaz Ali, a retired 
lawyer and scholar of Islamic jurispru-
dence, announced in the Canadian 
media that the Islamic Institute of Civil 
Justice (IICJ) would start offering arbi-
tration in family disputes in accordance 
with both Islamic legal principles and 
Ontario’s Arbitration Act, 1991. This act 
allowed a variety of private matters to 
be settled through legally binding ar-
bitration, including arbitration based 
on religious principles. A vociferous 
debate ensued on the introduction of 
sharia law in Ontario in which the pre-
sumed incompatibility of sharia-based family law and women’s individ-
ual rights took centre stage. This debate reached its conclusion in Sep-
tember 2005 when Ontario Premier Dalton McGuinty announced that 
he would end all religious arbitration. In February 2006, the Ontario 
legislature passed amendments to the 1991 Act that allowed family 
arbitration only if it was based on Ontario or Canadian law, excluding 
any form of religious arbitration, whether based on Christian, Jewish, 
Muslim, or other religious principles. 
The account that follows is based on my reading of the Canadian 
newspapers, the government commissioned report on the desirability 
of allowing sharia-based arbitration tribunals, and the websites of vari-
ous organizations arguing for and against the establishment of sharia-
based arbitration tribunals. 
The development of the sharia debate
Established in part to diminish a backlog in the courts, the Ontario 
Arbitration Act of 1991 allowed for religious, as well as non-religious, 
arbitration in private matters, including family and business matters. 
Under the 1991 Act, two parties can appoint an 
arbitrator to make a legally binding decision. Un-
like in mediation where two parties collabora-
tively reach a resolution aided by a mediator, an 
arbitrator acts much like a judge. Under the 1991 
Act, both parties have to agree to engage in ar-
bitration and if one of the parties feels that the 
decision reached is in conflict with existing Ca-
nadian law, they can appeal the arbitrator’s deci-
sion in court. However, the 1991 Act contained no 
institutional oversight mechanism to ensure that 
decisions were in compliance with Canadian law. 
Feminist scholars and legal practitioners have 
warned that arbitration, like mediation, runs the 
risk of reproducing gendered power inequalities 
in intimate relationships, leaving women to agree 
to decisions that might not be in their best inter-
est.1 Nonetheless, arbitration under the 1991 Ar-
bitration Act has continued to increase in popu-
larity in Ontario, quite likely because it offers a faster and cheaper route 
to resolving issues surrounding family dissolution and inheritance than 
the court system. 
After 1991, Jewish and Christian groups, as well as Ismaili Muslims, set 
up arbitration boards that arbitrated in accordance with their religious 
principles. These arbitrations never received public scrutiny and little 
is known about them. The IICJ’s proposal, then, built on over ten years 
of, seemingly unproblematic, religious arbitration in Ontario. Nonethe-
less, the ensuing public debate often misconstrued the Muslim Arbitra-
tion Board as a proposal to extend the law to include arbitration based 
on Islamic religious principles. As a matter of fact, under the Arbitra-
tion Act, such arbitration was already 
possible. As with all other arbitration, 
decisions would be legally binding as 
long as they did not violate existing 
Canadian law, though, again, there 
were at this point in time no oversight 
provisions to ensure that this was the 
case in each individual decision made. 
Furthermore, even though the debate 
centred on the proposal of the IICJ to 
start a sharia-based tribunal, there 
was no reason to assume that Ontario 
would only have one Muslim arbitra-
tion board. Under the 1991 Arbitra-
tion Act, multiple sharia-based tribunals could have been established, 
something that might well have happened given the tremendous di-
versity in Muslim communities in Ontario. 
The debate on the idea of sharia-based arbitration clustered around 
a number of events. First, there was the announcement, made in De-
cember 2003, by the IICJ. That announcement resulted in some news 
reporting and editorials on the application of Islamic principles in fam-
ily arbitration. A second period of more intensive debate occurred in 
June 2004 when Ontario Premier Dalton McGuinty asked his Attorney 
General, Michael Bryant, and Minister Responsible for Women’s Issues, 
Sandra Pupatello, to look at the issue of religious arbitration based on 
sharia more deeply. By the end of the month, Bryant and Pupatello 
asked former Attorney General Marion Boyd to conduct a study. Marion 
Boyd was a minister in the left-wing National Democratic Party govern-
ment in Ontario that passed the 1991 Arbitration Act. She had strong 
credentials as a feminist and was thought to be knowledgeable about 
both issues related to arbitration and to gender equality, particularly 
those pertaining to the family. 
The third wave of the debate occurred when Boyd issued her report 
in late December 2004. She argued that religious arbitration based on 
what she called “Islamic legal principles” was allowed under the exist-
ing Arbitration Act. Furthermore, Boyd proposed that religious arbitra-
tion should continue arguing, “secular state laws do not treat everyone 
equally because people’s individual backgrounds lead to differences in 
the impact of these laws.”2 At the same time, she was very concerned 
that individual rights, including women’s rights, be safeguarded. To en-
sure this, she proposed a number of amendments to the Act, including 
institutionalized oversight measures and education measures on the 
principles of both religious arbitration and Canadian legal principles.
The debate peaked in September 2005. On September 8, a number 
of women’s groups staged international protests against the adoption 
of sharia law in Ontario. On September 11, 2005, Premier McGuinty 
announced that he would put forth an amendment to the Arbitration 
Act to ensure that there would be “one law for all Ontarians” effectively 
ending faith-based arbitration. This was followed by a stream of op-eds, 
news analyses and opinion pieces, arguing, on the one hand, that this 
was a victory for women’s rights and on the other, that McGuinty was 
leaving religious Muslim women who would now turn (or be turned) 
to informal sharia based-arbitration without any protection by the 
state. Since the adoption of the amendments to the Arbitration Act on 
February 14, 2006,3 there has been little public discussion of the issue, 
though some groups, both Jewish and Muslim, have vowed to struggle 
for the reinstatement of religious arbitration. 
Multiculturalism, group rights, and women’s rights
The sharia debate was at its core a debate on group rights. In his 
work on multiculturalism, the Canadian political theorist Will Kymlicka 
argues that ethnic groups deserve protections of their culture insofar 
From 2003 through 2006 a debate developed 
on the introduction of “sharia law” or sharia 
arbitration in Ontario, Canada. The author 
shows how an issue that was in its core about 
legal principles and practices turned into a 
debate about women’s inequality, and by 
extension Canadian national identity and 
culture. The ensuing public lambasting of 
Islam reinforced the notion that Islam and 
gender inequality are inherently incompatible. 
Important questions regarding faith-based 
arbitration were thus ignored, and with it the 
possibility to improve gender equality. 
As a matter of 
fact, under the 
Arbitration Act, 
[sharia-based] 
arbitration was 
already  possible.
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as these protections further the group’s integration into dominant so-
ciety.4 This is in line with the intent of official Canadian multicultur-
al policy, which emphasizes the goal of integration in its respect for 
group rights and ethno-cultural difference. Kymlicka further makes 
an important distinction between what he calls external protections 
and internal restrictions. External protections are group rights that re-
move a barrier to a group’s full participation in society or that protect 
a group’s ethno-cultural heritage. Internal restrictions, on the other 
hand, are group rights that enable the imposition of practices by some 
members of a group on other members of that group. The sharia de-
bate, then, can be read as a debate on whether sharia arbitration would 
be an external protection furthering Muslim communities’ integration 
into Canadian society or an avenue by which Muslim men can place 
restrictions on Muslim women. 
Religious rights are one form of group rights that can be protected 
within the context of Canadian multicultural policy. The editorial board 
of The Globe and Mail, one of the two national newspapers in Canada, 
supported sharia-based tribunals because of their potential to increase 
integration of Muslims into Canada, arguing that, “the Islamic tribunal 
may yet send a message that Muslims can be who they are and still be 
as Canadian as anyone else.”5 The editorial board rooted this argument 
firmly in a multicultural group right to practice one’s religion within 
the confines of Canadian law. From this perspective, instituting shar-
ia-based tribunals would provide an external protection to Canadian 
Muslims that would enhance their integration into Canadian society. 
Syed Mumtaz Ali of the IICJ stressed a sense of religious obligation 
rather than of religious rights in his arguments for the establishment 
of sharia-based arbitration: “Islamic law obliges Muslims to follow local 
law, and Islamic law where possible. Under Ontario’s Arbitration Act, 
Muslims will be able to settle disputes in matters of contracts, divorce 
and inheritance privately with the help of arbitrators […]”6 
Echoing the multicultural paradigm, Mumtaz Ali argued elsewhere 
that in order for Muslims to feel accepted within Canadian society, they 
have to be able to fulfil what he sees as a religious obligation to obey 
Muslim family law, insofar as it is in accordance with Canadian legal 
principles. While there is one place on his website that lists an argu-
ment he made in 1997 that arbitration is useful to Muslims exactly be-
cause there is no oversight, in his later writings, Mumtaz Ali stresses 
that interpretations of sharia are always context dependent and that 
they therefore can and should accommodate Canadian law.7
However, this argument for the compatibility of Muslim family law 
and Canadian law did not resonate with those who were concerned 
with Muslim women’s rights. In her oft-cited critique of multicultural-
ism as “bad for women,” feminist political philosopher Susan Moller 
Okin argues that multiculturalism has a tendency to reinforce ethno-
cultural practices that are detrimental to women within that group.8 
In other words, from her perspective multicultural group rights almost 
always entail internal restrictions. 
This is exactly what those arguing against the institution of sharia-
based tribunals argued. They did not take Mumtaz Ali and others’ invo-
cation of support for the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and 
its protections for gender equality seriously. Rather, a wide range of or-
ganizations and individuals, representing religious Muslim women and 
men, secular Muslim women and men, and non-Muslims, strenuously 
argued that by allowing sharia-based tribunals government would give 
its approval to the systemic devaluation of women’s rights. 
The argument that multiculturalism threatened women’s individual 
rights dominated the debate. For example, Homa Arjomand was the 
founder of the International Campaign Against Sharia Court in Cana-
da and one of the most cited people in the debate.9 A feminist who 
fled her native Iran in the late 1980s, she stated in an interview that, 
“I chose to come to Canada because of multiculturalism. … But when 
I came here, I realized how much damage multiculturalism is doing to 
women. I’m against it strongly now. It has become a barrier to women’s 
rights.”10
Arjomand further argued that her experience living in Iran and work-
ing with Muslim women as a refugee counsellor in Toronto gave her 
first-hand knowledge of the negative impact of Muslim family law on 
Muslim women’s rights. Many of the groups and individuals arguing 
against sharia-based tribunals drew on such personal experiences as 
well as stories from countries like Iran, Pakistan, Saudi-Arabia, and Ni-
geria to argue that women’s rights are clearly incompatible with reli-
gious group rights.
The effects of the sharia debate in Ontario
Ultimately, the sharia debate in Ontario had a number of effects. The 
framing of the issue as multiculturalism gone awry combined with the 
reach and depth of groups arguing against sharia-based arbitration to 
pit public support for multiculturalism against support for women’s 
rights. As such, I would argue that the debate confused a larger prob-
lem with arbitration with matters of religion. In its 1991 incarnation, the 
Arbitration Act did not adequately deal with institutionalized power 
imbalances between men and women regardless of their religious af-
filiation or practices. Yet, rather than debating the way arbitration can 
reinforce such power imbalances, the focus of the debate was on how 
sharia threatened women’s equality, and by extension Canadian na-
tional identity and culture. The debate on sharia arbitration, then, often 
turned into a public lambasting of Islam rather than a debate on legal 
principles and practices. 
Second, this had the effect of reinforcing nega-
tive stereotypes about Islam as much of the evi-
dence for the detrimental effects of sharia-based 
arbitration were drawn from countries where 
sharia is used to justify acts that clearly violate 
international standards of women’s or human 
rights. In doing so, the debate also reinforced the 
notion that Islam and gender equality are inher-
ently incompatible and that liberal rights and 
freedoms depend on secularism. 
Third, the debate divided Muslim communities 
as it pitted those religious Muslims who believed 
they could best practise their religion privately 
against those who wanted state sanction for shar-
ia-based rulings. 
Finally, the issue of how to protect Muslim 
women in Canada from rulings that go against 
their interests was ultimately left by the wayside. 
As newspaper arguments made clear, religious 
Muslim women in Canada do go to Muslim arbi-
trators to rule on family matters. The decisions 
reached there will not be legally binding given 
the amendments to the Arbitration Act but they 
do shape the lives of these women and their chil-
dren. By not seriously engaging in an attempt to 
conduct religious arbitration with government 
oversight, where that oversight would have fo-
cused on issues of gender equality, Ontario quite 
possibly left these women with fewer protec-
tions.
Heated debate 
on Sharia 
law, Queen's 
Park, Ontario, 
8 September 
2005
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I F T I K H A R  D A D I
Miniature Painting 
as Muslim Cosmopolitanism
South Asia Muslims over the last cen-
tury have produced an important body 
of visual arts, drawing upon a complex 
of frameworks that included Indo-
Persian aesthetics, Indian regional 
schools, and the influence of Western 
art. By the beginning of the twentieth 
century, modern art had become firmly 
established in South Asia. One signifi-
cant development by artists has been 
to creatively reinterpret seventeenth 
century Mughal miniature painting 
and its successors. The city of Lahore 
has witnessed two such revivals dur-
ing the last century, by the artist Abdur Rahman Chughtai (1897-1975), 
and more recently, by the graduates of the Miniature programme, 
Department of Fine Arts, National College of Art (NCA) from the late 
1990s onwards. The contemporary miniature produced by the recent 
NCA graduates has been the focus of recent critical attention, but also 
needs to be situated in relation to the earlier twentieth century–de-
velopments. An aspect of my research seeks to understand the issues 
that preoccupied Chughtai—by examining his works, writings, and the 
wider intellectual circle in early twentieth century Lahore—and to see 
how these issues resurface in contemporary miniature. But first, a brief 
historical background is necessary.
Painting in (pre-)colonial South Asia 
North Indian elite Muslim cultural practices were deeply informed by 
Persianate influences, which increased in intensity during the Mughal 
period from the sixteenth century. Poetry, literature, painting, and cal-
ligraphy all closely followed Persian models. The Timurid kitabkhana 
(royal bookmaking workshop) had functioned as a royal design studio, 
producing designs for architectural facades, carpets and decorative 
objects, along with its central function of producing illustrated and il-
luminated manuscripts, and albums (muraqqa’) composed of calligra-
phy and painting. The status of the painter, which until the fifteenth 
century was generally considered lower than the calligrapher, grew in 
importance. In the sixteenth century, during the Safavid dynasty that 
followed the Timurids, the general status of painting rose further, and 
acquired greater diversity and a certain independence as an autono-
mous medium, rather than its earlier role as illustrating text. It was 
this later Timurid and Safavid Persian influence that was imported into 
India by the second Mughal emperor, Humayun, on returning from his 
exile in Iran to India in 1555. 
Humayun’s successor, the great emperor Akbar (r. 1556-1605), abun-
dantly expanded royal support of the ateliers, leading to the flowering 
of the highly influential school of Mughal painting and bookmaking. 
During Akbar’s later years, the character of painting changed, becom-
ing less action-oriented and more naturalist and realist. By this time, 
the aesthetics of Mughal painting had departed considerably from the 
earlier Persianized formal mannerism, and individual styles of various 
painters were appreciated for their particularities and their realism. 
With the ascension of the more religiously conservative Aurangzeb to 
the Mughal throne, painting lost a great deal of royal patronage start-
ing around 1668; instead it witnessed a partial dispersal to local courts, 
which led to the development of greater diversity in the process of dif-
fusion, leading to regional schools such as Pahari, Sikh, etc. 
Painting developed in relation to the overall arts of the book, in 
which calligraphy played a central role. Of particular interest in this re-
gard are the muraqqa’ albums composed both in Timurid and Safavid 
Persia, and in Mughal India.1 These albums, which can be considered a 
scrapbook for elite pleasure, compiled esteemed but heterogeneous 
examples of painting and calligraphy, 
and framed them in elaborate deco-
rated borders. In Indian albums, prized 
samples of Persian and Indian painting 
and calligraphy were inserted, and the 
album functioned as an important aes-
thetic benchmark for an age in which 
mechanically reproduced samples of 
work were absent. The muraqqa’ album 
was reinterpreted by Abdur Rahman 
Chughtai in 1928 when he published 
his Muraqqa’-i chughtai, which I discuss 
shortly.2 
Early twentieth century Lahore
The rise of British control over South Asia led to the decline of Mughal 
painting, which was almost complete after the Mutiny of 1857. There-
after, during the later nineteenth century, Indian painters largely emu-
lated European salon and academic styles. There were painting ateliers 
in Lahore since the Mughal times, and a small number of practitioners 
had continued to paint the miniature in the later nineteenth century. 
At that time, the British founded the Mayo School of Art (later renamed 
as NCA)—which was the most traditional of the art schools set up in 
colonial India. By the early twentieth century, Lahore, as the capital of 
the prosperous province of Punjab, was renowned for its higher edu-
cational institutions and a vibrant Muslim intellectual culture that in-
cluded the poet-philosopher Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938) and other 
influential writers, scholars, and poets well versed in Urdu, Persian and 
English.3 
The rise of a modern Indian style of painting begins in Calcutta in the 
early twentieth century, called the Bengal School of Art, which flour-
ished till the 1930s. The Bengal School was self-consciously “Indian,” re-
jecting British academic oil painting, and drew its themes from Indian 
mythological and historical texts. The Bengal School painters synthe-
sized conventions of the Mughal miniature with Japanese watercolor 
wash techniques, and the linearity and symbolism of Art Nouveau.4 
Abdur Rahman Chughtai, the first prominent modern Indian Muslim 
artist, studied at the Mayo School of Art from 1911, and began painting 
early on. Chughtai did not study in Calcutta, yet has a vexed relation-
ship to the Bengal School. Despite formal and thematic correspond-
ences between the work of Chughtai and many of the Bengal School 
artists, Chughtai vigorously argued that he belonged rather to the 
Lahore School of Painting, whose centrality and continuity he traced 
back to the Mughal era.5 Chughtai was well versed in Urdu and Persian 
literature, poetry, and over the years became increasingly interested 
in Persian, Mughal, and Pahari painting. Generally, the larger rubric of 
decolonization at the time provided for an experimental and creative 
atmosphere.
Chughtai started painting in the 1910s, initially creating works based 
on Hindu mythology. By the 1920s, under the influence of Iqbal’s pan-
Islamic ideas, he began reorient his paintings towards a consciously 
Islamic and “Mughal” aesthetic. The Muraqqa’-i chughtai (1928), illus-
trating the poetry of the nineteenth century Urdu poet Ghalib, marks 
this shift. Chughtai’s earlier Indian Paintings are set outside or in simple 
architectural frames, showing Hindu mythological figures. By contrast, 
the later paintings are carefully set in elaborate arabesque interiors, 
with the female figures covered in elaborate, stylized layers of cloth-
ing. The later paintings are not narrative based, but create an idealized 
and romanticized aesthetic universe akin to the classical Urdu ghazal. 
In his own Urdu introduction to the Muraqqa’, Chughtai had praised, 
among others, Bihzad’s use of imagination as a guide for pictorial de-
piction, rather than observing reality itself. The Persian artist Bihzad 
Artists in Lahore have creatively reinterpreted 
Mughal miniature painting and its successors. 
The artist Chughtai initiated this process when 
he started to reorient his “Indian” painting 
towards consciously Islamic styles. Although 
he had no immediate followers, since the 1980s 
a new group of artists inspired by Chughtai’s 
works has started to produce playfully 
subversive miniature paintings. By using 
“obsolete” painting techniques in depicting 
familiar political themes, important questions 
are raised about the “reality” of the media 
imagery that surrounds us.
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(1465-1535) has become celebrated in legend, and for Chughtai, Iqbal, 
and others, is an antonomastic figure characterizing perfection in the 
art of painting. By consciously following the path of imaginative depic-
tion that he ascribed to the great Bihzad—Chughtai inserts himself in 
a history of Muslim painting that traverses the Timurid, Safavid, and 
Mughal eras. Chughtai and Iqbal share a cosmopolitan Muslim imagi-
nation during a time when pan-Islamic ideas were still prevalent, and 
the rise of independent Muslim nation-states in South Asia and much 
of Middle East was not yet a settled affair. But there were also key dif-
ferences between them.
Iqbal’s later poetry and philosophy is characterized by revolution-
ary dynamism, which clearly departs from the introspective stasis of 
the classical ghazal. The relationship between Iqbal and Chughtai was 
thus characterized by asymmetry. Although Iqbal agreed to write a 
Foreword to the Muraqqa’, he remains rather evasive about the actual 
merits of Chughtai’s illustrations. Indeed, Iqbal goes so far as to claim, 
“[I]t is my belief that, with the single exception of Architecture, the art 
of Islam (Music, Painting and even Poetry) is yet to be born—the art, 
that is to say, which aims at the human assimilation of Divine attributes 
…,” implying that neither Chughtai nor any other painters’ works are 
properly “Islamic.”6 
Interestingly Iqbal’s unease with modern Muslim painting should 
also be seen in relation to the larger critique leveled against the Ben-
gal School by Bengalis and British modernist critics during its heyday. 
The Bombay Progressives, who oriented themselves in relation with 
International Modernism, and painted with oil in abstract and post-Cu-
bist styles, also attacked the Bengal School for its decadence, idealism, 
and an illustrative relationship to text and myth, rather than creating 
works that would be artistically autonomous in their own right. The art 
of Pakistan during its first five decades (1947-1997) largely develops 
from this engagement with modernism. Chughtai was over 50 years 
old when Pakistan was created. In terms of subsequent influence, 
Chughtai’s recovery of the miniature was largely neglected in Pakistan 
for decades. He remained a highly admired figure, but one who had no 
immediate followers. 
Contemporary miniature
By the 1980s, the NCA had started a separate Miniature programme, 
where a strictly traditional training based on copying Persian, Mughal, 
Rajput, and Pahari styles has continued to be imparted. By the mid 
1990s, its students began fracturing the traditional space and narra-
tive of the Mughal miniature. The contemporary miniature is currently 
flourishing in Pakistan—there are now numerous graduates of the NCA 
living around the world, and developing their own reinventions of the 
miniature based on its narrative, arabesque, and allegorical dimensions. 
My contention is that while oil-based abstract and post-Cubist works 
were dominant during the first few decades of national independence 
in Pakistan, the playfully subversive miniature today is perhaps better 
suited to participate in a globalized and postmodern cultural sphere in 
which Pakistani art is inextricably linked to diasporic practices, interna-
tional mega-exhibitions, and promotion by Western galleries. 
I present here only two examples of the contemporary miniature 
scene. Aisha Khalid, based in Lahore, who also studied in the Nether-
lands, has created works that explore questions of veiling, gender, and 
its relation to interiority, domesticity, and the decorative in a compel-
ling and urgent manner. In many of her works, the minimalist space and 
the repetition of arabesque pattern that also recalls colonial floor tiles, 
creates an enclosure from which no escape appears to be possible. The 
figure of the woman itself becomes the decorative background, inter-
changeable with objects of furniture or drapery.
Chicago based Saira Wasim deploys her striking technical skills to 
create potent political allegories, reminding us that many Mughal 
works were oriented to serve as allegories of the elevated status of 
the Mughal emperors. Her works depict persistent crises of national 
sovereignty in Pakistan and the Muslim world, and have for example, 
addressed religious and political hypocrisy in Pakistan, the fall of Iraq 
to US forces, and the propaganda of the Bush administration. Her reli-
ance on an “obsolete” painting technique precisely serves to create the 
temporal and aesthetic distance from pervasive media imagery, which 
allows her paintings to be read as allegories, rather than cartoons or 
parodies. Her works fully recognize political representations circulated 
by the electronic media, but by retaining a critical distance, prompt 
us to question whether the events we see every day on television are 
world-historical, or utterly banal and cynical instances of religious and 
political manipulation.7
Conclusion
Contemporary miniature is often claimed to be an unbroken continu-
ity with tradition, but also a new way of celebrating hybridity and cos-
mopolitanism. These are seen as formations that venture beyond the 
ideological dictates of the Pakistani nation-state. However, South Asian 
Muslim identity in modern history has been too complex and overde-
termined to be easily confined in a national register. The return of the 
miniature today is neither an unbroken continuity with “tradition,” nor 
fully new in its acknowledgment of hybridity, al-
though its playful and ironic potential is certainly 
a new development. But in many ways, it parallels 
the revival of the miniature by Chughtai, who also 
negotiated cosmopolitan frameworks, even while 
articulating an idea of a Lahore-based Muslim art. 
The Chughtaian and the contemporary minia-
tures draw upon the legacies of Mughal painting, 
(post)modernism, and Indian vernacular painting 
traditions to create a kind of post-national cos-
mopolitan Muslim aesthetic. The miniature either 
arises too early, before the founding of Pakistan, 
or too late—when the great national drive for 
modernization from the 1950s to the 1970s has 
been exhausted—to be unproblematically con-
sidered as national art. The miniature today also 
unwittingly recreates Chughtai’s object of long-
ing, the Lahore School of Painting, but whose 
geographic locale is ironically, globally dispersed 
and diasporic. 
Notes
1. David J. Roxburgh, The Persian Album, 
1400-1600: From Dispersal to Collection (Yale 
University Press, 2005); Imad al-Hasani, The 
St. Petersburg Muraqqa, 2 vol., ed. Ivanov 
Akimushkin (Leonardo Arte, 1996).
2. Muraqqa’-i cughta’i (Lahore: Jahangir Book 
Club, 1928); reprint edition (Lahaur: Aivan-i 
isha`at, 1971).
3. Akbar Naqvi, Image and Identity: Fifty Years 
of Painting and Sculpture in Pakistan (Oxford, 
1998), 40-99.
4. Partha Mitter, Art and Nationalism in Colonial 
India, 1850-1922: Occidental Orientations 
(Cambridge, 1994).
5. See his Lahaur ka dabistan-i musavviri 
(Cughtai Miyuziyam Trast, 1979); Naqvi, 
Image and Identity, 46-58.
6. Iqbal, “Foreword,” n.p.
7. Her work can be viewed on her website 
www.sairawasim.com.
Buzkashi, 
(2004). Gouache 
on wasli paper. 
25.5 x 16.5 cm.
Buzkashi, 
literally "goat-
grabbing," is an 
old game still 
popular in parts 
of Pakistan.CO
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Iftikhar Dadi is Assistant Professor, Department of History of Art, Cornell University. 
Email: mid1@cornell.edu
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M I R J A M  S H AT A N A W I
The Disquieting Art of 
Khosrow Hassanzadeh
“This series is the result of two years of 
thought, research and travel. It is a re-
flection of a world where the word ‘ter-
rorist’ is thrown about thoughtlessly. 
What is a terrorist? What are the origins 
of a terrorist and in an international con-
text who defines ‘terrorism’? The West, 
with its personal definition of terrorism, 
gives itself the right to take over a coun-
try, while in the Middle East the West is 
clearly accused of being a full-fledged terrorist. In exploring these ques-
tions, I portrayed the people in whom I have the most faith: my mother 
and sisters.” With these words Khosrow Hassanzadeh introduces his most 
recent work Terrorist (2004). In the four-piece series Hassanzadeh portrays 
himself and his family members against a backdrop with images referring 
to their personal religious beliefs, accompanied by labels describing each 
portrayed “terrorist” with characteristics such as nationality, religious 
denomination, and personal history. The combinations of images and 
texts reveal that Hassanzadeh addresses 
contemporary Western perceptions in 
which Islam is heedlessly associated 
with terrorism. His “terrorists” are Mus-
lim terrorists, and at the same time, or-
dinary believers who are under scrutiny 
because of their faith.
Discovering Islam
The emphasis on Islam in the Terror-
ist series reflects Hassanzadeh’s development as an artist whose career 
became increasingly tied with the Euro-American art world and its con-
comitant perceptions of Iran as a Muslim country. After a short training 
at Tehran’s Art Academy, Hassanzadeh made his first paintings in the 
mid-1980s. International recognition came only in 1999 when his War 
series, a gloomy diary of his memories as a volunteer soldier during the 
Iran-Iraq war, was exhibited at the Diorama Arts Centre in London. The 
exhibition proved to be a turning point in Hassanzadeh’s career. His work, 
increasingly addressing an outside observer, represented by 
his Western audiences, ultimately changed orientation. He 
began to observe Iranian society with the eye of an outsider, 
“looking in at his own society with a strictly incriminating 
eye” and “looking out for signs of culture and identity.”1
It is at this point that Islam made its way into the paintings 
of Hassanzadeh. While his early works contained no referenc-
es to Islam or Muslim society whatsoever, the newer series 
were loaded with them. Both Chador (2000), a response to 
Western perceptions of the veil as a symbol of the oppres-
sion of Muslim women, and Ashura (2000), a re-interpreta-
tion of the Shiite ceremony focusing on the female saints of 
Shiism, set out to challenge the dominant Western views of 
Muslim women. Prostitutes (2002), a tribute to sixteen pros-
titutes killed by a religious fanatic in Mashhad, increased 
Hassanzadeh’s fame in the West as a representative of a pre-
sumed Iranian “counterculture.” Meanwhile, Hassanzadeh’s 
orientation was gradually changing from a direct commen-
tary on Iranian society to including a reflection on Western 
obsessions with Islam.
Ethnic marketing
Hassanzadeh’s shifts in focus are tightly interwoven with 
the changed positions artists from the Middle East occupy 
in the global art world. Since 9/11, exhibitions featuring art-
ists from the “Middle East” or the “Islamic world” are booming 
in the West. Most of these exhibitions start from the–debat-
able–premise that contemporary art can serve as a means 
to inform audiences about the current state of affairs in the 
region.2 Moreover, the Middle East is “hot” and museums and 
galleries, just like publishing houses and other commercial 
institutions, need the marketing appeal of ethnic labelling 
to boost visitor counts or art sales.3 All the same, the idea 
that an artist’s national or religious background has an in-
delible effect on an artist’s practice is highly controversial in 
the art world, and particularly in the Middle East. Many art-
ists, including Khosrow Hassanzadeh, have been struggling 
against this notion for years. They argue that terms like “Is-
lamic,” “Middle East,” or even “Iran” are loaded with religious 
and political subtexts and that the use of such terms in exhi-
bition concepts draws away attention from the artistic value 
of their work. Ironically, it is precisely Hassanzadeh’s raw 
commentary on Iranian society that prompted most curators 
to include his work in their exhibitions. 
Khosrow Hassanzadeh is one of Iran’s leading 
contemporary artists. During his artistic career 
his work became increasingly concerned with 
Islam as a factor in the interplay between East 
and West. This article discusses his recent 
series of works Terrorist to analyse the artist’s 
efforts to simultaneously criticize the accusing 
gaze of the West and reclaim the right of self-
representation. 
“Terrorist” # 2
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Reclaiming independence
Set against this background, the Terrorist series can be analysed as 
a critique on the ways the international art world approaches artists 
from the Middle East, as Sohrab Mahdavi has done in his review of the 
series. He argues that by portraying himself and his mother and sis-
ters as terrorists Hassanzadeh wants to take possession of the accusing 
gaze of the “other,” i.e. the West. Thereby, the work seems to criticize 
the common practice of the art world to demand that artists in the 
Middle East scrutinize their identities and reformulate them accord-
ing to Western needs. Although Terrorist aims to reclaim the right to 
self-representation and independence, “It fails on both registers: ‘self-
representation’ here is an appropriation of Western values and the 
work can only become ‘independent’ if the artist’s intended viewer is 
Western.”4 Nevertheless, this “radical failure” only reinforces the artist’s 
message, making it unique in the non-Western art scene. Artists like 
Khosrow Hassanzadeh are in a catch 22 situation. They have to rely on 
the Euro-American art market to function as artists in a gradually glo-
balising art scene. Yet they feel uncomfortable with its crude marketing 
policies that emphasize their “otherness” and keep them in assigned 
roles of “Muslim” or “Middle Easterner.” Hassanzadeh describes himself 
as an “Occidentalist,” someone who moves back and forth between the 
mutual imagery that East and West produce. The question is if in the 
current hypersensitive political climate artists will be able to take up 
such sovereign positions.
A retrospective of Khosrow Hassanzadeh is on view at the Tropenmuseum Amsterdam 
from 22 September 2006 through 7 January 2007.
Mirjam Shatanawi is Curator of Middle East and North Africa at the 
Tropenmuseum, Amsterdam. 
Email: m.shatanawi@kit.nl
Notes
1. Sohrab Mahdavi, “Terrorist,” in Tehran Studio Works: The Art of Khosrow 
Hassanzadeh, ed. Mirjam Shatanawi (London: Saqi Books, 2006), 124.
2. As reflected in the titles of recent exhibitions that featured works by Hassanzadeh: 
Inside Iran (Amsterdam, 2006), iran.com (Freiburg, 2006), West by East (Barcelona, 
2005) and Musulmanes, Musulmans (Paris, 2004).
3. Tirdad Zolghadr, ed., Ethnic Marketing (Zürich: JRP Ringier, 2006).
4. Mahdavi, “Terrorist,” in Tehran Studio Works, 124.
13 – 15 October 2006
Conference 
Youth and the Global South: Religion, 
Politics, and the Making of Youth in 
Africa, Asia, and the Middle East
Venue: Dakar, Senegal
Organizers: African Studies Centre 
(ASC), Council for the Development of 
Social Science in Africa (CODESRIA), 
International Institute for Asian Studies 
(IIAS) & ISIM
19 October 2006
Onderhandelen met islamistische 
bewegingen?
Ramadan Festival Debate
Venue: University of Amsterdam
Panellists among others: Jan 
Schoonenboom, Tariq Shadid; 
Chair: Radi Suudi 
26 October 2006
ISIM in Utrecht
Sharia in Europe—Scope and Limits
Lecture by Mathias Rohe
Venue: Utrecht University
10 November 2006
Reflections on Muslim Intellectual 
History: Farewell Conference of 
Professor Abdulkader Tayob
Venue: Radboud University Nijmegen
Speakers: Mona Abaza, Nasr Abu Zayd, 
Asef Bayat, Martin van Bruinessen, Abdou 
Filali-Ansary, Muhammad Khalid Masud, 
Roel Meijer, Abdulkader Tayob
30 November 2006
ISIM in Utrecht
The Alevis in Flux: Reformulation and 
Institutionalization
Lecture by David Shankland
Venue: Utrecht University
21 March 2007 – 25 March 2007 
“Muslim Women” in Europe: 
Bodily Performances, Multiple 
Belongings, and the Public Sphere
Panel at 8th Mediterranean Research 
Meeting 
Venue: Florence & Montecatini Terme, Italy
Convenors: Ruba Salih (University of 
Bologna) & Annelies Moors (ISIM)
Sponsors: EUI & ISIM
ISIM Ph.D. and Staff Seminars
Venue: Leiden University
17 October 2006:
Uncoordinated Networks: 
Muslim Educational Institutions and 
the Will for Reform in India
Lecture by Rémy Delage
31 October 2006:
Sacred Places and Sacrificial Paradigms: 
Idd el-Hajj Discourses in Tanzania
Lecture by Gerard van de Bruinhorst
14 November 2006:
"Love Marriages" Revisited: The Shaista 
Almani Case
Lecture by Tanya Sheikh
28 November 2006:
Islamic Law and Society in Morocco, 
circa 1870–2006: The Genesis of 
a Modern Legal System
Lecture by Léon Buskens
12 December 2006:
The Bosnian Ulama and the Negotiation 
of Islamic Revivalism in Multi-Ethnic 
Bosnia
Lecture by Önder Cetin
6 February 2007:
Lecture by Joe Stork 
20 February 2007:
I Love Moroccan Music, Because I Am 
Moroccan: Dutch-Moroccan Youth 
and Their Musical Exploration of Identity
Lecture by Miriam Gazzah 
6 March 2007:
Gender and Family Law Revisited
Lecture by Annelies Moors
20 March 2007: 
Seeking Guidance in French Islam: Media 
Muftis and Telephone Fatwas in Paris
Lecture by Alexandre Caeiro
For more information on these and other 
events please consult the ISIM website or 
contact the ISIM secretariat at: 
Tel: +31 71 5277905
Fax: +31 71 5277906
E-mail: info@isim.nl
www.isim.nl
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ISIM invites applications from holders 
of externally funded Ph.D. and 
postdoctoral fellowships who wish 
to pursue research at ISIM. For more 
information please contact ISIM at 
fellowships@isim.nl.
In addition, ISIM invites applications 
and research proposals for visiting 
fellowships for its various programmes. 
For more information on the visiting 
fellowships and for application forms, 
please consult www.isim.nl.
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M A R T I N  V A N  B R U I N E S S E N
Public Debates about 
Islam in Europe
The privileging of religious identity in the public debate has tended 
to marginalize other social aspects, and many questions are more and 
more frequently debated in religious terms. Immigration has, in an im-
portant sense, become “Islamicized.” Reactive identities (i.e. identities 
defined in opposition to others) have become more salient and “act” 
specifically as such in the cultural, political, and religious fields. Mus-
lims are cast in the role of the ultimate, and essentially different, out-
sider, and images of Islam are projected against which spokespersons 
for autochthonous European cultures and values define themselves. 
The workshop focused on the modalities of these processes, and on 
the role of various actors (intellectuals, media, politicians, established 
churches, etc., as well as Muslim actors themselves) therein.
On 22-26 March 2006 in Florence and Montecatini Terme, Italy, Stefano 
Allievi and Martin van Bruinessen convened a workshop titled “Pub-
lic Debates about Islam in Europe: Why and How ‘Immigrants’ became 
‘Muslims,’” sponsored jointly by ISIM and the Robert Schuman Centre of 
the European University Institute. The workshop was part of the Sev-
enth Mediterranean Social and Political Research Meeting of the Euro-
pean University Institute.
The workshop focused on current debates on Islam and Muslims in 
Europe, in which the issue of integration is increasingly defined as one 
of (in)compatibility between Islamic and European values. In many 
countries of Europe the relation between the “indigenous” population 
and immigrants has been marked by cultural conflicts, and it has been 
especially conflicts over Islamic symbols that gained a high visibility. 
The content of discussions on immigration has tended to shift to-
wards the cultural and symbolic level. Political actors, the media, and 
public intellectuals have increasingly focused on supposedly Islamic 
specificities. Immigrants have increasingly come to be identified as 
Muslims first, both in the perception by the host societies and in their 
self-perception.
– Gerassimos Karabelias (Pantheion University, Athens)
 “The End of One-Nation One-State? Muslim Immigrants and the Issue of Islam in 
Post-Cold War Greece”
– Katrine Romhild Benkaaba (Université Aix-Marseille III/University of Copenhagen)
 “How Islam enters Danish Public Policies of Integration”
– Zora Hesova (Freie Universität, Berlin)
 “German Turks and ‘Parallel Societies’: Germany’s Fears about Social Cohesion”
– Rudolph Peters (University of Amsterdam)
 “A Dangerous Book: Dutch Public Intellectuals and the Koran”
– Stefano Allievi (University of Padua)
 “On Fallaci and other Fallacies: Cultural Conflicts about Islam in the Italian Case”
– Renate Dieterich (University of Bonn)
 “The Perception of Radical Islam in Germany: A Case Study of the Hizb al-Tahrir 
al-Islami“
– Mathias Rohe (Friedrich-Alexander-Universität, Nürnberg)
 “The Application of Islamic Norms in Germany and Europe”
– Corinne Torrekens (GERME–Université Libre de Bruxelles)
 “Local Political Process Discovering Islam in Belgium: Managing Religious Pluralism, 
Negotiations, and Muslim Ethnicity in Brussels”
– Anna C. Korteweg and Gökçe Yurdakul (University of Toronto)
 “Gender, Immigrant Integration, and National Identity: The Framing of Honour 
Killings in the Netherlands and Germany”
– Göran Larsson (Göteborg University)
 “Islam and Muslims in Swedish Media and Academic Research: The Construction of 
a Minority”
– Riem Spielhaus (Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin)
 “Germany Constructing Its Muslims”
– Maurizio Albahari (University of California, Irvine)
 “Performing ‘Religion’ and ‘Muslim Migrants,’ from behind the Charitable Fence to 
the Public Spotlight: Mechanisms and Stakes at the Edges of the Italian State”
– Marcel Maussen (University of Amsterdam)
 “Mosque Establishment and the Social Construction of Cultural Differences and 
Islamic Presence. Public Discussions in Marseilles and Rotterdam”
– Martin van Bruinessen (ISIM / Utrecht University)
 “After Van Gogh: The Roots of Anti-Muslim Rage”
– Loïc Le Pape (IREMAM, Aix-en-Provence)
 “The Ambiguous Place of Religion in the Public Sphere: From Islam to Islamism”
P A P E R S  P R E S E N T E D
 
– Irfan Ahmad (NWO Rubicon Postdoctoral Fellow)
Contesting Islamism: Immanent Critique of Jamaat e-Islami 
of India
1 August 2006 – 31 March 2008
– Maurits van den Boogert (Brill-ISIM Fellow)
The Western Canon of the Study of Islam
1 September 2006 – 31 August 2007
– Léon Buskens (Sabbatical Fellow)
Islamic Law and Society in Morocco, circa 1870-2006:  
The Genesis of a Modern Legal System
1 September 2006 – 31 January 2007
– Rémy Delage (ISIM Visiting Fellow)
Discourses on Muslim Reform in the Indian Public Space:  
Islamic Education System, Urban Governance and Processes of 
Assignation
15 September 2006 – 15 December 2006
– Omar Farouk Bajunid (IIAS/ISIM Visiting Fellow)
Islam in Contemporary Cambodia
1 December 2006 – 28 February 2007
– Jeannette Jouili (ISIM Postdoctoral Fellow)
The Ethics of Islamic Arts: Normativity, Creativity, and ‘Fun’ in 
the Muslim Diaspora in the West
1 October 2006 – 30 September 2007
– Julie McBrien (Affiliated Fellow)
Constructing Post-Soviet Muslim Public Space: Everyday Religious 
Life in a Kyrgyz-Uzbek Town
1 October 2006 – 30 September 2007
– Joe Stork (ISIM Visiting Fellow)
In the Shadow of Terror: Political Violence and Human Rights
Prospects in the Arab Middle East
1 November 2006 – 28 February 2007
N E W  F E L L O W S
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New Editor 
ISIM Review
As of 15 June 2006 Mathijs Pelkmans 
has joined ISIM as the new Editor of 
the ISIM Review. Mathijs obtained 
his Ph.D. in Anthropology from the 
University of Amsterdam in 2003. For 
the past three years he was Research 
Fellow at the Max Planck Institute for 
Social Anthropology where he focused 
on religious frontiers after socialism, 
particularly in Kyrgyzstan. He is au-
thor of Defending the Border: Identity, 
Religion, and Modernity in the Republic 
of Georgia (Cornell University Press, 
2006) and has published on Muslim-
Christian relations, territorial borders, 
and postsocialist change in the Cauca-
sus and Central Asia. Besides being the 
new editor of the ISIM Review, Mathijs 
will also join the editorial board of the 
new ISIM Book series. We cordially wel-
come Mathijs Pelkmans to ISIM. 
New Brill-ISIM 
Fellowship
ISIM is pleased to announce the es-
tablishment of a Brill-ISIM fellowship 
in cooperation with Brill Publishers. 
Within this fellowship the Academ-
ic Project Manager for the Third Edi-
tion of the Encyclopaedia of Islam, 
Maurits van den Boogert, will study 
the historical development of the 
Encyclopaedia, its shifting parameters, 
and its significance for the study of 
the Muslim world today. The Encyclo-
paedia of Islam and all publications 
derived from it effectively form a 
canon of knowledge on Islam based 
on Western scholarly traditions. The 
Third Edition, which is currently being 
prepared, will have a greater emphasis 
on social scientific research and Islam 
outside the Middle East than the two 
previous editions.
ISIM/News
ISIM Book Series
In cooperation with Amsterdam  
University Press, ISIM has taken 
the initiative to launch the ISIM 
Book Series. The Series will publish 
innovative and interdisciplinary 
research on trends and movements 
in contemporary Muslim societies 
and communities, bringing 
together expertise in anthropology, 
sociology, political science, social 
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history, cultural studies, and religious 
studies. The aim of the Series is to 
present cutting-edge scholarship on 
Islam and Muslim societies in different 
parts of the globe. It seeks to expose 
both the distinctive and comparable 
aspects of trends and developments 
in Muslim societies. The editors invite 
monographs and edited volumes 
that are both theoretically informed 
and grounded in empirical research. 
Proposals will be reviewed by experts 
in the field, under the direction of an 
international editorial board. Titles 
from Amsterdam University Press in 
the US and Canada are distributed by 
the University of Chicago Press. 
For more information about the Series, 
please contact Mathijs Pelkmans at 
review@isim.nl. Guidelines for book 
proposals and manuscripts are avail-
able at www.isim.nl.
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■ Paper 7: Juan R. I. Cole
 The Ayatollahs and Democracy 
in Contemporary Iraq
Iraqi Shiism is undergoing profound 
changes, leading to new elaborations 
of the relationship between clerics and 
democratic principles in an Islamic 
state. The Najaf tradition of thinking 
about Shiite Islam and the modern state 
in Iraq, which first developed during 
the Iranian constitutional revolution of 
1905–1911, rejects the principle that 
supreme power in an Islamic state must 
be in clerical hands. Grand Ayatollah Ali 
Sistani of Iraq stands in this tradition, 
and he has striven to uphold and devel-
op it since the fall of Saddam Hussein. 
At key points he came into conflict with 
the Bush administration, which was not 
eager for direct democracy. Parliamen-
tary politics have also drawn in clerics 
of the Dawa Party, the Sadr movement, 
and the Supreme Council for Islamic 
Revolution in Iraq, all of which had 
earlier been authoritarian in outlook. Is 
Iraqi Shiism experiencing its enlighten-
ment moment?
Juan R. I. Cole is Professor of Modern 
Middle East and South Asian History at 
the University of Michigan. 
■ Mujiburrahman
 Feeling Threatened 
Muslim-Ch ristian Relations 
in Indonesian's New order
ISIM Paper
Muslim-Christian relations have played 
an important role in the social and 
political dynamics of Indonesia. Tense 
relations and mutual suspicions be-
tween Indonesia’s Muslim majority 
and its significant Christian minority 
were reflected in Christian fear of the 
prospect of an Islamic state and Muslim 
anxieties about domestic Christian mis-
sionary activities. At first the regime 
made heavy-handed efforts to contain 
inter-religious conflict, but its attitude 
towards vocal Muslim groups shifted 
from suppression to accommodation.
These socio-political developments in 
turn contributed to violence coloured 
by Islamic and Christian sentiments 
after the fall of the regime.
Mujiburrahman was an ISIM Ph.D. 
fellow from 2001 to 2005. He is 
presently a lecturer at the State Institute 
of Islamic Studies (IAIN), Antasari, 
Banjarmasin, Indonesia.
ISIM Dissertation
ISIM Papers and the ISIM Dissertation Series 
can be ordered online through www.isim.nl or 
www.aup.nl or by email: orders@aup.nl. 
Earlier publications in the ISIM Papers Series 
are available on the ISIM website.
New Position Abdulkader Tayob
In June 2006 Professor Abdulkader Tayob, ISIM Chair at Radboud University Nij-
megen, left ISIM to take up a position as the head a new programme on Islamic 
Studies at the University of Cape Town, South Africa. The position involves es-
tablishing an international research and teaching programme focusing on Africa. 
We are delighted, and hope, that this programme will be a basis for a continued 
cooperation, and for expanding even further ISIM’s network in Africa.
During his tenure at ISIM, Professor Tayob made valuable contributions to the 
research programme of ISIM, in particular as Programme Director of the Con-
temporary Islamic Identity and Public Life programme, as well as to research and 
teaching activities on modern Islam at Radboud University Nijmegen. Further-
more, he directed the ISIM project Rights at Home and brought it to a successful 
completion.  
No doubt, the students, colleagues, staff members, and fellow scholars at ISIM 
and Nijmegen will miss Professor Tayob’s friendship and scholarship, even though 
we hope to continue collaborating with him in the coming years. ISIM will organ-
ise a Farewell Conference in honor of Professor Tayob on 10 November 2006 at 
Radboud University Nijmegen.
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Editors’ Picks
Bourdieu's Secret Admirer in 
the Caucasus: A World-System 
Biography
By Georgi M. Derluguian
Chicago: Chicago University Press, 
2005.
Derluguian provides a gripping 
account of the dynamics unleashed 
by the demise of Soviet socialism 
in the conflict-torn North Caucasus. 
Balancing on the line between 
biography and world-system theory, 
the author forcefully adds a human 
face to structural forces and highlights 
the importance of linking micro-
sociological observations to grand 
history.
Multitude: War and Democracy in 
the Age of Empire
By Michael Hardt and Antonio 
Negri
London: Penguin Books, 2005.
A provocative book, which argues 
that the accellerating integration 
of economic, political and cultural 
powers in the world is actually a 
force for the good. No longer silent 
and oppressed masses, the world's 
populations form a powerful network 
that contains the seeds of radical 
global and social transformation. 
The authors provocatively suggest 
that this is the key to democracy on 
a global scale. 
Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy and 
the Quest for Identity in Post-New 
Order Indonesia
By Hasan Noorhaidi
Ithaca, NY: Cornell Southeast Asia 
Program, 2006. 
Indonesia’s Laskar Jihad took part in 
inter-religious fighting in the Moluccas 
and other regional conflicts in the 
brief period between 2000 and late 
2002 when it demobilized. The author 
studied the movement’s emergence 
and demise at close quarters and 
presents a unique analysis of its roots 
in the transnational Salafi movement 
and of the local political factors that 
contributed to shaping it. 
Living Islam: Muslim Religious 
Experience in Pakistan's North-West 
Frontier
By Magnus Marsden
Cambridge: University of Cambridge 
Press, 2005.
Looking beyond simplistic and often 
negative images of the place of Islam 
in Pakistan, Marsden shows that the 
life of a good Muslim in the Chitral 
region is above all a mindul life, 
enhanced by the creative force of 
poetry, dancing and critical debate. 
By encasing a thorough ethnographic 
study in larger debates, the book 
offers a powerful contribution to an 
understanding of the relation between 
religion and politics. 
5 8  I S I M  R E V I E W  1 8  /  A U T U M N  2 0 0 6
Why They Don't Hate Us: Lifting the 
Veil on the Axis of Evil
By Mark LeVine
Oneworld Publications, 2005.
LeVine argues that the idea that 
most Muslims hate the US or the 
West is a useful fabrication that 
helps fundamentalists on both sides 
to maintain political, economic or 
cultural power in their societies 
through the spread of what the 
author calls an Axis of Arrogance and 
Ignorance. By insisting on the reality of 
complexity, LeVine powerfully shows 
the fallacies of dominent rhetoric and 
conceptions about Muslim societies.
The Emergence of a New Turkey: 
Democracy and the AK Party
Edited by M. Hakan Yavuz
Salt Lake City: The University of Utah 
Press, 2006. 
An interesting set of essays that 
attempts to explain the phenomenon 
of Turkey’s Justice and Development 
Party (AKP), which has its roots in 
a series of Islamist parties but has 
restyled itself as a non-religious 
conservative liberal party, bringing 
the country closer to accession to the 
EU. Several contributors focus on the 
political economy of the party’s rise; 
others address changes in Turkish 
secularism, the AKP’s relations with 
the military, gender, foreign policy and 
the American intervention in Iraq.
Arts
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Reza Abedini, Iranian graphic designer 
and professor of graphic design and 
visual culture at Tehran University, 
emphasizes in his work the relationship 
between visual tradition and modern
form. His passion for graphic design, 
particularly Persian type and typo-
graphy, has led him into linking lit-
erature and aesthetics in search for 
a unique visual dialectic that reflects 
Persian poetic sensibilities. In his 
recent project for the International 
Fajr Theatre Festival in Tehran Abedini 
designed about 60 logos, posters, bill-
boards, stationary and advertisements 
each of which is based on a central 
logotype, a combination of a face and 
a mask. 
Reza Abedini has been granted 
the Principal Prince Claus Award  
2006. 
For more information see:  
www.princeclausfund.org. 
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Photo Commentary
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Suburban life, 
Kashgar, 
Western China, 
2000 
Traffic in 
downtown 
Kashgar, 
Western China, 
2005 
Urban Dynamics
